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11 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) document “Concept of Operations for 
the Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation System” describes a 2025 air traffic system 
that will experience significant growth [1]. To achieve this increase in capacity while 
maintaining safety, new technologies and procedures will have to be developed and tested. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Airspace Systems Project has 
conducted research in collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 
aviation industry, and academia to address many of the issues identified in that document. The 
research described in this technical paper was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center 
(LaRC) in 2011 to test procedures for the JPDO’s “super-density operations”; that is, arrival and 
departure operations at busy major airports. The goal of this area of research is to explore and 
develop technologies and procedures designed to increase runway throughput, reduce flight 
delay and fuel burn, and improve predictability of flight operations [2]. 
NASA LaRC’s research of precision control for arrival operations began in the 1970’s with 
an exploration of “constant distance” and “constant time” spacing techniques along a common 
trajectory [3], with onboard information and software used to enable the aircraft to independently 
achieve Air Traffic Control’s (ATC) operational goal. These original concepts and algorithms 
matured into a trajectory-based algorithm that accommodates complex route structures arriving 
to the airport from all directions. 
In 2006, the NASA LaRC research team joined the Interval Management (IM) working 
group, led by the FAA Surveillance Broadcast Services (SBS) Office, to develop the Flight deck 
Interval Management (FIM) concept. (Note:  “FIM” is now used to define the subset of the IM 
concept, technology, and procedures that pertain only to the flight deck or flight crew, “GIM” the 
subset pertaining to the ground. Any use of “IM-S”, or “Interval Management – Spacing” is the 
earlier nomenclature, and was replaced with FIM at the end of the experiment. In certain places 
in this document, such as questionnaires, the IM-S nomenclature is retained to maintain a 
historically accurate record.) 
The FIM concept goal is to improve the precision of the spacing interval between aircraft 
through accurate scheduling of traffic, controller automation and support tools, flight deck 
automation, and new procedures. A key contributor to this goal is the flight crew’s management 
of the aircraft’s speed to achieve the ATC-specified spacing interval behind the lead, or Target 
aircraft. Throughout this operation, the controller remains responsible for maintaining separation 
between the spacing aircraft and all other aircraft, including the Target aircraft. 
This work has been published by the FAA as the FIM Concept of Operations (ConOps) 
document [4], and subsequently as a joint FAA and EUROCONTROL document that also 
defined requirements, assessed safety and performance, and conducted analysis of expected 
flight crew tasks [5]. 
21.2 Arrival Operations to Dependent Parallel Runway Problem Statement 
Commercial aviation operations are forecast to grow 3.7% annually for the next 20 years, and 
annual revenue passenger miles to double by 2023 [6]. To offset this anticipated growth, aviation 
tools and concepts are being explored with the goal of increasing throughput and flight 
efficiency, and reducing fuel consumption. One promising area of development is arrival 
operations at major airports during high demand periods. Currently, arrivals typically have 
intermediate level-off altitudes to deconflict routes and increase the aircraft’s ability to decelerate 
for improved time control. These “step-down” type of arrival operations do assist maintaining 
high airport throughput, but imparts an additional operating cost to aircraft. 
To improve the efficiency of arrival operations, Optimized Profile Descents (OPD) have 
been developed to reduce fuel consumption and perceived ground noise by using near-idle 
descents to the runway. However, the range of optimum descent angles and speeds causes large 
variability in the flight time of these aircraft. As a consequence, in current day arrival operations, 
this variability and unpredictability makes it difficult for the Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) to maintain aircraft separation (particularly at merge points), and therefore OPDs are 
frequently not given or terminated early during periods of high demand. 
OPD procedures are further reduced when the additional separation requirements necessary 
for dependent parallel runway operations are incorporated. Arrivals to parallel dependent 
runways are particularly challenging due to different separation criteria for aircraft proceeding to 
each runway (more details in Appendix B). The FAA’s separation criteria requires 1000 feet (ft) 
vertical and 1 nautical mile (nmi) separation between aircraft proceeding to parallel runways 
during dependent operations prior to being established on final approach; additional 
requirements include the distance between runway centerlines as well as the ground facilities at 
that airport [7]. 
Figure 1 is an excerpt from this FAA Air Traffic Control regulation, and illustrates the 
separation and spacing requirements used in this experiment that are modeled after the Dallas 
Fort-Worth airport (KDFW) operations. Aircraft lateral separation (landing on different 
runways) requirements are determined by the distance between runway centerlines (KDFW 
ground equipment assumed to be not available, and the aircraft wake category has no bearing on 
the requirement). In this illustration, at least 2 nmi separation is required for aircraft #1 and 
aircraft #2 since the distance between runway centerlines is between 4300 ft and 9000 ft. 
Separation requirements for aircraft in-trail (landing on the same runway) are 1000 ft and 3 nmi 
prior to being established on final, then criteria based on wake vortex category is applied. In the 
example shown, 6 nmi is required between the heavy aircraft #1 and the small aircraft #3 based 
on their wake vortex categories.
3Figure 1.  Aircraft separation criteria during parallel dependent operations. 
1.3 Interval Management with Spacing to Parallel Dependent Runways 
Previous research has been conducted at LaRC to develop and publish a FIM concept for 
precise arrivals to single runways [8]. A 2006 study at NASA LaRC used this concept to 
investigate single runway FIM operations and reported that precise runway delivery can reduce 
ATC’s spacing buffer by 10 to 15 seconds, thereby supporting a 5% to 10% increase in runway 
throughput [9]. The same human-in-the-loop (HITL) experiment indicated that pilots found the 
FIM spacing procedures, commanded speeds, and required workload level to be acceptable [10].
The FIM concept to single runways document [8], as well as the FAA and RTCA documents 
cited previously [4][5], were used by LaRC researchers in 2010 to develop the FIM ConOps for 
precise spacing of aircraft during arrival operations to parallel dependent runways [11]. In 2011, 
a human-in-the-loop experiment at LaRC based on this concept called Interval Management with 
Spacing to Parallel Dependent Runways (IMSPiDR) used 24 air transport pilots to study FIM 
operations. The focus of the experiment was to understand the spacing algorithm performance, 
flight crew performance, and flight crew acceptability of FIM procedures during parallel 
dependent runway operations. Since there were no a priori hypotheses, objectives were defined 
to structure the experiment design and data analysis. The overall IMSPiDR experiment 
objectives were: 
 Measure the performance and behavior of the FIM software; 
 Measure the performance and behavior of flight crew during FIM operations; 
 Have the flight crew assess the FIM concept, procedures, and displays; and 
 Identify potential operational issues of the FIM concept. 
The Dallas Fort-Worth airport was selected for this experiment due to the research team’s 
familiarity with the airport and surrounding airspace, and because the distance between the 
centerlines of the landing runways is less than 9000 ft. When arriving aircraft are landing on 
runways with less than 9000 ft between centerlines, parallel dependent runway operations 
(discussed in the next sub-paragraph) may be required based on the available ground equipment 
at that airport. KDFW has the appropriate ground equipment currently installed to not require 
4dependent parallel operations; nevertheless, for this research experiment, that equipment was 
assumed to be unavailable and the additional requirements for these operations had to be met. 
Nevertheless, a visit to the KDFW Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and 
discussions with the Training Manager and Procedures Manager were instrumental in designing 
realistic operations for this experiment. Pertinent subsets of procedures discussed in that meeting, 
and from documents provided to the LaRC IMSPiDR research team, are detailed in Appendix B. 
Several conference papers have been previously published on the expanded concept of FIM 
operations to parallel dependent runways used as the basis for the IMSPiDR experiment. Those 
papers include: a description of the experiment methodology, and the findings to evaluate the 
concept, procedures, speed guidance, and pilot interface [12]; a description of the data 
communication (Data Comm) procedures and messages, pilot response time to these messages, 
and the acceptability rating given by pilots to the concept and procedures [13]; the impact 
variances in pilot actions and compliance to procedures has on FIM operations [14]; and the 
performance of the spacing algorithm performance during parallel dependent runway operations  
[15].
This NASA Technical Paper incorporates all the previously published conference papers, 
plus additional data analysis to complete the examination of the five objectives listed above. The 
Results in Section 5 are structured to align with the four experiment objectives described in 
Section 4.1, with the exception of there is no Results sub-section for the fourth objective 
(identify operational issues), and there is a Results sub-section discussing data from the one off-
nominal event scenario that each crew experienced. The Conclusions in Section 6 are presented 
in a format that directly addresses the four objectives. 
52 Concept of Operations 
2.1 Overview of FIM Operations to Parallel Dependent Runways  
The operational goal of FIM is to enable high runway throughput by precisely achieving the 
ATC derived spacing interval behind the Target aircraft when crossing the runway threshold. 
Deviation from the assigned spacing interval is termed a “spacing error” in the FIM concept, 
since it may result in loss of separation (less than the interval) or reduced throughput (greater 
than interval). 
The FIM concept relies on a ground based tool to calculate an achievable arrival schedule 
based on appropriate routes and the assigned runway. Once the runway has been assigned and a 
Scheduled Time of Arrival (STA) established, this information is made available to controllers as 
a FIM clearance for pilots of FIM equipped aircraft. The controller issues the FIM clearance to 
the flight crew, and the crew enters the clearance into the onboard spacing software, Airborne 
Spacing for Terminal Arrival Routes (ASTAR). [Note:  once the STA has been entered into the 
spacing software and the flight crew is flying the required airspeed to meet that time, the STA is 
referred to as the Required Time of Arrival (RTA).]  Operations for aircraft without FIM 
equipment remain unchanged for normal arrival procedures conducted as of the publication date 
of this technical paper. Figure 2 provides a high level overview of normal (non-FIM) and FIM 
operations to parallel dependent runways. 
Figure 2.  Aircraft conducting in-trail and parallel dependent FIM operations. 
62.2 Schedule Automation 
The FIM operation begins with a schedule of arrival times to a particular runway, for all 
arriving aircraft, arriving from any direction. The STAs at the runway thresholds are calculated 
by the ground automation to create a logical and time-deconflicted arrival sequence that allows 
aircraft to fly a feasible and efficient airspeed, and the difference between subsequent STAs must 
meet or exceed safe separation and wake vortex spacing criteria. The difference in STAs is also 
the spacing interval behind the Target aircraft used by ATC in the FIM clearance. 
Aircraft conducting FIM operations into high-density airports follow procedures similar to 
those in use today. From cruise altitude, the aircraft will either fly an OPD or step-down descent 
along a Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR), and enter terminal airspace at a metering fix 
(or corner-post). Then Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) hands off the aircraft to the 
TRACON. The difference between FIM and today’s procedure is that the schedule must 
establish a continuous four-dimensional (4D) trajectory from en route altitude to the runway 
threshold for the aircraft. This route is passed by the controller to the flight crew, who must enter 
it into the aircraft spacing software to calculate the FIM speed. If the published STAR does not 
connect to the instrument approach for that runway, either the scheduling software or the 
controller must assign waypoints to connect them, and the pilots enter those points into the 
spacing software. 
Finally, the schedule must identify FIM capable aircraft and provide information required to 
issue a FIM clearance with the appropriate information (described in the next section). For the 
IMSPiDR experiment, the spacing goal was given as a time interval behind aircraft landing on 
the same runway and as a distance for aircraft landing on the parallel runway. 
2.3 FIM Clearance 
Prior to the aircraft reaching Top Of Descent (TOD), the controller issues the spacing 
clearance to flight crews of appropriately equipped aircraft. Clearances used during the 
IMSPiDR experiment were aligned as much as possible with existing FIM guidance [5], 
proposed message formats by the FAA [16], and international standards [17][18]. Due to the 
complexity and length of an RTA+FIM clearance for parallel dependent runway operations, only 
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) was used in this experiment. 
Four additional information elements were added to the list of standard FIM data elements 
for the IMSPiDR experiment, and two data elements were not used. First, an RTA to the runway 
threshold was included to enable the flight crew to begin controlling the aircraft to the location 
desired by ATC even when outside of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 
range. The RTA function normally associated with current commercially available Flight 
Management Systems (FMS) was not used in this experiment. Instead, the RTA algorithm used 
in the IMSPiDR HITL experiment was identical to the FIM algorithm, with the dependency of 
the lead aircraft removed and replaced by an arrival time. The ASTAR10 algorithm uses the 
RTA to provide speed guidance until valid ADS-B data is available. Secondly, the CPDLC 
7message included the text WHEN ABLE to make the FIM clearance conditional; that is, the 
aircraft speed commanded is based on the assigned time at the runway threshold until the aircraft 
is within ADS-B range of a lead aircraft, at which time the commanded ASTAR speed will be 
based on the lead aircraft’s position. Third, the lead aircraft’s Final Approach Speed (FAS) was 
included based on previous research that showed significant improvement in delivery precision 
when the ASTAR spacing tool compensates for differences in those speeds. Finally, a November 
2010 IM workshop attended by the FAA, NASA, MITRE, pilots, and controllers generated 
feedback that the experiment include the flight crew notifying ATC when the spacing tool 
transitions from a speed based on the RTA, to a speed based on the spacing interval behind the 
target aircraft. The concern was that the commanded speed from the spacing tool, and therefore 
the aircraft’s position, may be different enough between absolute (RTA) and relative spacing 
(FIM) to create operational issues for the air traffic controllers. 
The left column of Table 1 lists the FIM clearance data elements defined by the ASPA-FIM 
standard (reference [5]), and the right column data used in the IMSPiDR experiment. An asterisk 
(*) indicates those elements that are unique to one aircraft (consequently need two of them for a 
FIM clearance for dependent runway operations behind two aircraft). The “FIM tolerance” and 
“Intercept point” data specified in the ASPA FIM standard were not included in the IMSPiDR 
experiment since neither had not been implemented in the software at that time. 
Table 1.  Data Elements in a FIM Clearance 
 ASPA FIM  [standard] IMSPiDR [this experiment]
(CPDLC uplink)
 - RTA time 
 - RTA location 
 - Conditional phrase 
 Target aircraft ID Target aircraft ID (*)
 Spacing goal Spacing goal (*)
 FIM clearance type FIM clearance type (*)
 Achieve-by-point Achieve-by-point
 Termination point Termination point 
 Target aircraft route Target aircraft route (*)
 - Target aircraft FAS (*)
 FIM tolerance - 
 Intercept point - 
(CPDLC downlink)
 ACCEPT or REJECT ACCEPT or REJECT 
 - IM SPACING NASA2  (*)
(*) indicates data elements that must be included for each Target aircraft
Shown below is an example of a CPDLC message containing all the data elements for a 
RTA+FIM clearance. The first target aircraft, NASA1, is on the CEDAR CREEK SIX arrival to 
the Instrument Landing System (ILS) on runway 17C, and the second target aircraft is on the 
8GLEN ROSE NINE arrival to the ILS on runway 18R. Figure 5 through Figure 8 in section 2.5 
use this example to illustrate various cockpit displays. 
CROSS R-17C AT 0028:26Z. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-SPACING 95 SEC 
WITH NASA1 AND 2.2 NM WITH NASA2. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE 
AT R-17C. NASA1 ROUTE GGG CQY6 PENNY ILS17C, FAS 130 KT. 
NASA2 ROUTE INK JEN9 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 130 KT. REPORT 
COMMENCING IM-SPACING. 
RTA operations are not part of the core FIM concept; however, they were included in this 
experiment to allow flight crew to conduct operations when outside of ADS-B range of the 
Target aircraft, and to understand the difference in performance of absolute time and relative 
spacing. The corresponding RTA only clearance is: 
CROSS R-17C AT 0028:26Z. 
2.4 Aircraft FIM System Overview 
2.4.1 Spacing Software Overview 
NASA LaRC has developed the trajectory-based ASTAR algorithm for more than a decade 
[19]. This spacing algorithm uses enhanced arrival and approach route information to generate 
the spacing speed command, and is also a relative spacing concept. That is, the algorithm spaces 
to the relative difference between the Target (lead) aircraft’s estimated time of arrival and the 
ownship's estimated time of arrival. This relative spacing technique, versus an absolute time of 
arrival, allows for the potential to reduce the buffer needed between aircraft since only the FIM 
aircraft's relative spacing error needs to be considered. Additionally, because the ASTAR 
algorithm is trajectory-based, it also has the inherent ability to support RTA operations. 
Fundamental operations and capabilities of the ASTAR algorithm are: 
 The ability to achieve an RTA to the runway threshold (RTA only mode). 
 The ability to achieve an ATC-directed time interval or spacing distance behind a 
Target aircraft (FIM only mode). 
 The ability to begin the operation with an RTA and then transition to FIM once valid 
ADS-B information becomes available from a traffic aircraft (RTA+FIM mode). 
 The use of forecast wind and real-time wind data in the 4D trajectory calculation. 
 The maximum speed variation is limited to 10% of the published speed for the 
segment currently being flown to provide operational predictability and arrival string 
stability.
 The filtering of the spacing error to reduce the number of commanded speed changes. 
 The transition to FAS from FIM when the FIM aircraft crosses the FAF. 
 The use of the Target FAS (if issued by ATC in the FIM clearance) and FAS of the 
FIM aircraft to establish an offset at the Final Approach Fix (FAF) to compensate for 
the compression or expansion that occurs after the FAF due to differences in FAS. 
9For parallel dependent runway operations, an ASTAR10 version was created with additional 
functionality to meet new requirements [20]. They include: 
 The ability to calculate a trajectory and spacing errors for a second traffic aircraft, 
with this aircraft landing on a parallel runway. 
 The ability to compensate for offset runway thresholds. 
 The ability to meet unique lateral spacing requirements for parallel dependent 
approaches (occurs after both aircraft were on their respective final approach course).
ASTAR10 can generate three spacing error calculations at any given time: the error for RTA, 
the error for the first traffic aircraft, and the error for the second traffic aircraft. The RTA error is 
used to calculate the ASTAR10 speed command prior to any FIM operation. That is, ASTAR10 
will operate in its RTA mode until ADS-B and valid trajectory data become available for a traffic 
aircraft. Once ADS-B and valid trajectory data become available for a traffic aircraft, ASTAR10 
enters FIM mode and will not revert to an RTA. If both traffic aircraft data are valid, ASTAR10 
calculates its speed command based on the “controlling” aircraft data. This controlling aircraft is 
the one that requires the FIM aircraft to be the farthest back, thereby ensuring that both spacing 
intervals are either met or exceeded. 
The ASTAR10 algorithm generates two speeds: instantaneous FIM End Commanded Speed, 
and the FIM Commanded Speed. The FIM Commanded End Speed is the airspeed at the 
completion of a speed change, is the speed set in the Mode Control Panel (MCP) by the crew, 
and is displayed in the upper left of the Primary Flight Display (PFD) in Figure 3. The FIM 
Commanded Speed is the instantaneous speed estimated by ASTAR10 to account for 
deceleration, and is shown as a green speed bug just to the right of the speed tape in Figure 3. 
2.4.2 Aircraft FIM Displays 
Three different simulators (details in Section 3) were used to explore different levels of 
aircraft equipage, which in turn drove the use of different FIM displays and flight crew 
procedures. Additional details of the differences between the simulators are given in Appendix 
C.
Once the flight crew activated the FIM clearance, RTA speed guidance is shown on the PFD. 
During the RTA-only scenarios, pilots flew the RTA speeds to the runway. During the 
RTA+FIM scenarios, aircraft transitioned from RTA (absolute time) to FIM (precise interval) 
once valid ADS-B data from the Target aircraft was received. When this transition occurred, the 
flight crew was required to notify ATC. Since the aircraft in this experiment were arriving to 
dependent parallel runways, pilots were cleared to space behind two Target aircraft. The spacing 
algorithm uses the aircraft that was furthest back as the controlling aircraft to determine the 
commanded speeds. The flight crew is not required to know which Target aircraft the displayed 
FIM speeds are based on; however, the crew may ascertain which Target aircraft the FIM speeds 
are based on by selecting the FIM page on the Multi-function Control and Display Unit 
(MCDU), or from the Navigation Display (ND) symbology. The ND displays both Target 
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aircraft with a matching outer icon (in this case a diamond) and the aircraft’s callsign, with the 
controlling Target outer icon and callsign in green (NAS163 in Figure 3). 
Figure 3.  Cockpit displays of FIM speeds and target aircraft. 
2.5 CPDLC Procedures for FIM Operations 
A description of general flight crew procedures for FIM operations is provided in Appendix 
G. This section pertains to the subset of flight crew procedures for CPDLC. For the IMSPiDR 
experiment, no machine-to-machine transmission delays between ATC and the flight crew were 
modeled.
A high-level flow chart of the procedures used by the flight crew to receive, interact, and 
respond to FIM clearances using CPDLC and spacing tool equipment is shown in Figure 4 
below. After receiving the FIM clearance via a CPDLC message, the flight crew auto-loaded the 
message into the ASTAR10 spacing tool. Next the crew activated the tool, reviewed the speed 
calculated by the tool, then determined whether that speed was operationally acceptable or not.  
The next step in the crew procedure was to notify ATC of that decision using CPDLC by 
sending either an ACCEPT or REJECT downlink message. If the speed was acceptable, the crew 
was instructed to send an ACCEPT downlink message and then depress the EXECUTE button 
on the MCDU, causing FIM information to appear on the PFD and ND. If the clearance was not 
acceptable, the crew was to send a REJECT downlink message and continue to follow the 
previous clearance. 
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The blue and red brackets in Figure 4 indicate the CPDLC ‘Read’ and ‘Respond’ times 
correspond to the two paragraphs above, and are discussed later in Section 5.2.3 and shown by 
the same blue and red lines in Figure 34. 
Figure 4.  Procedural flow chart for FIM operations. 
A more detailed description of flight crew FIM procedures in Figure 4 is given below for the 
single pilot simulators, with minor differences to procedures used in the two pilot simulators 
(differences and details discussed in Section 3). 
FLIGHT CREW NOTIFICATION: 
The flight crew received notification of a CPDLC uplink message from ATC as a single 
chime, and a message on the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) as either a 
“Large ATC Uplink” or “ATC Message”. 
REVIEW FIM CPDLC MESSAGE: 
The pilot monitoring (PM) pressed the appropriate button to read the uplink message, 
reviewed the message, and then briefed the pilot flying (PF). The CPDLC message containing 
the FIM clearance from the previous section of this paper is shown in Figure 5 (single-pilot 
simulator) and Figure 6 (two-pilot simulator). 
LOAD FIM: 
To auto-load the CPDLC message into ASTAR10, the flight crew pressed the LOAD IM-S 
button on the EICAS (single-pilot simulator) or LOAD on left side of MCDU (two-pilot 
simulator). Once the FIM clearance had been loaded into ASTAR10, the LOAD IM-S or LOAD 
functionality was removed from the EICAS or MCDU. 
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Figure 5.  CPDLC FIM clearance on an EICAS page (single-pilot simulator). 
Figure 6.  CPDLC FIM clearance on MCDU pages (two-pilot simulator). 
ACTIVATE: 
The third step was to press the ACTIVATE button on the MCDU to have ASTAR10 initiate 
calculation of the speed required to achieve either the RTA or RTA+FIM clearance (all 
simulators). The ACTIVATE display was removed from the MCDU after the button press, and 
the EXECUTE light was illuminated. The spacing tool required 15 to 20 seconds to determine 
the speed required to achieve the ATC assigned RTA or RTA+FIM clearance. This speed was 
displayed only on the first of the three MCDU pages of the spacing tool, in the second from the 
top in the left column (circled in Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  FIM Commanded End Speed shown on MCDU. 
SEND CPDLC RESPONSE:
The crew then determined whether the ASTAR10 commanded speed was operationally 
acceptable, and then sent an ACCEPT or REJECT CPDLC downlink message from either the 
EICAS (single-pilot simulator) or MCDU (two-pilot simulator) (Figure 8). 
Figure 8.  CPDLC ACCEPT downlink message on EICAS (left) and MCDU (right). 
EXECUTE:
The fifth and final step was for the flight crew to depress the execute button on the MCDU 
(green bar at lower right of Figure 7).  Prior to this button push, the ASTAR10 spacing software 
only displayed information on the MCDU. After depressing the EXECUTE button, the spacing 
software commanded speed was shown in green text in the top-left of the PFD, with the green 
speed bug available as a second indicator. The spacing mode (RTA, IM) was also shown, just to 
the right of this speed. The ND displayed all ADS-B equipped aircraft as a chevron (single-pilot 
simulator) or diamond (two-pilot simulators). If the Target aircraft was within ADS-B reception 
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range (i.e., ASTAR10 in FIM mode), that aircraft icon had a second chevron or diamond drawn 
around it. Figure 9 shows the spacing algorithm has calculated a speed of 300 knots to achieve 
the assigned spacing behind BTA291 (left side of ND) and DAL421 (right side of ND). 
Figure 9.  PFD and ND with FIM information (single-pilot simulator). 
FIM MODE TRANSITION:
Not shown in Figure 4 is the flight crew procedure to notify ATC when the spacing tool 
transitions from fixed-time spacing (RTA) to relative spacing (FIM). If neither aircraft was 
within ADS-B range of the FIM aircraft when the ASTAR10 algorithm was initiated, the speed 
calculated by ASTAR10 was to achieve the assigned RTA. Once within ADS-B range of either 
Target aircraft, the algorithm switched automatically to FIM based calculations and updated both 
the PFD and EICAS displays.
Regardless of whether the spacing algorithm initiated in FIM mode or switched to it later in 
the flight, the crews were instructed to notify ATC when the transition occurred (via CPDLC in 
the single-pilot simulator, voice in the two-pilot simulators). An example would be: 
 NASA4 SPACING WITH NASA2 
The FIM clearance could be terminated at any time by the flight crew or ATC (some of the 
scenarios did have ATC amend the spacing interval). Within the ASTAR10 spacing tool was 
logic that terminated the algorithm and gave warnings on the PFD and EICAS, such as when an 
aircraft was more than 6000 ft off the vertical path of the trajectory, greater than 2.5 nmi from 
trajectory centerline, or greater than 90 degrees from trajectory heading. If the FIM operation 
was terminated by the onboard spacing tool or by the crew for operational reasons, the flight 
crew was instructed to contact ATC and continue flying the previous commanded speed until 
receiving further instruction. 
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3 Facilities and Software 
Three different simulators were used to explore a range of aircraft equipage and flight crew 
procedures appropriate for each: the Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL), the 
Development and Test Simulator (DTS), and the Integration Flight Deck (IFD). The ATOL was 
configured to emulate an integrated, fully NextGen capable aircraft; the DTS a near-term, 
partially capable NextGen aircraft; and the IFD as a current day, retrofit equipped aircraft. 
3.1 Air Traffic Operations Laboratory 
The ATOL was a medium-fidelity simulator, comprised of the Airspace and Traffic 
Operations Simulation (ATOS) platform, ATC controller stations operating Multi Aircraft 
Control System (MACS) software developed and provided by NASA Ames, and a network of 
hundreds of real-time, medium-fidelity aircraft simulators that can be used for batch Monte Carlo 
studies as well as real-time HITL experiments [21]. The ASTOR simulators were equipped with 
cockpit displays similar to current commercial aircraft, and employed pilot interfaces to be 
operated by a single pilot (Figure 10). These ASTOR stations also had a “Pilot Model” function 
that, when selected, controlled the simulator using software logic. ASTOR components include: 
six degrees of freedom dynamics model, PFD, Multi-Function Display (MFD), autopilot and 
auto-throttle systems, Flight Management Computer (FMC), Multi-function Control Display 
Unit (MCDU), MCP, voice communication, CPDLC, ADS-B, and ASTAR10. 
ASTOR stations were flown by the pilots using the auto-pilot fully coupled, the auto-throttles 
engaged, the MCP speed window closed, and the aircraft in Vertical Navigation (VNAV) Path 
mode. The ASTAR10 algorithm was integrated into the FMS, and the FIM speed overrode the 
FMS speed. 
Figure 10.  Aircraft Simulation for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) station. 
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3.2 Development and Test Simulator 
The Development and Test Simulator (DTS) was a full-scale simulator representative of a 
current, large generic commercial transport category aircraft and was driven by a high fidelity 
aircraft dynamics model. The DTS has a 210° horizontal by 45° vertical out the window field of 
view and is equipped with eight D-Sized LCD displays, sidestick controls, rudder pedals, two 
color Control Display Units (CDU), and additional interface devices derived from a variety of 
other transport aircraft (shown in Figure 11 without flight crew to allow unobstructed view of the 
flight instruments). The visual scene used for this experiment was the KDFW terminal 
environment in a daytime setting. 
The DTS was flown by the flight crew using fully coupled auto-pilot and auto-throttle, with 
the MCP speed window closed, and the aircraft in VNAV Path mode. The ASTAR10 algorithm 
was integrated into the FMS, and the FIM speed overrode the FMS speed. 
Figure 11.  Development and Test Simulator (DTS). 
3.3  Integration Flight Deck 
The Integration Flight Deck (IFD) was a full-scale simulator of a current generation 
commercial transport category aircraft and was driven by a high fidelity dynamics model (Figure 
12). The cockpit includes standard ship’s instruments representative of an operational aircraft, 
and the cockpit’s visual system is a panorama system that provides 200° horizontal by 40° 
vertical field-of-view (shown in Figure 12 without flight crew to allow unobstructed view of the 
flight instruments). The visual scene used for this experiment was the KDFW terminal 
environment in a daytime setting. 
The IFD was flown by the flight crew using fully coupled auto-pilot and auto-throttle, the 
MCP speed window was open, and the aircraft in VNAV Speed mode. The ASTAR10 algorithm 
was not integrated into the FMS. 
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Figure 12.  Integration Flight Deck (IFD) simulator. 
3.4 ASTAR10 Spacing Algorithm 
3.4.1 Overview 
This section provides a simple overview of the basic, trajectory-based concept for ASTAR10, 
with special emphasis on the additions and modifications made to ASTAR10 to support 
operations to parallel dependent runways [20]. If the 4D trajectory of an aircraft and its current 
position is known, then the aircraft's position on that trajectory can be determined. By knowing 
the aircraft’s position on a trajectory, the aircraft’s estimated time-to-go (TTG) to a point can be 
calculated (the runway threshold was used during IMSPiDR). To apply this to a self-spacing 
concept, a TTG is calculated for the Target aircraft (TA) and for the ownship, noting that the 
trajectories do not need to be the same. The nominal spacing time, tnominal, and the spacing time 
error, terror, can then be calculated as: 
tnominal = TTGTA  +  planned spacing interval 
terror = TTGownship  –  tnominal 
In the FIM concept, ATC retains responsibility for safe separation of aircraft; therefore ATC 
determines the Target aircraft and the spacing interval behind it. 
The capability described in Section 2 of this document can also be implemented in a manner 
similar to the traffic spacing technique, and can be calculated as: 
tnominal = RTA – current time 
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From this time, a speed error value can be calculated. A conceptual example for the 
determination of error for traffic spacing is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13.  ASTAR10 time error example. 
3.4.2 Trajectory Generation 
In ASTAR10, the ownship trajectory definition begins with a path definition, for example, a 
STAR with a continuous connection to an instrument approach procedure, along with relevant 
speed and altitude constraints. The same data is required to calculate the Traffic aircraft’s 
trajectory, and this information is obtained via CPDLC as part of the FIM clearance. An internal 
trajectory generator within ASTAR10 then computes a full 4D trajectory defined by a series of 
Trajectory Change Points [19]. 
In conjunction with the basic calculations, ASTAR10 preprocessed the trajectory input data 
depending on the situation, and three parameters of the generic trajectory were modified by 
ASTAR10. They were: 
 FAS: For the FIM aircraft, this information was obtained from the FMS. For the 
Target aircraft, this information is part of the CPDLC FIM clearance. 
 Initial cruise altitude and Mach. For the FIM aircraft, this information is obtained 
from the FMS. For the Target aircraft, this information was conveyed through a 
scenario artifact. The real-world implementation has not yet been determined. 
 TOD point:  ASTAR10 monitored aircraft state data to establish the TOD point. If 
either FIM or Target aircraft began its descent from cruise before the point that 
ASTAR10 predicted, ASTAR10 recalculated a new 4D trajectory based on the actual 
TOD. A similar technique was used for a late descent except that ASTAR10 
continues to recalculate the 4D trajectory until the actual TOD occurs. 
It was assumed in the design of ASTAR10 that a highly developed wind forecast model 
would be used to provide vertical profile wind data at the waypoint locations. Of special 
importance to ASTAR10 is the wind estimation at the altitude that the trajectory crosses the 
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waypoint's position. It was also assumed that the externally provided waypoint wind data is 
reasonably accurate and bounds the expected waypoint trajectory crossing altitude. ASTAR10 
then provides local modifications to the forecast wind data provided to its trajectory generator.  
3.4.3 Calculation of the Spacing Interval 
Several relative spacing interval calculations are performed by ASTAR10, depending on the 
situation. The two primary intervals used in this experiment are the basic interval and the 
diagonal distance interval, with the latter being used for the parallel dependent operations. 
3.4.3.1 Common Runway Traffic 
The basic time spacing interval is the interval that ATC would assign the spacing aircraft to 
obtain a precise interval behind the assigned Target aircraft at the runway threshold. The basic 
spacing interval for ASTAR10 is a time-reference interval against a traffic aircraft that is landing 
on the same runway as the ownship. The operational goal in this situation is for the ownship to 
cross the runway threshold at the assigned interval after the traffic aircraft crossed the same 
threshold. For this basic time interval case, there is no additional calculation required for the 
spacing interval; it is simply the time assigned by ATC. 
3.4.3.2 Parallel Runway Traffic
In many airport environments, calculation of the diagonal distance interval requires some 
compensation for offset runway thresholds between the parallel runways. To accommodate 
parallel dependent approach spacing where the runway thresholds are not aligned, ASTAR10 
internally calculates the approach time difference due to this offset and adjusts the spacing 
interval to account for this difference. In Figure 14, the runway threshold for the traffic aircraft is 
beyond the threshold of the ownship. Since the inbound approach course is known, the distance d
can then be calculated using right-triangle geometry. From d, which is the distance-to-go value 
for the traffic aircraft (TA) when it is abeam with the ownship’s runway threshold, the time-to-go 
at that point for the traffic aircraft can be determined. Defining this time as thresholdoffset, the 
adjusted spacing time interval is then calculated as: 
adjusted spacing time interval = planned spacing interval - thresholdoffset.
Figure 14.  Example of non-aligned runway thresholds. 
Ownship’s approach path
d
TA’s approach path
Runway threshold
Runway threshold
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A similar calculation can be made for the case where the runway threshold for the ownship is 
beyond the threshold of the traffic aircraft. In this case, the adjusted spacing time interval is 
calculated as: 
adjusted spacing time interval = planned spacing interval + thresholdoffset.
To support parallel dependent approaches, ATC uses a spacing interval based on the diagonal 
distance between successive aircraft on adjacent approaches (Figure 15). Given that the diagonal 
distance interval and the distance between the runway centerlines are known, the effective in-
trail distance that provides the diagonal distance interval can be calculated using right-triangle 
geometry. From this effective in-trail distance, the adjusted time spacing interval can be 
calculated by determining the ownship’s trajectory state at the effective in-trail distance from the 
threshold. The spacing time goal is then the time-to-go to the threshold at this distance. That is, 
the relevant spacing time is the time-to-go on the ownship’s trajectory at a distance-to-go equal 
to the effective in-trail distance calculated. 
Figure 15.  Diagonal distance interval during parallel dependent operations. 
3.4.4 Selection of the Spacing Target 
ASTAR10 can simultaneously calculate the time error relative to all of the operational 
targets, i.e., an RTA, spacing against a traffic aircraft going to a common runway, and spacing 
against a traffic aircraft going to a parallel runway. In a typical arrival operation, both of the 
traffic aircraft may be initially outside of ADS-B range. In this situation, ASTAR10 calculates 
the speed command against the RTA time error. Once ADS-B data from either of the traffic 
aircraft is received and a trajectory is calculated for that aircraft, spacing against the RTA is 
inhibited and pair-wise spacing, i.e., spacing against a traffic aircraft, is initiated. The algorithm 
does not revert into an RTA mode if the traffic aircraft data are subsequently lost or become 
invalid.
If the algorithm has valid data for both traffic aircraft, then data from the Target aircraft that 
has the largest nominal spacing time is used to compute the speed command, where for each 
Target aircraft: 
tnominal = TTGTA + adjusted spacing time interval. 
Using this technique, there are no step changes in the nominal TTG value being used by the 
speed control law when the selection switches between the traffic aircraft. 

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3.4.5 Maximum Spacing Interval 
While the Interval Management concept allows for any spacing interval, the maximum speed 
deviation ASTAR10 can command is ±10% of the profile speed. Limiting the deviation from the 
profile speed prevents the algorithm from commanding speeds that are unacceptably low or high 
for the FIM pilot, produces more predictable behavior for the pilots of the ownship and air traffic 
controllers who are monitoring the spacing operation, and results in increased string stability 
when a numbers of aircraft spacing are behind each other. An estimate of the amount of time 
delay or gain the spacing algorithm can achieve for a generic arrival is shown in Figure 16. The 
time an aircraft can delay (red line) is greater than the time it can gain (blue line) due to the 
procedural requirements (250 knots or less below 10,000 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL)), and the 
impact of groundspeed (slowing 10 knots over a certain distance causes a larger change in time 
than accelerating 10 knots over the same distance). 
Figure 16.  Time error correctable by ASTAR10 versus Distance To Go. 
3.4.6 Speed Change Minimization and Lag Compensation 
One design goal for ASTAR10 was to minimize pilot workload by minimizing the number of 
speed command changes presented to the pilot. Several capabilities are provided within the 
algorithm that attempt to balance the number of speed changes against the spacing performance.  
3.4.6.1 Spacing Error Filtering 
One method used to reduce the number of speed changes is the application of a filter on the 
spacing error value in the speed control law. By applying a filter, small variations due to system 
noise or small spacing error perturbations would not be propagated into a change into the speed 
command. In implementing this filter, when the aircraft is far from the runway threshold, fairly 
large spacing errors are allowed without inducing a speed correction. One performance issue 
with using this technique is that by not correcting large spacing errors when far from the runway, 
the algorithm may not be able to recover from what may have been a recoverable error. In the 
current IM concept, this must be mitigated by air traffic control, and flight crew procedures have 
22
been developed to temporarily suspend the FIM operation and resume once within the range of 
correctable error (see section 3.4.5). 
3.4.6.2 End Speed Estimation 
In this implementation of ASTAR10, the pilot is expected to implement the algorithm's speed 
command by matching the aircraft's autothrust command to the ASTAR10 speed command. 
During a programmed deceleration segment (for example, the change from 210 to 170 knots 
shown in Figure 17), the ASTAR10 speed command changes smoothly from 210 to 170 knots 
and is shown as a solid line. To reduce workload so that the pilot does not need to continuously
monitor the speed command and continuously change the input to the autothrust system, a 
secondary speed command is output by ASTAR10 for display to the pilot. This secondary speed 
command, termed the FIM Commanded End Speed, is an estimate of the speed command at the 
end of the speed change. In this example, the FIM Commanded End Speed would change from 
210 to 170 knots as soon as the aircraft reaches the start of the deceleration segment, and is 
shown as the dashed line. 
Figure 17.  Speed change with no spacing correction. 
3.4.6.3 Speed Command Quantization 
Another method for reducing the number of ASTAR10 speed changes was quantization of 
the FIM Command End Speed. By applying a quantization to the speed command prior to its 
output, the end speed command changes would only occur in discrete intervals, thus reducing the 
number of commanded speed changes. Hysteresis was included in the quantization logic to 
reduce dithering of the end speed command when the command speed is near the breakpoint for 
the quantization value. 
For example, if the speed command was to change from 210 to 172 knots and using a 5 knot 
quantization value, then the following would occur: 
• Immediately prior to the speed change, the output values for both the FIM Commanded 
Speed command and the FIM Commanded End Speed would be 210 knots. 
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 • At the start of the speed change, the output value for the FIM Commanded Speed would 
slowly begin to decrease (209, 208, 207, etc.), while the output for the FIM Commanded 
End Speed jumps to 170 knots (due to the 5 knot quantization, or “chunking”). 
 • At the end of the speed change, the output values for both the speeds would be 170 knots. 
3.4.6.4 Nominal Deceleration Roll-In Logic 
During development of ASTAR10, it was determined that the lag in response to a speed 
command change by the simulated aircraft was problematic and contributed to undesirable 
spacing performance. To reduce this problem at the start of a planned deceleration segment in the 
nominal profile (where this lag was most apparent), a predictive, nominal speed roll-in logic was 
added to the speed command. Examples of a deceleration in the nominal profile without and with 
this roll-in logic are shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19. 
Figure 18.  Speed change without roll-in logic. 
Figure 19.  Speed change with roll-in logic. 


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3.5 Traffic Generators 
The ASTOR platform with Pilot Model was used to model traffic arriving to KDFW and 
Dallas Love (KDAL) airports, except for the six aircraft flown by the subject pilots. MACS was 
used to generate aircraft departing the KDFW airport. All aircraft were visible in the out-the-
window view of the IFD and DTS, and visible on any other aircraft’s ND as an ADS-B target. 
All voice communication by controllers or pilots was heard by anyone on that frequency, 
regardless of simulator type. 
All aircraft transmitted ADS-B data in compliance with DO-260B standards [23]. No 
position inaccuracies were modeled, and the maximum reception range of ADS-B data was 
limited to within 120 nmi. 
3.6 Connectivity of Simulators 
A gateway between the ATOL, DTS, and IFD allowed for the transmission of aircraft state 
data, Data Comm messages, and audio transmissions. In addition to the ASTOR machines in the 
ATOL, there were also four confederate ATC controller stations, voice servers and recorders 
(one for each frequency of that scenario), and a server for the electronic questionnaires. ATOL 
pilots completed the questionnaire on their ASTOR station computer, and the IFD and DTS 
pilots utilized a small table outside the simulator that contained tablet computers connected to the 
server in the ATOL. 
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4 Experiment Methodology and Design 
4.1 Objectives 
The four objectives of the IMSPiDR experiment were: 
 Measure the performance and behavior of the FIM software; 
 Measure the performance and behavior of flight crew during FIM operations; 
 Have the flight crew assess the FIM concept, procedures, and displays; and 
 Identify potential operational issues of the FIM concept. 
Scenarios and parameters were selected to expose the FIM spacing algorithm to significant 
operational error, and explore the limit of flight crew procedure acceptability when using less 
than optimum equipment and displays. For example, arrival routes were modified to remove all 
level segments to emulate OPDs, CPDLC messages were intentionally long and complex, sub-
optimized CPDLC crew interfaces were used, the forecast wind error was 150% of that model’s 
expected error value, a strong wind shear existed where the routes converged onto final 
approach, and CPDLC messages and ATC traffic call-outs were timed to occur simultaneously 
with other crew tasks. This experiment was not intended to explore possible increases in 
operational efficiencies unique to a particular airfield; however, that work is planned for future 
research work. 
4.2 Assumptions  
The following assumptions were made during the IMSPiDR experiment: 
 FIM did not constrain or exceed the maximum arrival rate for a runway; rather it 
supported whatever arrival rate ATC set in the ground scheduling tool. 
 Routes were defined from the enroute structure to the runway threshold (a continuous 
path from the arrival to the approach), with a speed assigned for each segment. 
 Routes for ownship and the traffic to follow were accessible to the ground tool and 
aircraft, for both ownship and the Target aircraft. 
 The ground scheduling tool generated a logical and achievable arrival sequence, with 
spacing between aircraft pairs that met all constraints (runway occupancy, wake vortex 
limits, separation criteria, etc.). Periodic updates were provided during cruise flight, but 
not after the freeze horizon (typically just prior to TOD). 
 The RTA from the ground schedule to the flight crew was to the runway threshold. This 
RTA was superseded by ADS-B In data from the Target aircraft once it was received, and 
the ASTAR10 algorithm was able to calculate the speed to achieve the assigned spacing 
interval behind that aircraft. 
 The corrected FAS of both Target aircraft was available, and sent to the FIM aircraft as 
part of the FIM clearance sent via CPDLC. 
 All aircraft were equipped with ADS-B Out, and were compliant with DO-260B.
 Communication between flight crew and controllers occurred primarily via CPDLC 
datalink; however, voice was used for time critical, safety of flight, and complex or off-
nominal types of communication. 
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 Flight crews were expected to respond within 60 seconds to a CPDLC message. 
 The same forecast wind fields were used for both the ground scheduler and aircraft 
avionics. The aircraft dynamics model used the truth wind field. 
4.3 Test Matrix 
The IMSPiDR experiment utilized a split-plot design as shown in Table 2. Each ASTOR 
pilot, DTS crew, and IFD crew was designated as a whole plot, and Simulator Type served as the 
whole-plot factor, since each pilot or crew was assigned to fly one of the three types of 
simulators previously described. To meet time constraints, the two scenarios with No Error were 
flown only once, and the remaining four scenarios twice. Therefore, each pilot or crew flew 10 
nominal scenarios, with each whole plot “split” into 10 sub-plots, or treatment conditions. As 
described below in the Scenario Design section, each flight scenario (i.e., treatment condition) 
was designed according to a combination of two independent variables (e.g., Control Method and 
Error Source). Therefore, Control Method and Error Source served as the experiment’s sub-plot
factors.
Table 2.  Experiment Test Matrix for Nominal Scenarios 
CONTROL METHOD 
E
R
R
O
R
 
 S
O
U
R
C
E
RTA RTA+FIM 
None Scenario A (1 replicate) Scenario B (1 replicate) 
Wind Scenario C & G (2 replicates) Scenario D & H (2 replicates) 
Offset Scenario J & L (2 replicates) Scenario K & M (2 replicates) 
An exploratory eleventh scenario (Scenario I) was flown after the 10-scenario test matrix was 
complete; however, only subjective data (post-run questionnaire) were analyzed. 
4.4 Independent Variables 
4.4.1 Control Method 
The first independent variable was the ASTAR10 algorithm’s “Control Method”, and the 
options were RTA (absolute time to the runway threshold) or RTA+FIM (start with absolute 
time to the runway, then transition to relative spacing behind the Target aircraft). Although RTA-
only operations are not part of the FIM Concept, they were included to allow operations outside 
of ADS-B reception range, and for comparison of control to an absolute time (RTA) or relative 
time behind another aircraft (FIM). Additionally, the RTA functionality provided by ASTAR10 
is significantly more precise than typical RTA performance available in current day aircraft. 
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4.4.2 Error Source 
The second independent variable was “Error Source,” with values of No Error, Wind Error, 
and Offset Error. Two wind fields were defined that were uniform and did not vary over time, 
but did vary direction and speed as a function of altitude. The forecast (or predicted) wind field 
was used for every scenario for creating the schedule, data link to the flight crew, and 
calculations by ASTAR10. It was also the wind field that the aircraft model experienced during 
the No Error and Offset Error conditions. The actual wind field was used during the Wind Error 
condition, but only by the aircraft model. The logic used to create the truth wind file is outlined 
in the next paragraph. 
4.4.2.1 Forecast Wind Error 
The Wind Error condition was intended to emulate the difference between the forecast and 
actual wind. This error was created in two steps. First, 150% of the error expected of a Rapid 
Update Cycle (RUC-13) three hour forecast (Figure 20, the difference between the solid blue and 
dotted orange lines) was added to an observed wind during KDFW south flow operations. 
Second, an observed wind shear, strategically set at the merge altitude of 5000 ft MSL, was also 
added. (Note:  1 m/s = 1.94 kt.) 
Figure 20.  Expected errors of various RUC wind forecasts. 
The summation of these two errors, added to the base wind, resulted in the wind field shown 
in Figure 21. This figure has lines connecting the circles to represent the forecast wind direction 
and speed, and the lines connecting the squares represent the actual wind direction and speed. 
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Figure 21.  Predicted, actual, and FMS winds used in IMSPiDR. 
Table 3.  Predicted, Actual, and FMS Wind Values 
 Predicted Actual FMS 
Altitude Direction 
(degrees) 
Speed
(knots) 
Direction
(degrees) 
Speed
(knots) 
Direction
(degrees) 
Speed
(knots) 
Surface 147.0 8.0 157.0 12.0 147.0 8.0 
5k 151.0 20.0 74.0 25.0 151.0 20.0 
10k 158.8  13.0 168.8 25.0 158.8 13.0 
15k 161.2 19.0 171.2 31.0   
20k 163.0 28.0 173.0 41.0   
25k 164.6 41.8 174.6 56.0   
30k 165.1 55.5 175.1 70.0   
35k 167.1 69.3 177.1 84.0   
40k 168.5 83.0 178.5 97.0 168.5 83.0 
NOTE 1:  The Predicted wind values were used during all scenarios to calculate the schedule, 
and was the wind used by the ASTAR10 spacing algorithm to calculate time. 
NOTE 2:  The Actual wind values were used during the Wind Error condition, and were 
what the aircraft model and simulation platform experienced. 
NOTE 3:  The FMS wind values were entered into the FMS prior to every scenario, 
regardless of control method or error condition. 
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4.4.2.2 Offset Error 
The Offset Error scenarios replicated an operational environment with a single 30 second 
perturbation (a 30 second delay applied to the schedule). All aircraft in all the Offset Error 
conditions begin with no schedule error, and experienced no error between the forecast and 
actual wind fields. To emulate the pulsed error, in the Offset Error RTA scenarios, a second 
CPDLC message was issued approximately 9 minutes into the scenario that delayed each 
aircraft’s landing time by 30 seconds. For the Offset Error RTA+FIM scenarios, a second 
CPDLC message containing a new FIM clearance was sent to only one aircraft (the one 
immediately preceding the first subject piloted aircraft).  
4.5 Dependent Measures  
Dependent measures included a range of data collected to characterize system and human 
performance, and sequentially link directly to the first 3 objectives in Section 4.1. 
4.5.1 Quantitative Algorithm Performance Measures 
Quantitative data was collected to characterize ASTAR10 algorithm performance during FIM 
operations for parallel dependent runways into KDFW. These measures included the deviation 
from the RTA or the assigned spacing interval (also called arrival error) at the runway and 
throughout the arrival, the number and location of speed changes, and the timing of speed 
changes. This information was also used in additional analyses to describe ASTAR10 behavior 
and assess algorithm performance by runway and by position in the arrival stream. 
4.5.2 Quantitative Pilot Performance Measures 
The quantitative measures of flight crew performance of primary interest were pilot reaction 
time to the FIM speed change and pilot conformance to the FIM speed. Of secondary interest 
was the time required to “Read” and “Respond” to CPDLC messages. Of tertiary importance was 
gear and flap deployment by the pilot, which was used to analyze examples of not achieving the 
FIM speed or improperly conducting FIM operations. 
4.5.3 Qualitative Pilot Assessments 
Pilot ratings regarding the acceptability and workload of the FIM concept and procedures, as 
well as the spacing algorithm’s speed guidance and pilot interface, were collected through a post-
run questionnaire (Appendix D), a post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix E), and during post-
experiment group debrief sessions. Workload ratings were obtained using the Modified Cooper-
Harper (MCH) Rating Scale [22]. Use of the MCH scale yields an overall workload rating 
ranging from “1” (indicating that the instructed task was very easy/highly desirable; operator 
mental effort was minimal; and desired performance was easily attainable) to “10” (indicating 
that the instructed task was impossible and could not be accomplished reliably). 
4.6 Scenario Description 
4.6.1 Nominal Scenario 
Scenarios were designed to simulate a near term NextGen environment. Each scenario had 
the six piloted aircraft flying different approaches to runway 17C at DFW airport in visual 
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weather conditions and using instrument flight rules. Additional traffic was added to the 
scenarios with pilot model flown ASTOR machines. The routes were created by modifying 
existing STARs into KDFW, with the piloted aircraft on the MASTY 3, BONHAM 5, and 
CEDAR CREEK 6 arrivals (Figure 22). Altitude restrictions on the routes were modified to 
approximate OPDs, simulating near idle continuous descents designed to be fuel efficient and 
reduce noise. The airport diagram, arrival procedures, and instrument procedure diagrams, are 
available in the Appendix F. 
Figure 22.  Arrival routes and initial aircraft positions. 
NOTE:  Figure 22 has been created to show the relative starting position of all aircraft 
arriving to KDFW, with the six aircraft piloted by the subject pilots indicated by the NASA 
callsigns. The relative position and color coding of NAS557, NAS163, and EGF132 pertains to 
the results described in Figure 30 and Figure 31. 
Each scenario contained 35 aircraft on one of 14 arrivals into KDFW, 25 aircraft departing 
KDFW, and 4 aircraft arriving to KDAL. Arriving aircraft not flown by subject pilots were 
generated using ASTOR stations using the Pilot Model function, and departing aircraft generated 
by MACS. The aircraft’s initial conditions (callsign, route, altitude, arrival sequence) were 
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identical during the ten data collection runs, while the particular aircraft flown by the subject 
pilots varied by run. The six aircraft flown by subject pilots were in the middle of the arrival 
stream and in level flight. Four of the six aircraft were ASTOR simulators, one was the DTS, and 
one was the IFD. The pilots maintained the same position (ASTOR pilot, First Officer in the 
DTS, etc.) throughout the experiment. 
In order of arrival, Table 4 gives the piloted aircraft’s callsign, route of flight, approximate 
time of flight, RTA clearance, and FIM clearance for the ten data collection scenarios. 
Table 4.  Callsign, Routes, and Clearances, by Arrival Sequence 
Callsign Route / 
Transition 
RTA
Clearance 
RTA+FIM Clearance 
NAS094 Cedar Creek 
6 / Humble
CROSS
R-17C
AT
0022:30
CROSS R-17C AT 0022:30. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-
SPACING 120 SEC WITH DAL421 AND 2.2 NM WITH 
BTA291. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE AT R-17C. 
DAL421 ROUTE FSM BYP5 PENNY ILS17C, FAS 133 KT. 
BTA291 ROUTE INK JEN9 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 126 KT. 
REPORT COMMENCING IM-SPACING.
NAS163 Masty 3 / 
Hydes
CROSS
R-17C
AT
0024:30
CROSS R-17C AT 0024:30. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-
SPACING 120 SEC WITH NAS094 AND 2.2 NM WITH 
AAL351. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE AT R-17C. 
NAS094 ROUTE IAH CQY6 PENNY ILS17C, FAS 126 KT. 
AAL351 ROUTE TXO UKW1 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 133 KT. 
REPORT COMMENCING IM-SPACING.
NAS557 Bonham 5 / 
Little Rock
CROSS
R-17C
AT
0026:30
CROSS R-17C AT 0026:30. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-
SPACING 120 SEC WITH NAS163 AND 2.2 NM WITH 
EGF132. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE AT R-17C. 
NAS163 ROUTE HYDES MASTY3 BOSSI ILS17C, FAS 126 
KT. EGF132 ROUTE INK JEN9 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 133 
KT. REPORT COMMENCING IM-SPACING.
NAS328 Cedar Creek 
6 / 
Alexandria
CROSS
R-17C
AT
0028:30
CROSS R-17C AT 0028:30. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-
SPACING 120 SEC WITH NAS557 AND 2.2 NM WITH 
AAL15. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE AT R-17C. 
NAS557 ROUTE LIT BYP5 PENNY ILS17C, FAS 126 KT. 
AAL15 ROUTE SAT JEN9 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 133 KT. 
REPORT COMMENCING IM-SPACING.
NAS472 Cedar Creek 
6 / Gregg 
County
CROSS
R-17C
AT
0030:30
CROSS R-17C AT 0030:30. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-
SPACING 120 SEC WITH NAS328 AND 2.2 NM WITH 
UPS391. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE AT R-17C. 
NAS328 ROUTE AEX CQY6 PENNY ILS17C, FAS 126 KT. 
UPS391 ROUTE SAT JEN9 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 133 KT. 
REPORT COMMENCING IM-SPACING.
NAS701 Bonham 5 / 
Mc Alester
CROSS
R-17C
AT
0032:30
CROSS R-17C AT 0032:30. WHEN ABLE CLEARED IM-
SPACING 120 SEC WITH NAS472 AND 2.2 NM WITH 
JBU853. ACHIEVE BY R-17C. TERMINATE AT R-17C. 
NAS472 ROUTE GGG CQY6 PENNY ILS17C, FAS 126 KT. 
JBU853 ROUTE TXO UKW1 YOHAN ILS18R, FAS 133 KT. 
REPORT COMMENCING IM-SPACING.
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During these scenarios, the pilots used FMS guidance to fly the aircraft from its initial 
position to the runway. Pilots were cleared for the descent prior to the beginning of the scenario 
and had a route preloaded into the FMS. Before reaching the TOD, pilots were issued a CPDLC 
clearance containing their spacing instructions. Since all messages provided within this 
experiment were correct, pilots were expected to load the clearance and accept it. Once the 
clearance was accepted and the spacing operation was executed, pilots were instructed to follow 
ASTAR10’s speed commands to achieve a precise spacing or RTA at the runway threshold. In 
each of the nominal scenarios, the initial CPDLC clearance was given prior to the TOD; 
however, Offset Error scenarios involving the use of RTA procedures included an additional 
message that was sent when the aircraft reached 9,000ft MSL to create a spacing error. 
While CPDLC messages were used for the FIM clearance, voice was used for all other 
communication. Three ATC stations were staffed by confederate controllers who gave landing 
clearances, provided frequency changes, and handled any unexpected events. In addition to the 
communications between subject pilots and the confederate air traffic controllers, 
communication between pilot model ASTORs and ATC were recorded and played to provide 
background chatter. 
4.6.2 Exploratory Scenario 
One exploratory scenario was designed to examine various off-nominal events. During the 
exploratory scenario, the ATC assigned spacing interval was decreased to 75 seconds to simulate 
operations in visual flight rules conditions. Additionally, a new display element, the 
conformance box, was added to the PFD during this scenario. This exploratory run contained 
multiple events; however, of primary interest was the acceptability of FIM procedures at a 
relatively low altitude after a go-around. This operation was flown by the crew in the IFD, with 
the crew in the DTS provided several changes to their FIM clearance to create adequate space for 
the IFD to merge back into the traffic flow. Other events in this scenario included a clearance to 
space off an aircraft landing on runway 13R, and spacing behind a Target aircraft on the same 
route but landing on the parallel runway. Only questionnaire data was collected and analyzed for 
this run. 
4.7 Subject Pilots 
Twenty-four current commercial airline pilots, employed by major U.S. air carriers, 
participated in three groups of eight participants, each group completing the experiment in 2.5 
days. All pilots were male and ranged in age from 37-61 years, with a mean age of 51.5 years 
and 6.3 years standard deviation (SD), and an average of twenty years flying experience and over 
11,000 hours of flight time. Seventeen of the subjects were qualified as Boeing 777 pilots, four 
as Boeing 757/767 pilots, two as Boeing 747 pilots, and one as a Boeing 737 pilot. Twelve 
participants flew as single pilots in the ATOL while the remaining twelve flew as members of six 
two-person crews in either the IFD or DTS. To minimize potential effects associated with 
different airline operating procedures, all two-person crews were paired from the same airline, 
with pilots in the same Captain or First Officer position they fly operationally. 
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Each pilot was required to meet specific qualifications, which differed by simulation 
platform, and are outlined below. 
a) Category I (2 pilots in the IFD): 
i) current B-757 pilots (preferred) or have flown B-757 within the past 6 months 
ii) one pilot will be qualified as a Captain, the other as First Officer (or have been 
qualified in that position within the past 6 months) 
iii) the Captain and First Officer will be from the same airline 
iv) experience with CPDLC Data Comm is desired 
b) Category II (2 pilots in the DTS): 
i) current in a Boeing glass cockpit aircraft (preferred), such as B-747-400, B-777, B-
737NG, or B-767-400, or have flown them within the past 6 months 
ii) one pilot will be qualified as a Captain, the other as First Officer (or have been 
qualified in that position within the past 6 months) 
iii) the Captain and First Officer will be from the same airline 
iv) experience with CPDLC Data Comm is desired 
c) Category III (4 pilots in the ATOL): 
i) currently flying an aircraft with glass cockpit displays and a Flight Management 
System (required) 
ii) experience with CPDLC Data Comm is desired 
4.8 Protocol  
Three sessions were scheduled over consecutive weeks, each with a different group of pilots, 
for a total of 24 pilots. Within each group of participants, four flew as single pilots using the 
ASTOR stations, two flew as a two-person crew in the DTS, and two flew as a two-person crew 
in the IFD. For the ten nominal scenarios, the aircraft’s initial position and arrival sequence was 
identical, with the six aircraft flown by subject pilots identified by a NASA callsign. The 
subjects remained at the same physical location throughout the experiment (ATOL, IFD, DTS), 
but rotated among these six aircraft with NASA callsigns. 
All pilots received training material tailored to their simulator prior to arriving at NASA 
LaRC (see Appendix G for the IFD version), plus five hours of hands-on training after arriving. 
Emphasis was on conducting FIM procedures in accordance with their company’s standard 
operating procedures while flying in a busy terminal environment and complete cockpit tasks 
appropriately as workload permitted. It was further emphasized they should accomplish FIM 
related tasks within the context of other priority tasks, and that the experiment goal was not to 
determine how quickly the tasks could be accomplished. Several training runs were held on the 
first day, and a refresher on the second day (Appendix H). During data collection runs, each 
group of pilots simultaneously flew their aircraft in shared scenarios, i.e., they piloted six of the 
39 aircraft arriving to the Dallas Forth-Worth airport. The remaining aircraft were controlled and 
flown by software designed to replicate normal pilot behavior. 
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5 Results 
This Section presents results in four sub-sections:  quantitative algorithm performance, 
quantitative pilot performance, qualitative pilot responses, and off-nominal scenario. The first 
three sub-sections align directly to the first three objectives in Section 1.3, and also align directly 
to the three dependent measures in Section 4.5. The fourth sub-section in Results, off-nominal 
scenario, is listed separately since only qualitative pilot data was collected and analyzed. 
5.1 Quantitative Algorithm Performance Results 
5.1.1 Spacing Interval Precision at the Runway 
The primary goal of the ASTAR10 spacing algorithm is precise delivery of aircraft to the 
runway threshold at the assigned interval behind the two Target aircraft. Results from IMSPiDR 
indicate the mean spacing error of aircraft using relative spacing (RTA+FIM) at the threshold 
was under five seconds regardless of the error source (Table 5). The inter-arrival time recorded 
in this experiment revealed an interaction effect between Control Method and Error Source (p = 
0.002), and results of post hoc comparisons revealed that Wind Error scenarios conducted using 
RTA procedures resulted in a greater arrival error when compared with each of the other five 
Control Method by Error Source combinations (p < 0.05). Furthermore, Wind Error scenarios 
conducted using RTA+FIM procedures resulted in a significantly smaller arrival error when 
compared with Offset Error with RTA+FIM scenarios, and RTA scenarios involving either an 
Offset Error or No Error (p < 0.05). ASTAR10’s control design was estimated to have a ±4 
second error using a five-knot granularity in the commanded speed. All of the mean arrival errors 
in this experiment were below 3.5 seconds, demonstrating the effectiveness of the ASTAR10 
algorithm when large wind and offset errors are present. (Complete table of data and additional 
analysis is in Appendix I.) 
Table 5.  Runway Arrival Error 
 RTA only RTA+FIM 
Error Source Mean (s) SD (s) Mean (s) SD (s) 
None -3.3 4.0 -1.8 3.9 
Wind  3.5 3.3   0.9 3.9 
Offset -2.3 3.3 -2.2 3.3 
Despite the lengthy FIM clearance, the cumbersome CPDLC crew procedures, and 
significant forecast wind error and wind shear, the results align with or improve upon results 
from previous research [8][9][10]. A histogram of the spacing error for the piloted aircraft during 
RTA+FIM scenarios is shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23.  Histogram of RTA+FIM time error at the runway, piloted aircraft only. 
5.1.2 Spacing Interval Error Throughout the Arrival 
The raw time error at the runway threshold of the six piloted aircraft is plotted by control 
method (RTA in red, RTA+FIM in blue) for No Error conditions (Figure 24). The high 
frequency noise during RTA+FIM runs are generated by the ASTAR10 algorithm’s updates to 
ownship and Target position estimation and are removed as part of the calculations to generate 
“filtered” time error (used to generate the FIM Commanded Speed). The large, singular jumps in 
RTA+IM data are due to differences between the actual Top Of Descent point of either the FIM 
aircraft or the Target aircraft, and those estimated by ASTAR10. None of the discontinuities or 
singular jumps affected the speed that the pilots were provided.  
Figure 24.  Time error during No Error conditions, piloted aircraft only. 
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For the No Error scenarios, there does not appear to be an operationally significant difference 
(defined as 30 seconds in Center airspace and 15 seconds in TRACON airspace) between how 
the RTA and RTA+FIM control method corrected the time error. Both control methods exhibited 
high precision to the FAF with a slight increase in variance by the runway threshold. This 
spacing error increase was primarily due to the flight crew not matching the deceleration 
schedule from the final FIM Commanded Speed to the FAS. Causes include: 1) aircraft not 
within five knots of the final FIM Commanded Speed when ASTAR10 switched to FAS, 2) gear 
down and at flaps set to at least 20 degrees not achieved when ASTAR10 switched to FAS, 3) 
crew response to set FAS not timely, and 4) airspeed allowed to decelerate too quickly or 
momentarily go below FAS. Currently, the location where the ASTAR algorithm switches to the 
FAS depends on the difference between the nominal profile speed and the FIM commanded 
speed. It is hypothesized that the variance in the location where ASTAR switches to the FAS 
contributed to the increase in spacing error between the FAF and the runway threshold. A 
potential mitigation strategy would be to fix the location where the ASTAR10 algorithm 
switches to the FAS, thereby allowing crews to anticipate changes to the desired aircraft 
configuration.
During the Wind Error condition, the RTA+FIM control method had a greater variation of 
time error to correct at 40 nmi from the runway than the RTA control method did (Figure 25). 
However, the RTA control method’s spacing error consistently had a large increase in the time 
error at 20 nmi from the runway, which corresponded to the location of the wind shear. This 
wind shear resulted in the RTA control method needing a larger control input than the RTA+FIM 
control method to correct for the wind shear during the final 20 nmi of flight. In the end, both 
methods delivered the aircraft to the threshold with high precision and little variance (Table 5). 
Both control methods also exhibited an increase in error variance after the FAF; however, they 
also had a 3-second late bias due to the stronger than expected headwind. 
Figure 25.  Time error during Wind Error conditions, piloted aircraft only. 
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The large, singular jumps in RTA time error during Offset Error conditions is due to the 
second CPDLC message nine minutes into the scenario that delayed the aircraft’s runway arrival 
time by 30 seconds. The RTA control method appears to resolve time error sooner than the 
RTA+FIM method; however, most of the apparent difference is due to how the time error is 
calculated (i.e., the difference of aircraft position using the two control methods was much less 
than the time shown). As seen in Figure 26, there is no statistically significant difference in time 
error at the runway threshold (p=0.27).
Figure 26.  Time error during Offset Error conditions, piloted aircraft only. 
The previous plots graphically illustrated the differences between the RTA and RTA+FIM 
control methods. These differences can also be examined numerically. One measure of the 
magnitude of control inputs provided by the spacing algorithm is the Root-Mean-Squared (RMS) 
difference between the FIM-commanded speeds and the nominal profile speeds (Figure 27). The 
RMS difference between the commanded speeds and the profile speeds was examined for 
differences between control methods and error sources. The results demonstrated that there were 
significant differences between error sources (p<0.001) and significant interactions between the 
control methods and error sources (p<0.001). A Tukey pairwise comparison test was used to 
examine which factors were significantly different from each other. This analysis revealed that 
the aircraft in the scenarios without error had the smallest deviation from the nominal profile, 
followed by the Wind Error and Offset Error scenarios. Furthermore, there were a number of 
significant interactions between the errors sources and control methods. 
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Figure 27.  RMS difference between nominal profile speed and commanded speed. 
An interesting result was the effect of Wind Error on both Control Methods. As seen in Table 
6, the aircraft in the Wind Error scenarios remained significantly closer to their nominal profile 
when using the RTA+FIM control method versus the RTA control method. This observation is 
consistent with the results shown in Figure 25, where it was shown that the wind shear (at 20 
nmi) created a larger time error for aircraft using only the RTA control method than it did for 
aircraft using the RTA+FIM control method. It is hypothesized that this occurred because the 
RTA aircraft had to compensate for the wind error to achieve the scheduled time. In contrast, 
aircraft using the RTA+FIM control method were responsible for achieving an interval. Thus, 
both the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft flew through the same wind error, enabling the interval 
to be maintained without the need for large corrections. However, this result is unique to the 
particular scenarios used in this experiment and is not representative of other results obtained for 
relative spacing in the presence of Wind Error. 
Table 6.  Difference Between Profile Speed and Aircraft Speed by Control Method 
RTA RTA+FIM 
Error Source Mean 
(knots) 
SD  
(knots) 
Mean
 (knots) 
SD
(knots) 
No Error 2.8 1.7 2.2 1.3 
Wind Error 6.0 2.0 3.6 1.2 
Offset Error 5.0 1.8 4.9 2.2 
In summary, although the initial amount of time error to be resolved within each error 
condition was the same, the way that the ASTAR10 spacing algorithm resolved the error was 
different based on Control Method (RTA only, or RTA+FIM). Furthermore, the two specific 
error types (Wind and Offset) created different ASTAR10 behavior within that condition based 
on Control Method. The most notable difference was that the RTA control method needed 
almost twice the control input than the RTA+FIM control method during the Wind Error 
scenarios. 
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5.1.3 Number and Frequency of FIM Speed Changes 
It was expected that the majority of the workload and disruptions associated with the spacing 
operation would result from monitoring and implementing FIM speed changes. And as described 
in a later section, many of the pilots made comments related to undesirable responses driven by 
large wind and offset errors. Therefore, it is useful to understand the effect of the wind and offset 
errors on both the number and distribution of speed changes. 
The highest number of ASTAR10 speed changes occurred during the Wind Error condition 
for both Control Methods (p<0.001) (Table 7, subject pilot aircraft only), which coincided with 
the lowest FIM procedure acceptability rating by flight crew during post-scenario questionnaires. 
The majority of the additional speed changes happened during the wind shear, which was 
intentionally designed to occur when the crew was configuring the aircraft and intercepting final. 
(Complete raw data and further analysis is available in Appendix J.) 
The total number of speed changes strongly depended on the error source, with the No Error 
condition being associated with the lowest number of speed changes and the Wind Error 
condition being associated with the highest number of speed changes. Of the FIM speed changes 
during the 25 to 30 minute arrival, five correspond to scheduled profile speed changes. Note that 
these five speed changes do not take into account the additional number of speed changes that 
would normally be issued by ATC in a traditional spacing operation. To better understand the 
commanded speeds, the total number of speed changes was examined in conjunction with 
distributions of speed change frequency and speed changes as a function of distance to go. 
Table 7.  Total Number of Speed Changes, by Control Method and Error Source 
Control Law 
RTA RTA+FIM 
Error Source Mean (sec) Std Dev (sec) Mean (sec) Std Dev (sec) 
No Error   9.3 2.0   9.7 1.9 
Wind Error 17.2 4.0 16.1 3.3 
Offset Error 10.4 2.3 13.1 1.8 
One comment flight crew made throughout the post-scenario and post-experiment 
questionnaires was related to the algorithm providing flight crew with multiple speed commands 
within a short period of time, thereby generating higher workload and causing some pilots to 
question the rationale of the algorithm. To better understand the distribution of the time between 
consecutive speeds changes, a histogram was created (Figure 28). When all scenarios were 
examined together, it was found that 71% of speed changes occurred less than one minute after 
the previous speed change, 41% of speed changes occurred fewer than 30 seconds after the 
previous speed change, and 12% of speed changes occurred fewer than 10 seconds after the 
previous speed change. Scenarios involving the No Error condition contained the best 
distribution, with 68% of speed changes occurring less than one minute after the previous speed 
change, 33% of speed changes occurring fewer than 30 seconds after the previous speed change, 
and 9% of speed changes occurring fewer than 10 seconds after the previous speed change. 
These percentages must be read in the context of the total number of speed changes shown in 
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Table 7. While the distribution of the scenario involving the No Error condition has a similar 
distribution to the scenarios involving Wind Error and Offset Error, the smaller number of speed 
changes makes it less likely for speed commands to be closely spaced together in time. 
Figure 28.  Histogram of time between consecutive speed changes. 
Since several flight crews reported that the number of speed changes on final approach 
seemed excessive, the number of speed changes that occurred when the aircraft was on final 
approach was also analyzed, and a histogram of the location along the arrival was plotted (Figure 
29). The shape of the distribution of speed changes as a function of distance-to-go was dictated 
by the filtering in ASTAR10 that ignored some time error when the aircraft was far from the 
runway, resulting in fewer total speed changes, but resulted in a higher percentage of speed 
changes as the aircraft approached the runway. When examining all scenarios (i.e., those using 
the RTA control method and the FIM control method), the speed changes that occurred on final 
approach during the Wind Error scenarios were found to be significantly greater than the speed 
changes on final for the scenarios involving No Error and the scenarios involving the Offset 
Error (p<0.0005). The No Error scenarios had an average of 2.44 (SD=0.80, N=36) speed 
changes on final; the Offset Error scenarios had an average of 2.68 (SD=0.93, N=72) speed 
changes on final; and the Wind Error scenarios had an average 3.38 (SD=1.10, N=71) speed 
changes on final. 
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Figure 29.  Histogram of speed changes as a function of distance remaining. 
When speed changes were examined as a function of distance to go, 89% of speed changes 
occurred during the last 100 nmi, 69% occurred during the last 40 nmi, and 21% of speed 
changes occurred during the last 10 nmi of flight. These results are consistent with those 
indicating that a majority of the pilots’ peak workload occurred while below 5,000 ft MSL. 
When asked if the spacing tool required an extraneous expenditure of mental resources that 
should be used for landing preparation, 67% of flight crew rated the expenditure of resources as 
acceptable, 13% said that the spacing tool freed up mental resources, and 21% stated that the 
spacing procedure demanded mental resources needed to prepare for landing. Those who stated 
that spacing procedure’s requirement of mental resources was too great, cited inadequate cues to 
notify the flight crew of a speed change and undesirable speed changes. 
A third issue reported by the flight crew was related to undesirable speed increases. To 
attempt to limit the number of speed increases shortly followed by speed decreases, the 
ASTAR10 algorithm inhibited speed increases 10 seconds prior to a scheduled profile speed 
decrease. However, some flight crew still commented that speed increases were shortly followed 
by a speed decrease, leading to the perception that the speed increase was unnecessary. 
Additionally, flight crew commented that speed increases were undesirable once they had begun 
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to configure their aircraft (approximately 20 nmi from the runway threshold). To better 
understand the impact of undesirable speed increases, two metrics were examined: the time 
between a speed increase and a subsequent speed decrease, and the number of speed increases 
given when the distance-to-go was less than 20 nmi. The average number of speed increases for 
all scenarios was 3.58 (SD=2.21, N=180). Overall, aircraft were issued an average of 1.56 
(SD=1.40, N=180) commanded speed increases when they were within 20 nmi of the runway 
threshold, with aircraft in the No Error scenarios involving receiving a mean number of 0.53 
commanded speed increases (SD=0.84, N=180), aircraft in the Wind Error scenarios receiving a 
mean of 1.89 commanded speed increases (SD=1.30, N=180), and aircraft in the Offset Error 
scenarios receiving a mean number of 1.74 commanded speed increases (SD=1.49, N=180)
within 20 nmi of the runway threshold. Additionally, the time between a speed increase and 
subsequent speed decrease was examined, and the results are shown in Table 8. These results 
indicate that a short time between speed increases and a subsequent speed decrease was a greater 
problem for the Wind Error scenarios than it was for Offset and No Error scenarios. 
Table 8.  Distribution of Time Between Speed Increase Then Decrease 
Time Between Speed Increase and 
Subsequent Speed Decrease 
No
Error
Wind
Error
Offset 
Error
All
Scenarios
<10 seconds 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.17 
<20 seconds 0.19 1.24 0.27 0.65 
<30 seconds 0.28 1.82 0.51 1.01 
<60 seconds 0.64 2.68 1.09 1.67 
5.1.4 Example of ASTAR10 Performance 
Figure 30 contains typical algorithm performance observed during the IMSPiDR experiment, 
and Figure 31 is an expanded view illustrating the final 25 nmi of flight. Data shown in these 
figures are from the IFD during a RTA+FIM with Wind Error scenario, with both Target aircraft 
beginning outside of ADS-B range. The FIM aircraft is NAS557 arriving from the east, and 
issued spacing intervals of 120 seconds behind NAS163 and 2.2 nmi behind EGF132. [NOTE: to 
assist in understanding the events that occurred to this particular crew during this example, 
Figure 22 illustrates the aircraft’s initial condition and arrival procedures, Table 4 contains the 
FIM clearance for NAS557, and the colors in Figure 30 and Figure 31 align with the colors used 
in Figure 22.] 
The top plot describes the ASTAR10 calculated time error, with positive (+) seconds 
indicating the FIM aircraft arrived late to the runway, and negative (-) seconds indicating the 
aircraft arrived early. The horizontal axis for all plots is “distance to go in nmi”. Shown are the 
raw time error for Target 1 (dashed blue line), raw time error for Target 2 (dashed green line), 
and filtered time error (solid magenta line). The filtered time error began when the RTA+FIM 
clearance was entered by the flight crew into the onboard spacing tool, approximately 120 nmi or 
2 minutes into the scenario, and is initially based on the RTA to the runway since both Target 
aircraft are outside of ADS-B range. At approximately 101 nmi from the runway, the FIM 
aircraft received ADS-B information on Target 1, and ASTAR10 transitioned to achieving the 
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assigned spacing interval (FIM). During the final portion of the flight, the ASTAR10 spacing 
tool momentarily transitioned to Target 2, then back to Target 1 (discussed next and shown in 
greater detail in Figure 31). 
The second plot illustrates how the spacing algorithm corrected for the time error in the top 
row. Shown are the published approach speed (solid black line), FIM Commanded End Speed 
(dashed magenta line, corresponds to speed in upper left of Figure 3), and the transition from 
Mach to airspeed (red X). The horizontal segment left of the X indicates level cruise flight (130 
to 115 nmi distance to go), with the sloped segment left of the X a constant Mach descent (115 to 
95 nmi distance to go). At approximately 101 nmi from the runway, the ADS-B signal from 
Target 1 was received, and the filtered time error calculation based on Target 1 resulted in a five 
knot increase of the FIM Commanded End Speed. Positive time error (aircraft arrives late) 
results in FIM speeds higher than the published speed (e.g., from 95 to 65 nmi). 
The third plot illustrates the flight crews’ performance to achieve the FIM Speed. The FIM 
Command Speed (solid magenta line, corresponding to green speed bug in Figure 3) is the 
estimated instantaneous speed, and the dashed black line is the actual aircraft speed. This crew 
exhibited very good speed control during this scenario. 
The bottom row of panels illustrates the crew action (or inaction) in response to the “IM Drag 
Required” message that appeared whenever the aircraft’s airspeed was more than six knots above 
the FIM Command Speed (red line). Also shown is the percent speed brake deployment (black 
line) and throttle lever angle (blue line). Just after 50 nmi, the FIM Drag Required message was 
displayed for a very short duration, and the crew elected to not deploy the speed brake. Failure to 
respond to the Drag Required message had such a small impact on the spacing interval error that 
no new FIM speed was generated, because a considerable distance remained to the Achieve By 
Point. At 23 nmi remaining to the runway, the crew was attentive to EICAS message and 
deployed speed brakes as required; however, the wind shear overwhelmed the correction, and 
multiple new FIM speeds were generated to slow the aircraft down. 
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Figure 30.  Example of ASTAR10 spacing algorithm performance. 
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Figure 31 is an expanded view of the final 25 nmi of flight for this scenario to better illustrate 
several interesting effects that occurred during the wind shear, which was intentionally designed 
to occur as the aircraft turned onto final approach. Additional information shown in the top two 
panels of Figure 31 is when ASTAR10 ceased correcting for spacing errors and displayed the 
FMS computed Final Approach Speed (blue triangle), and the third plot shows the aircraft’s 
airspeed (dashed black line), flap deployment (blue dots), and gear deployment (green dots). 
The first effect was that ASTAR10 switched from Target 1 to Target 2 at the beginning of 
the wind shear, then back to Target 1 as the FIM aircraft descended below the wind shear (top 
plot). The impact that the wind shear had on the ASTAR10 algorithm is highlighted by the two 
gray lines, indicating where the green dashed raw time error for Target 2 became the controlling 
parameter to calculate the filtered time error. The transition between Target aircraft did not 
generate a change to the FIM Commanded End Speed and did not require any notification to the 
crew or action by the flight crew. Complicating the FIM calculations, the Target 1 and Target 2 
spacing errors were affected differently due to the arrival route geometry. The time error for 
Target 1 arriving from the north increases (FIM aircraft late), despite the FIM crew flying 
slightly faster than the FIM Commanded Speed. The transition occurred because Target 1 
descended below the wind shear, and the faster ground speed created an earlier ETA at the 
runway for Target 1. In turn, this generated a 5 knot increase in FIM Commanded Speed at 21 
nmi for the FIM aircraft. Meanwhile, due to arrival geometry, the time error for Target 2 from 
the west decreased (FIM aircraft early) due to the slower than anticipated progress (caused by the 
unexpected headwind). As a result, Target 2 became the controlling aircraft at 19.5 nmi. 
A second effect was caused by the flight crew not bringing the throttles completely to idle 
(fourth plot), and the extra thrust kept the aircraft from decelerating as rapidly as the algorithm 
had expected (second plot). Coupled with the wind error, not bringing the throttles to idle 
initially caused the aircraft to increase the time error, that is, arrive early (first plot); however, the 
crew recognized this issue and deployed the flaps and gear considerably earlier than normal. 
Deploying the flaps and gear early enabled the aircraft to achieve the FIM Commanded Speed, 
which was now significantly less than the published speed at this point. Had they not foreseen 
the need for drag, there would have been considerable time error at the runway. 
Finally, the combined effect of not spacing after the algorithm switched to the FAS with an 
incorrect wind forecast, and flying slower than the FIM speed, caused almost 15 seconds of 
change in the spacing error after the FAF (top plot). 
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Figure 31.  Expanded view of ASTAR10 performance during final 25 nmi. 
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Overall, the flight crew on this particular run exhibited precise speed control, with the wind 
shear during the turn to final creating several interesting effects. In summary, the ASTAR10 
algorithm behaved predictably and as designed, and reacts to and compensates for variations in 
pilot performance (if sufficient distance remains to the runway). ASTAR10 produced the desired 
spacing precision when the pilots flew the FIM speed, and used less control authority than 
controllers do in current day operations and also smaller speed changes than the aircraft is 
capable of. 
5.1.5 Algorithm Performance by Runway 
Analysis of time error by runway and position in the arrival stream showed no statistically 
significant difference between the two control methods during the No Error and Offset Error 
conditions and no statistically significant difference between the two conditions themselves 
(Figure 32). Data shown are results averaged from both repetitions, and all three groups. 
Figure 32.  Time error by position in the arrival stream, by runway. 
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The Wind Error condition also produced no statistically significant difference for both 
control methods (RTA and FIM) to a particular runway and no statistically significant  difference 
between the control methods. However, both control methods showed a bias for aircraft landing 
on Runway 17C (the eastern runway) approximately 2 seconds late. The aircraft landing on 
Runway 18R showed a bias for landing approximately 4 seconds early. However, the mean 
spacing error at the runway threshold for all RTA+FIM operations for all conditions was less 
than 2.2 seconds (Table 5). These results indicate ASTAR10’s capability to respond to unknown 
and continuous error (forecast wind error and wind shear), and a pulse error (offset to create time 
delay).
5.2 Quantitative Pilot Performance Results
5.2.1 Pilot Reaction Time to FIM Speed Change 
While conducting FIM, it is important for pilots to respond to speed changes within an 
appropriate timeframe to ensure that the aircraft achieves its required spacing interval, and 
prevent ASTAR10 from commanding further deviations from the nominal profile. During this 
experiment, pilots in the IFD were expected to notice speed changes and dial them into the MCP 
speed window in a timely manner. Pilots in the ATOL and DTS had their auto-throttles coupled 
to the ASTAR10 commanded speed for a majority of the flight; however, the MCP speed 
window opened when they captured the ILS and the pilots were expected to manually dial the 
commanded speeds into the MCP speed window. The pilot’s reaction time to these speed 
changes was defined as the time it took for pilots to dial the speeds into the MCP speed window 
after a new commanded speed is given. 
The time it took pilots to notice and respond to commanded speeds (during both RTA and 
RTA+FIM operations) was examined and compared with assumptions made by the automation 
during the periods when the MCP speed window was open. To complete the analysis, the 
response time data were averaged for each run. If a new speed change occurred before the pilot 
reacted to the old speed change, the reaction time for that particular speed change was considered 
to be the time between the two speed changes. The square root of the response data were taken to 
transform it into a normal distribution to enable the use of non-parametric statistical analysis. 
The square root transformation provided a better, though not perfect, approximation of a normal 
distribution (Figure 33). When the square root of the reaction time was analyzed, significant 
differences were found between the error (p=0.035) source and the simulator type (p<0.001).
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Figure 33.  Pilot reaction time to change (left) and distribution of reaction time (right). 
A Tukey pairwise comparison test revealed that the reaction times of the pilots in the 
scenarios without error were larger than the reaction times of the Wind Error scenarios (Table 9). 
It is hypothesized that the scenarios without error had a larger reaction time because they had 
fewer speed changes, and the pilots may not have been looking for them as actively. There was 
also a statistically significant difference in the pilots’ reaction time between the different 
simulator types, with the ATOL having the highest reaction time (M=10.5, SD=9.2) and the IFD 
having the lowest reaction time (M=6.6, SD=7.4). Part of the difference in reaction times 
between simulators may be that the IFD flew a majority of its arrival with the MCP speed 
window open, whereas the ATOL and DTS pilots had the commanded speed coupled directly to 
the auto-throttle, with the MCP speed window opening automatically when they captured the 
ILS. Pilots who flew in the ATOL and DTS commented that this transition often took them by 
surprise, since the FMS had managed their speed throughout most of the arrival. 
Table 9.  Pilot Reaction Time to FIM Speed Change, by Condition
RTA RTA+FIM 
Error Source Mean (sec) SD (sec) Mean (sec) SD (sec) 
No Error  11.6  10.7  10.4  10.7 
Wind Error    8.0    7.3    8.5    7.2 
Offset Error    9.1    9.8    8.8    8.9 
The reaction time data shows that pilots were able to dial new commanded speeds into the 
MCP speed window within a reasonable period of time during all experimental conditions. 
However, it was determined that the reaction time was shorter for the scenarios with error 
conditions and for the simulator that required pilots to manually dial new commanded speeds 
into the MCP speed window throughout the entire arrival. Additionally, the reaction times 
observed in the experiment closely matched with reactions times pilots stated were reasonable in 
their post-experiment questionnaires. 
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5.2.2 Pilot FIM Speed Conformance 
During the training program, pilots were instructed to keep their speed within ±5 knots of the 
commanded speed if feasible within normal operating procedures. A significant Control Method 
x Error Source interaction effect was found (p<0.0005), indicating that the effect of error source 
on pilot speed conformance was dependent upon the control method used (Table 10). Pilot 
conformance to the commanded FIM speed was best during scenarios conducted under 
conditions of No Error and was worse when RTA procedures were used during the presence of 
Wind Error. The No Error scenarios were the only scenarios during which the average speed 
deviance was within the ±5 knot bound. Researcher observations indicated that many of the 
segments of non-conformance occurred when commanded speed changes required a large 
acceleration or deceleration. Excursions of greater than 5 knots from the appropriate speed were 
partially due to the fact that the auto-throttles used in this experiment had a sensitivity of ±10 
knots, forcing the pilots to manually adjust the throttles to maintain a ±5 knot interval. 
Additionally, pilot comments along with researcher observations revealed that there were pilots 
who preferred allowing the aircraft to slow without using the speed brake to fly a smoother flight 
for passengers, causing larger speed conformance errors. 
Table 10.  Flight Crew Deviation From FIM Speed 
Error Source Mean Error 
(knots) 
Std Dev 
(knots) 
None 3.6 1.2 
Wind 6.2 2.0 
Offset 5.8 1.6 
5.2.3 Pilot CPDLC Interaction Times 
This section provides data collected and analyzed pertaining to the human flight crew 
CPDLC interactions during the normal scenarios. These secondary metrics were of particular 
interest to the FAA Data Comm Program office, in particular the time from CPDLC uplink 
message receipt to intra-cockpit crew action to read the message, and time between message 
receipt to crew sending a CPDLC downlink response (shown earlier in Figure 4). Therefore, the 
time from the chime simultaneously sounding with the ATC Message light illuminating on the 
EICAS, until the flight crew sent a CPDLC downlink message of ACCEPT or REJECT, is the 
Required Communication Performance (RCP) time labeled “Responder” and outlined by the red 
box in Figure 34 (excerpt from Appendix B of reference [18]). None of the simulators used 
during the experiment modeled any of the other systems or categories shown in the diagram 
below.
The time expected for the entire CPDLC process to occur within 95% probability is either 
210 or 350 seconds (based on equipment type), and are the top and bottom horizontal lines 
labeled “RCP type” in Figure 34. This time includes the message composition, message sent by 
air traffic control, transmission delays, message received and responded to by the flight crew, 
and response read by the controller. The time allocated for the Responder is 60 seconds, 
regardless of equipment type. 
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Figure 34.  Required Communication Performance (RCP) diagram. 
Three data runs (two in the ATOL and one in the DTS) were discarded for the Read and 
Respond data analysis in this section due to extremely lengthy response times. A review of the 
recorded video for two of these runs indicated the crews understood and were attempting to 
follow the FIM spacing procedures; however, they were having difficulty finding the correct 
button to push to send the ACCEPT CPDLC downlink message. The third run discarded was due 
to the failure of one of the two MCDUs in the DTS. (The complete list of raw data is available in 
Appendix K.) 
Time used by the flight crew to Read and to Respond to CPDLC uplink messages containing 
the FIM clearance are shown in Figure 35, with the left group of columns containing data for 
condition by simulator type (by condition), the middle group of columns data for control method 
by simulator type (by control), and the right group of columns the data by simulator type. The 
data are also shown as histograms in Figure 36, using 0.5 second bins and blocked by simulator 
category. 
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Figure 35.  Mean CPDLC times by condition, by control method, and by simulator. 
Large variation in flight crew Respond time to the FIM clearance sent via CPDLC appears to 
be primarily influenced by simulator type (one-person versus two-person crew) and sequence 
order of the run (learning continued throughout the experiment). 23 of the 177 (13%) data points 
analyzed for flight crew Respond time were greater than 60 seconds, of which 18 of the 23 were 
in the IFD and DTS category of simulator type. Review of recorded audio and video files reveals 
in almost all cases, these particular data points were from scenarios early in the run sequence 
(see Figure 37), and the conversation was geared to resolving questions about the CPDLC 
equipment or locating the correct button to press. Furthermore, the FIM procedures used in the 
experiment represented the most complex possible as defined in the data link standards. There 
were no observed runs where the crew did not have time to respond, or was not willing to 
respond, within 60 seconds.
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Figure 36.  Histogram of Read (left) and Respond (right) CPDLC times, by simulator. 
Figure 37.  Mean CPDLC times by simulator (left, ATOL; right, IFD & DTS), by run. 
The mean flight crew Read time of 5.9 seconds was similar across single-pilot simulator 
(ATOL) and two-person crew simulators (IFD&DTS), and no statistically significant difference 
by error or by error  control was found. A statistically significant difference in Read response 
time was found by control condition (RTA:  M=6.57, SD=4.43; RTA+FIM: M=5.26, SD=3.31; 
p=0.009); however, the time difference is considered operationally insignificant. Therefore, a 
detailed table is not shown for Read time results. 
Table 11 shows flight crew Respond time (in seconds), analyzed across error condition (No 
Error, Wind Error, and Offset Error), control type (RTA, RTA+FIM), and error  control. No 
statistically significant difference was found for control or error  control, which is an 
unexpected result considering the length and complexity of the RTA+FIM clearance compared to 
the RTA only clearance. A statistically significant difference was found by error condition, with 
an unexpected result that the No Error condition had the highest mean Respond time. However, 
this is considered a statistical anomaly since error has no effect on the flight crew’s interaction 
with CPDLC. 
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Table 11.  CPDLC Respond Time, by Condition 
 Mean SD N   Mean SD N 
Error (p=0.001)     Condition (p=0.131)    
None 49.03 19.39 35  None / RTA 50.72 21.99 17
Wind 41.19 10.52 71  None / RTA+FIM 47.34 16.87 18
Offset 44.40 15.21 71  Wind / RTA 38.32 9.89 36
Control
(p=0.538)
    Wind / RTA+FIM 44.15 10.45 35
RTA 43.13 15.70 88  Offset / RTA 44.17 15.48 35
RTA+FIM 44.99 13.79 89  Offset / RTA+FIM 44.63 15.16 36
Table 12 shows flight crew Respond time by simulator type (ATOL, IFD and DTS), and was 
statistically and operationally significantly different between simulator types. Based on crew 
debrief comments and research observations, it is postulated that the difference is caused by two 
factors: (1) the time required for the two-person crew to verbally brief the CPDLC message to 
each other, and (2) the use of a mouse to operate the personal computers in the ATOL compared 
to actual aircraft hardware in the IFD and DTS. Considered much less of a contributing factor 
were the effect of using the EICAS system for CPDLC (ATOL) versus the MCDU for CPDLC 
(IFD and DTS), and operating the aircraft in VNAV Path Mode (VNAV PTH) versus VNAV 
Speed Mode (VNAV SPD). 
Table 12.  Flight Crew Respond Time to FIM CPDLC Message, by Simulator 
 Mean SD N 
Simulator (p=0.002)    
ATOL 39.9 10.0 118 
IFD and DTS 52.1 18.8 60 
5.2.4 Pilot Deployment of Flap and Gear 
In this experiment, the pilots’ primary responsibility was to operate the aircraft safely and to 
use their normal procedures to ensure the aircraft’s FIM commanded speeds were safe to fly. To 
reduce the amount of drag on the aircraft, pilots were instructed to use the minimum flap setting 
needed to achieve the FIM speeds calculated by ASTAR10. Pilots were also instructed to lower 
the landing gear, extend the flaps to 20 degrees, and set the aircraft’s target speed in the MCP 
window when ASTAR10 commanded their FAS. After this point, pilots were required to 
configure the aircraft as necessary to be stable by 1000 ft AGL. 
The data from this experiment showed all aircraft maintained appropriate flap settings for the 
aircraft’s speed and met all regulatory requirements. Examples include at or below 250 knots 
when below 10,000 ft MSL and configuration and speed requirements for a stabilized approach. 
Some pilots used more than the minimum flap setting for their assigned speed, and some pilots 
lowered their landing gear well before they were required to. Data were analyzed to determine if 
there was a correlation between arrival time and distance from the runway when the pilot 
lowered the landing gear. 
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The ASTAR10 spacing algorithm uses a nominal deceleration rate to predict the deceleration 
from the current arrival speed to the FAS. If the landing gear is lowered early, aircraft power can 
be increased to fly the FIM speeds, and the aircraft will slow to the FAS by reducing power. If 
the landing gear is lowered late (i.e., well after ASTAR10 commands the FAS), the interval error 
can increase since there is less drag on the aircraft than is predicted by the spacing algorithm. 
The data illustrated in Figure 38 are a scatter plot of the gear deployment versus arrival time 
error. Blue circles with positive time error show when the gear was lowered prior to ASTAR10 
estimating it needed to be lowered, and whether the aircraft arrived at the runway after the 
assigned spacing interval. Blue circles with negative time error show gear lowered early and a 
spacing interval at the runway less than assigned by ATC. Red circles with negative time error 
indicate gear lowered later than estimated and the spacing interval less than assigned by ATC, 
and red circles with positive time error indicate gear lowered late and the spacing interval larger 
than assigned by ATC. Figure 38 and Table 13 contain data for all runs, with the exception of 
one run in the first group that encountered an unexpected runway assignment error. 
Figure 38.  ASTAR10 time error, by when the gear was deployed. 
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Table 13 provides data for the mean and SD from the assigned spacing interval for when the 
gear was deployed early and when deployed late. It is noted that the relationship between the 
pilots lowering the gear and the FIM spacing interval error is a multi-faceted issue. Some pilots 
commented that they lowered the landing gear early to achieve the arrival speed ASTAR10 was 
commanding without using other forms of drag. Other pilots stated lowering the landing gear 
early allowed the use of higher power settings, which enabled more precise speed control, but at 
cost of additional fuel consumption. 
Table 13.  Spacing Interval Error, by Early or Late Gear Extension 
This cursory analysis does not appear to indicate an operationally significant difference 
between when the gear was deployed and the precision of the FIM operation. However, more 
detailed analysis is required before concluding that the ASTAR10 algorithm is robust to variance 
in pilots’ execution of FIM procedures and the differences between the standard operating 
procedures of various airlines. Metrics required for this level of detail were not included in the 
IMSPiDR experiment, but will be in future research. 
5.2.5 Examples of Flight Crew Non-Conformance 
5.2.5.1 Flight Crew Not Timely Achieving FIM Speed 
Figure 39 illustrates a data run where the pilots in the IFD did not properly follow the pilot 
procedures for following FIM commanded speed changes. The aircraft’s airspeed stayed well 
above the Profile speed (“Cmd Speed”). The IM DRAG REQUIRED message was displayed on 
the EICAS between 20 nmi and 5.5 nmi, indicating to the pilots that their aircraft needed more 
drag to properly follow FIM guidance. Between 20 and 7.5 nmi, the pilots failed to add sufficient 
drag to allow the aircraft to decelerate quickly enough to catch multiple speed reductions 
commanded by the ASTAR10 algorithm (“Cmd End Speed”) between 20 and 16 nmi. Sufficient 
drag was added when the landing gear was lowered at 7.5 nmi from the threshold. Therefore, this 
lack of timely response and drag management caused a negative, or early, time error to build to 
approximately 28 seconds. 
Another event occurred on this run caused an interesting outcome. At approximately 7.5 nmi 
remaining to the runway threshold, the ASTAR10 algorithm commanded a speed of 150 knots. 
The pilots lowered the landing gear, but instead of setting the FIM commanded speed of 150 
knots in the MCP window, they set the FAS of 130 knots. The unexpected setting of the FAS 
caused the aircraft to decelerate well below the FIM speed guidance at that point on the 
approach, and as a result, substantially reduced the time error. The cumulative result of these 
multiple failures to follow FIM guidance was a spacing error of approximately 8 seconds. 
Gear Extension Mean 
(seconds)
SD
(seconds)
Early -0.3 4.4 
Late -1.5 3.8 
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Figure 39.  Example of failure to follow FIM guidance (IFD). 
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5.2.5.2 Flight Crew Using Incorrect FIM Speed 
Each of the ASTOR simulators was operated by a single pilot; consequently, those pilots did 
not benefit from having another pilot present to ensure FIM procedures were followed properly. 
Figure 40 is ASTAR10 data from an ASTOR during the final 10 nmi of the approach, when the 
MCP speed window was open (after ILS capture) and the pilot was required to set the FIM 
commanded end speed manually in the MCP window. In the left plot, the pilot correctly 
followed the FIM guidance as instructed. The ASTAR10 commanded end is shown in black, and 
corresponds to green speed at the top left of the PFD in Figure 41. The aircraft’s commanded 
speed set manually by the ASTOR pilot in the MCP window is shown as a dashed magenta line 
in Figure 40. During this run, the pilot set the aircraft’s commanded speed in the MCP window 
to match the FIM commanded end speed every time that speed changed. 
Figure 40.  Correct (left) and incorrect (right) setting of FIM speed in MCP. 
Figure 41.  FIM speed guidance on ND. 
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The right plot of Figure 40 illustrates data from a single RTA run that had no induced error. 
It also covers the last 10 nmi of flight when the aircraft was following ILS guidance, and manual 
speed entry of the FIM commanded speed generated speed was required. In this example, instead 
of correctly entering the FIM commanded end speed (green number in upper left of PFD, Figure 
41) into the MCP window, the pilot continuously adjusted the MCP speed to match the FIM 
commanded speed (green speed bug to right of the speed tape). The FIM commanded end speed 
was intended to be available to the crew to provide an estimate of the deceleration rate, and is not 
appropriate to act as a guide for the speed to set in the MCP. 
This unexpected use of the FIM commanded end speed to set the value in the MCP window 
by the pilot did not substantially affect the precision performance of the experiment shown in 
Table 5. The small effect on arrival precision was partially due to the robustness of the 
algorithm, which continuously calculated a corrected speed for the pilots to fly. In setting the 
MCP speed to the speed indicated by the FIM speed bug at the edge of the speed tape, the pilot 
was required to spend a substantial amount of time tracking the speed bug and setting the 
aircraft’s commanded speed in the MCP speed window to match the FIM commanded speed. 
The pilot did not identify his method of complying with the ATC FIM clearances in his post 
flight questionnaires. 
Analysis in this section indicates ASTAR10 will continue to update speed guidance to 
address the cumulative error of pilot deviation. Analysis also indicates that pilot training may 
need to be more extensive for some pilots, and FIM guidance and alerting may require 
adjustments to enable better adherence to FIM procedures. 
5.3 Qualitative Pilot Responses  
The sub-section addresses the third experiment objective, “Have the flight crew assess the 
FIM concept, procedures, and displays.” Information to address this objective comes from data 
and comments provided by the flight crew in response to the post-run and post-experiment 
questionnaires, and during the post-experiment verbal debrief. (Complete data from the post-run 
questionnaires are found in Appendix L, and from the post-experiment questionnaires in 
Appendix M.) Within this sub-section, the results are presented in order of importance: 
acceptability, workload, spacing algorithm, use of Data Comm, and cockpit displays. 
5.3.1 Flight Crew Acceptability of FIM ConOps and Procedures 
Post-experiment responses were examined to evaluate the acceptability of the spacing 
concept in terms of additional responsibility, perceived safety, and change in workload as 
compared with current day operations. When asked whether the added responsibility of meeting 
a spacing interval was acceptable, 75% of the flight crew responded positively. Those who did 
not find the responsibility acceptable cited concerns regarding the speed behavior and the 
interface, rather than unacceptability of the airborne spacing concept. Using a scale of 1 (Not 
Safe At All) to 7 (Much More Safe), all flight crew rated the safety of the spacing operation as 
being “as safe as” or “slight more safe than” current day operations (M=4.88, SD=1.12, N=24).
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When asked if the FIM procedures used during this experiment were complete, accurate, and 
logical, 92% of the flight crew answered positively. However, when asked to use a scale of 1 
(Very Difficult) to 7 (Very Easy) to rate the ease with which the spacing procedures could be 
integrated with current day procedures, the flight crews’ mean response was 4.58 (SD=1.56,
N=24), indicating that they were somewhat undecided. Many comments also indicated that flight 
crews thought the spacing operation would be associated with a significant learning curve, and 
that simulator training would be required to adequately learn the airborne spacing procedures. 
One specific issue that was consistently noted in questionnaires, debrief sessions, and researcher 
observation logs was that pilots found it counterintuitive to terminate the existing spacing 
operation before loading a new spacing clearance. Comments suggested that, upon acceptance of 
the spacing clearance, the old operation should automatically be overwritten. 
Flight crews in both the IFD and DTS were asked to characterize how the spacing operation 
affected the distribution of tasks between the pilot flying (PF) and pilot monitoring (PM), and to 
indicate whether it changed their crew coordination. Three-quarters of the flight crews reported 
that the distribution of tasks required to complete the spacing operation was desirable and 
complemented their current distribution of tasks, and 83% of the pilots indicated that the spacing 
operation did not change their crew coordination. However, the pilots found it somewhat 
difficult to coordinate the acceptance of CPDLC messages. In this experiment, the PM was 
expected to load and accept the CPDLC clearance, while the PF was expected to simultaneously 
review the information on the FIM MCDU page and ensure that ASTAR10’s commanded speed 
was acceptable. Half of the flight crew commented that the system should allow the PM to both 
accept the clearance and execute the spacing operation, and at least one crew ignored the 
distribution of tasks outlined in the procedures they were asked to follow and completed the 
operations by having the PM operate both flight crews’ MCDUs. 
Flight crews were asked to provide the amount of time they thought would be reasonable to 
notice and implement a speed change. Pilot responses in the post-experiment questionnaire 
indicated that they would consider noticing the speed change within nine seconds (M=9, SD=5,
N=24)  of a commanded speed change, and dialing the speed commands into the MCP speed 
window within seven seconds (M=7, SD=4, N=24) of noticing the speed command as acceptable. 
5.3.2 Pilot Workload Ratings 
Using a scale of 1 (Much More) to 7 (Much Less), pilots responded that they would expect 
the workload of the FIM spacing operation to be the same or slightly greater than current day 
operations (M=3.88, SD=1.39, N=24). While concerns were raised regarding the specific 
implementation of FIM in this experiment (described below), pilots found the overall FIM 
concept acceptable. 
Flight crews used the MCH rating scale, ranging from “1” (indicating that the instructed task 
was very easy/highly desirable; operator mental effort was minimal; and desired performance 
was easily attainable) to “10” (indicating that the instructed task was impossible and could not be 
accomplished reliably), to provide assessments of both average and peak levels of workload 
experienced during each flight scenario. No significant differences were found to exist between 
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workload levels reported for a given control method or among workload levels reported for a 
given error source (p < 0.05). The flight crews rated their mean “average” workload as 1.97 
(SD=0.86, N=240), and their mean “peak” workload as 2.32 (SD=1.01, N=240), which is 
comparable to the average workload of 1.87 (SD=0.78, N=207) found in a previous airborne 
spacing experiment conducted at NASA LaRC [10]. These results indicate that the average 
workload associated with the task the flight crew were asked to perform was easy/desirable, their 
mental effort was low, and the desired performance was attainable. The pilots’ peak workload 
ratings indicated that the task they were asked to perform was mildly difficult; however, the 
mental effort was acceptable, and an adequate level of performance was attainable. The average 
workload was not expected to be rated higher than a “3,” indicating that the pilots’ instructed 
task had a mild difficulty level and required an acceptable level of mental effort to attain 
adequate system performance. However, the data indicated that eight flight crews rated their 
average workload between a “4” and “6.” Half of these relatively high workload ratings occurred 
during the first data collection scenario of a particular group, while the remaining high workload 
ratings were associated with pilot errors in operating the simulators and undesirable speed 
change behavior (discussed below). 
In addition to workload ratings, pilots were given the option of selecting the segment of flight 
during which their peak workload occurred. Of the 191 flights associated with responses, pilots 
indicated that their peak workload occurred below 5,000 ft, 70% of the time, and peak workload 
occurred when their aircraft was between the altitudes of 5,000 ft and 11,000 ft, 17% of the time 
(Table 14). The greatest variation from the average result occurred during the RTA only control 
scenarios with an Offset Error. During 38 of these scenarios, flight crews reported that their peak 
workload occurred between 11,000 ft and 5,000 ft, 32% of the time, and peak workload occurred 
below 5,000 ft, only 50% of the time. It is suggested that the discrepancy between the aggregate 
results and results for Offset Error scenarios and use of the RTA control method is directly 
related to the issuance of a CPDLC message sent when the aircraft reached 9,000-ft, instructing 
flight crew to amend the original spacing clearance. 
Table 14.  Flight Segment Associated With Peak Workload 
Segment of Flight Responses (N=191) 
>18,000ft (cruise, initial descent, CPDLC) 10% 
18,000ft – 11,000ft (descent, approach check) 3% 
11,000ft - 5,000ft (TRACON, low altitude merge) 17% 
<5,000ft (final approach, configure aircraft) 70% 
The off-nominal scenario required the IFD crew to accept a new FIM clearance while being 
vectored at 5000 ft back to the runway after a go-around. These crews rated the head down time 
required to accept and implement the FIM clearance using CPDLC as not appropriate for this 
high workload environment. 
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5.3.3 Flight Crew Comments about the ASTAR10 Spacing Algorithm 
After each scenario, flight crews were asked to rate the acceptability, safety, and correctness 
of ASTAR10’s commanded speeds and to describe any unexpected behavior exhibited by the 
algorithm. They found the commanded speeds acceptable; however, large errors, such as the 
Wind Error and Offset Error used in this experiment, can lead to some instances of less than 
desirable speed behavior. The ASTAR10 algorithm was designed with mechanisms to provide 
flight crews with desirable speed behavior. However, based on pilots’ comments, it is suggested 
that the time between consecutive speed changes, the distribution of speed changes as a function 
of time-to-go, and analysis of speed increases can be used in conjunction with the total number 
of speed changes as quantitative metrics to help predict pilots’ acceptance of speed changes. 
The crews reported that the desired deceleration rate (shown by the FIM Commanded Speed) 
appeared too great, particularly during the scenarios with the Wind Error condition. Modification 
of the route (shallower descent angle and slower speeds) should reduce both the number of speed 
changes and how frequently the speed brake is required. 
Two ASTAR10 characteristics reported as undesirable were: 1) several speed changes over a 
short time period, especially if they were in opposite direction, and 2) an increase in speed that 
exceeded the flap limit. The vast majority of these events occurred during the Wind Error 
scenarios and was caused by the unexpected wind shear at 5000 ft. 
Overall, pilots found the IM concept acceptable; however, pilots found some behaviors of the 
automation less than desirable (Table 15). Pilots were asked to rate a series of questions about 
their perceptions of the IM speeds using a scale that ranged from “1” (completely disagree) to 
“7” (completely agree), with “1” being the most favorable response and “7” being the most 
unfavorable response. The data were averaged across replicates, and a Friedman test was 
conducted to examine the data for statistical differences using a 95% confidence interval. The 
Friedman test was blocked by crewmember, and examined whether the answers to the questions 
changed when different error sources were present. 
Table 15.  Pilot Ratings for FIM Speed Commands 
Question Mean SD Median P Value
10 a)  Unsafe 1.35 0.84 1 0.223 
10 b)  Incorrect 1.47 0.99 1 0.282 
10 c)  Interruption 2.48 1.55 2 0.068 
10 d)  Unexpected 2.12 1.57 1 0.247 
10 e)  Conflicted With Other Information 1.68 1.18 1 0.793 
10 f)  Uncomfortable 1.56 1.24 1 0.341 
10 g)  Frustrated 2.08 1.49 1 0.053 
No statistically significant differences were found between any of the experimental factors 
(p>0.05). However, both the question asking if IM was an interruption (p=0.068), and the 
question asking if the IM speed frustrated the crew (p=0.053) were close to being significant. 
For the IM scenarios, the Wind Error scenarios received the worst ratings for both the frustration 
question (M=2.5, SD=1.7) and the question asking about interruptions (M=2.7, SD=1.4). The 
63
non-error conditions received the most favorable ratings for both the frustration question 
(M=1.7, SD=1.1), and the question asking if pilots were interrupted (M=2.2, SD=1.1). While the 
difference in the mean values may be small, they appear to be indicative of a greater number of 
outliers with unfavorable responses during the scenarios containing Wind Error. The results are 
also consistent with many comments pilots provided that stated that the speed guidance was too 
twitchy, or that the gains should be turned down. In general, the data suggest that the IM 
operation was acceptable during all of the error condition circumstances; nevertheless, the Wind 
Error and Offset Error scenarios had a greater chance of creating outlier ratings that were 
unacceptable. It is suspected that the pilot ratings indicating high frustration with the IM 
procedures occurred because of the large number of speed changes that were present in these 
conditions. It may be possible to decrease the frustration and interruptions by providing pilots 
with display and procedures that show them why the algorithm is commanding specific speed 
changes, and increase their ability to predict the spacing algorithm’s behavior in the near future. 
Despite the frustration, there were only a few instances where pilots thought IM was unsafe. 
It is useful to understand some of the outliers in the ratings provided by pilots. Of particular 
interest are the three instances where the flight crew slightly agreed that the IM operation was 
unsafe and the two instances when they provided a neutral rating. Some of these ratings were 
caused by a simulator anomaly, which commanded the pilots to fly at Mach 0.85 prior to their 
TOD. Other comments indicated that the ASTAR10 waited until a point after the FAF to 
command the aircraft’s final approach speed (this will occur if the aircraft is below the profile 
speed), and because pilots were not given adequate time to slow their aircraft to meet the 250 
knot speed limit at 10,000 ft. The two neutral comments were provided because pilots had to 
reconfigure the aircraft to achieve the commanded speed, and because they spent too much time 
monitoring the PFD for commanded speed changes. The ratings that indicated that the 
commanded speeds were incorrect were provided because of commanded speed increases that 
were shortly followed by speed decreases, ASTAR10 commanding the final approach speed after 
the FAF, and because speed changes occurred too frequently. The ratings that stated that speed 
changes occurred too frequently occurred during Wind Error scenarios and to a lesser extent 
during the Offset Error scenarios. 
There were questionnaire responses that indicated that the spacing algorithm could interrupt 
pilots thought processes, primarily due to the pilots’ inability to predict FIM speed changes. 
Other responses indicated some of the FIM speed changes were unexpected, appeared to conflict 
with other information, or too many occurred within a short period of time. Ratings indicating 
that pilots were frustrated included speed changes that were very frequent, speed changes that 
did not make sense to the flight crew, speed changes that forced pilots to reconfigure their 
aircraft, and the need to use an excessive amount of speed brakes. These examples as discussed 
demonstrate the rationale behind the worst ratings provided by pilots. It should be remembered 
that the poor ratings represented a small number of runs, and that many of them were instigated 
by large error sources that pilots are not expected to encounter very often. Nevertheless, these 
ratings can provide insight into what behavior pilots typically find unacceptable. A majority of 
the critiques that flight crews provided throughout the experiment can be broken down into three 
categories: too many speed changes on final, too many speed changes within a short period of 
time, and undesirable speed increases. 
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5.3.4 Pilot Comments about Use of Data Comm 
Following each scenario, the flight crew completed an electronic questionnaire with 
questions about workload, situation awareness, procedure acceptability, and display elements. 
Two specific questions were:  1) was the time required to respond to CPDLC a distraction from 
other tasks, and 2) if the head down time required to respond to CPDLC messages was 
acceptable. There are 120 responses from ATOL flight crew (3 groups of 4 pilots, each group 
completed 10 scenarios) and 60 responses from IFD and DTS flight crew (only the Pilot 
Monitoring results used in this analysis, therefore 3 groups of 2 pilots, for 10 scenarios each). 
Figure 42 shows the median response given by flight crew (red line) was Moderately Agree to 
Completely Agree when asked if the CPDLC messages used for the FIM clearance in the 
IMSPiDR experiment did not detract from other cockpit tasks. Figure 43 shows the mean 
response of Moderately Agree to Completely Agree when asked if the amount of head down 
time required to respond to CPDLC messages was acceptable. The edges of the blue box indicate 
the 25th and 75th percentile, the black whisker bar extends to the most extreme data point not 
considered an outlier, and outliers are shown as blue circles. 
Figure 42.  Pilot rating for CPDLC not detracting from other tasks. 
Figure 43.  Pilot acceptability rating of head down time required for CPDLC. 
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Prior to the Post-Experiment questionnaire, the crews were reminded that the instructions 
they received during training were to consider these Interval Management spacing procedures in 
the context of a busy operational terminal area environment, to include poor weather, at an 
unfamiliar airport, and with an inexperienced crewmember. 
The flight crews were asked to rate if “The use of CPDLC messages were operationally 
acceptable as simulated in this experiment” on a scale of “1” (Completely Disagree) to “7” 
(Completely Agree), with “6” defined as Moderately Agree. The mean acceptability rating of the 
FIM procedures for the 24 flight crews was 6.25, with a SD of 1.07. 
The flight crews were asked “How long should a pilot have in a busy terminal (as simulated 
by this experiment) to respond to a CPDLC uplink message? Consider other cockpit tasks, 
environmental conditions, complexity of flight operation, importance of the message, crew 
coordination and briefing, etc.” The mean rating for all 24 crews was 42.7 seconds, with a SD of 
35.6 seconds. 
23 of the 24 flight crew answered YES to “Within the context of an approach into a busy 
terminal area, are there times when it is not acceptable to receive an FIM CPDLC message?” A 
breakdown of how the flight crew responded to when it would not be acceptable to send FIM 
clearances via CPDLC is shown in Table 16. 
Table 16.  Acceptable Use of CPDLC by Altitude 
Altitude Number Percent
Acceptable at all times 2 8% 
Acceptable with caveat for altitude 20 -- 
(1) No messages below 18,000ft (1) 4% 
(2) No messages below 10,000ft (13) 54% 
(3) No messages below 5,000ft (includes within 10 minutes 
of landing, on downwind, and when on final) (20) 83% 
When given with ATC verbal communication (no altitude associated) 1 4% 
In weather, turbulence, off-nominal conditions (no altitude associated) 1 4%
TOTAL 24 --
Following the post-experiment questionnaire, a debrief session with the research team and 
the subject pilots was held, generally lasting 45 to 60 minutes. A synopsis of comments 
pertaining to use of CPDLC in a busy terminal area for FIM spacing operations includes: 
 Appropriate use of CPDLC reduces voice communication, which reduces stress and 
miscommunication. 
 Use of CPDLC tends to be more acceptable in airspace with all aircraft operating 
under ATC control (above 18,000 ft MSL in the U.S.) and when weather conditions 
preclude aircraft operating under visual flight rules (poor weather), since flight crew 
have reduced visual scan responsibilities. 
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 As experience is gained with CPDLC, the workload would decrease further and 
acceptability should increase. 
 The procedure should allow for reloading a CPDLC message into the spacing tool if 
required.
 If the CPDLC equipment is certified to accurately transmit messages from the ground 
to the aircraft, and the aircraft avionics are certified to accurately transfer the 
information from the CPDLC message into the spacing tool, the crews should conduct 
only a cursory review of the data in the MCDU FIM spacing pages. Certified CPDLC 
equipment was estimated to reduce flight crew Respond time by 10 seconds. 
 The CPDLC interaction required too many button pushes to accomplish the FIM 
procedure. The multiple button pushes, especially when occurring in different 
locations (for example, the CPDLC pages on one MCDU and FIM pages on the other), 
were confusing, time consuming, and the root cause for the three runs excluded from 
data analysis. The crews made two suggestions to reduce the number of steps in the 
FIM procedure: 
(1) 5-step as implemented:  Review, Load, Activate, Accept, Execute (Figure 4) 
(2) 4-step recommendation:  combine the ACTIVATE and EXECUTE 
functionality for the spacing tool into one button push. 
(3) 3-step recommendation:  if transmission and transfer accuracy can be certified 
(see comment above), the LOAD button push should auto-load the message 
into the spacing tool and the spacing tool should automatically calculate the 
speed (Review, Load, Accept). A CPDLC process utilizing only 3 steps would 
require the ground scheduling software to send a very high rate of 
operationally acceptable clearances to the crew, and allow for the crew to 
request a change or terminate the clearance at a later time (currently in the 
concept of operations document). It was estimated this procedure would 
probably reduce flight crew Respond time by 15 to 30 seconds. 
5.3.5 Pilot Comments about FIM Displays 
5.3.5.1 Saliency of FIM Display Elements 
Overall, flight crews were able to maintain their speed within approximately six knots of the 
FIM Commanded Speed; however, they reported a need for more salient notification of changes 
to that speed (e.g., flashing box, chime). Crews reported that an indication of the controlling 
aircraft (green outer icon and data tag on ND) was useful, but not needed for conducting FIM 
operations. However, a strong preference was given for more salient displays to indicate when a 
speed change had occurred. Additionally, a strong preference was given for a display to monitor 
the progress of the operation. 
On the PFD, the commanded end speed was displayed directly above the FMS commanded 
speed, and the commanded speed bug was designed to mate with the FMS speed bug. Displaying 
FIM speeds on the PFD allows flight crew to easily determine if the FMS speed matches the 
commanded speed, and what the commanded speed is in relation to other parameters displayed 
on the PFD. Similarly, the modifications to the ND were designed to allow flight crews to 
quickly identify the lead aircraft and maintain situation awareness regarding their progress. 
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Additionally, redundancy was built into the pilot interface. If the flight crew failed to implement 
a speed decrease and was flying too fast, they could see the discrepancy on the PFD, and the IM 
DRAG REQUIRED message would appear on the EICAS display. As a result of this human-
centered design, flight crews found most of the display elements intended to support spacing 
operations to be useful and intuitive. For example, 63% of the flight crews reported that the 
display elements used in this experiment were easy to understand and positioned in logical 
locations. However, 29% of the flight crews stated that the information conveyed by the displays 
was adequate and that improvements were needed regarding how and/or where the information 
was displayed. Most of the flight crews recommending that improvements be made focused on 
the need for a more salient alert associated with changes to the commanded speed. 
5.3.5.2 Usefulness of FIM Display Elements 
While various display elements did not serve as independent variables within this 
experiment, qualitative data collected from the pilot participants were used to examine their 
interaction with the spacing tool in terms of how useful they found each display element and how 
they monitored the displays. Using a scale of “1” (Detrimental) to “6” (Required), flight crew 
rated all of the display elements on the PFD as “very useful” or “required,” with the exception of 
the box located around the commanded speed (to alert flight crew of a speed change) that was 
rated as moderately useful (M=4.67, SD=1.46, N=24) (Figure 44). A majority of the other display 
elements on the ND, MCDU, and EICAS were rated as moderately useful, with the lowest rated 
display element, an IM SPEED LIMITED message on the EICAS, receiving a rating of slightly 
to moderately useful (M=3.38, SD=1.31, N=24).
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Figure 44.  Pilot rating of FIM display elements. 
In addition to asking flight crews about the usefulness of each display element, they were 
asked to rate how frequently they used each display to monitor the spacing operation. Using a 
scale of 1 (Never) to 5 (All the Time), flight crews reported that they monitored the PFD very 
often (M=4.26, SD=0.75, N=24), monitored the ND moderately to very often (M=3.86, SD=1.11, 
N=24), and monitored the MCDU slightly to moderately often (M=2.70, SD=0.97, N=24) (Figure 
45). These data demonstrate that the flight crews used the displays as anticipated and found the 
displays used in this experiment to be useful. 
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Figure 45.  Pilot ratings regarding how often FIM displays were monitored. 
Since the spacing error was displayed only on the first FIM MCDU page, there was concern 
that flight crews would spend more time than desired monitoring that page rather than utilizing 
the MCDU for normal flight tasks as intended. The metrics collected included the total number 
of visits to the first FIM page and the time spent on the first FIM page as a percentage of total 
flight time. The full crew simulators collected the metric of total visits to either of the MCDUs, 
and the total time either of the MCDUs showed the first FIM page as a percentage of flight time. 
Results indicate that the flight crew visited the first MCDU page an average of 4.44 (SD=3.13,
N=180) times throughout a flight and spent an average of 26% (SD=30, N=180) of the flight on 
the MCDU. However, median time spent on the first FIM page was 11%. Since the IFD and DTS 
each have two MCDUs, the FIM page could be kept on one and not the other. When only the 
IFD and DTS data were reviewed, the median percentage of time spent monitoring the first FIM 
MCDU page was 17% (M=22, SD=21, N=60) of the simulation time, and the median number of 
times the page was visited was 4% (M=4.58, SD=2.7, N=60). Since the pilots were more likely to 
monitor the FIM MCDU pages within the context of this experiment, the data suggest that pilots 
will use the spacing error but will not spend excessive amounts of time viewing the first FIM 
MCDU page. 
5.3.5.3 Speed Changes Alerts and Non-Conformance 
One of the flight crews’ major responsibilities with respect to airborne spacing was to 
monitor the PFD for changes to the commanded speed. Within this experiment, the alert that was 
provided to the flight crew was the illumination of a green box around the commanded end speed 
for ten seconds. Pilot responses reveal that the green box was inadequate to attract the pilots’ 
attention, and it caused the pilots to spend too much time monitoring the PFD for speed changes. 
Of the 24 pilot participants, 23 thought that a more salient alert, either in place of or in addition 
to the green box, was needed. Additional comments throughout the questionnaires as well as 
researcher observations of flight crews confirm this result. Within the post-experiment 
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questionnaire, the flight crews were asked to select whether they desired the currently 
implemented green box, a flashing box, a chime, or any combination. 67% of flight crews 
indicated that they would like an aural alert to be included as part of a system to notify them of 
speed changes; 54% stated that they would like the box around the commanded end speed to 
flash for ten seconds; and 25% desired both a flashing box around the commanded end speed as 
well as an aural alert. 
While it is useful to gather pilot opinions regarding the type of alert they desire, it is also 
important to discuss the potential impact from a human factors standpoint. The type of alert used 
should depend on the importance of the alert. A distinct aural alert will immediately direct a 
pilot’s attention to a new commanded speed. However, it will cause increased disruption if the 
flight crews are in the process of completing other critical tasks. Based on distribution of speed 
changes as a function of time-to-go and the dependence of the number of speed changes on error 
source, the disruption will worsen as the aircraft approaches the runway and as conditions 
worsen. In contrast, a flashing green box would provide a more salient alert than the non-flashing 
box implemented in this experiment; however, the chance of the flight crew missing the speed 
changes is greater with this implementation than for an aural alert. 
In addition to the alert given for a new commanded speed, an EICAS alert, presenting the 
text IM DRAG REQUIRED, was given when the aircraft was greater than 6 knots above the 
commanded speed and was turned off when the aircraft returned to within 4 knots of the 
commanded speed. A few pilots stated that the EICAS message, IM DRAG REQUIRED, did not 
necessarily indicate when they had to apply drag. Data were evaluated to determine how often 
flight crews used the speed brake when the EICAS message appeared. The IM DRAG 
REQUIRED message was activated an average of 3.53 (SD=1.44, N=180) times per flight, and 
the flight crews used the speed brake during 84% (SD=25, N=180) of these instances, 
demonstrating that the message resulted in the desired response a majority of the time. The high 
SD of compliance coupled with researcher observations suggests that there were some flight 
crews who judicially used the speed brake to meet the commanded speed, while there were 
others who did not desire to use the speed brake to maintain the five knot tolerance. It is 
hypothesized that those who are willing to judicially use the speed brakes will find the IM 
DRAG REQUIRED message helpful, while those who do not will find it a nuisance. 
5.3.5.4 Predictability of Speed Changes 
Having the flight crews be able to predict when the next ASTAR10 speed change occurs was 
not a design goal. Using a scale of 1 (Completely Disagree) to 7 (Completely Agree), the flight 
crews moderately agreed that it is important to be able to predict changes to the commanded 
speed (M=5.46, SD=1.28, N=24). Additionally, flight crews moderately agreed that the spacing 
tool behaved in a predictable manner (M=6.04, SD=0.55, N=24) and slightly agreed that they 
were able to predict commanded speeds before they occurred (M=5.36, SD=1.37, N=180). Thus, 
the pilots’ qualitative ratings indicate both the importance of predictability and that the spacing 
tool was somewhat predictable. To help drive future design decisions, it is important to discern 
what information pilots use for their predictions. Flight crews were asked to describe the displays 
and/or trends that helped them predict changes to the commanded speed, and their comments 
showed that 46% of them used the first FIM page on the MCDU to drive their predictions while 
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46% used the published speed profile, scheduled speed decreases, or general flight rules to 
enable their predictions. Finally, 29% of the flight crews stated that they used visual 
representations of the lead aircraft to predict when speed changes would occur. 
A number of the comments that pilots provided suggested that they were attempting to 
understand the relationship between the time error that was displayed on the MCDU and the 
speed commands generated by ASTAR10. The following comments demonstrate that pilots often 
had an incorrect or incomplete mental model of the relationship between the time error displayed 
on the MCDU and the commanded speed changes. 
 “Maybe with more experience I'd have a better feel for what speed comes next, but 
even when we seem to be ahead of our goal (time) we still get commands to speed up.”
 “The conformance box was the easiest method to predict performance and trends. 
Without it I had to refer to the IM page in the CDU. Even then it was difficult to predict 
the next commanded speed. On several occasions when I checked the IM page it 
showed me as much as 23 sec ahead of schedule and yet it subsequently commanded a 
speed increase.” 
 “I was looking at the IM page and noting error in the progress. For example, if I 
noticed it was late and trending later, it was easy to expect that there was a change 
coming for an increase.” 
Based on the comments, it appears as if some pilots thought that speed changes would only 
increase if the time error was positive (arriving late), and only decrease if the time error was 
negative (arriving early). In reality, the commanded speed will move toward the nominal profile 
speed as the time error moves toward zero. This means that if the time error is increasing, the 
commanded speed will increase, and if the time error is decreasing, the commanded speed will 
decrease (regardless of the value of the time error). The pilot that provided the final comment 
was close to figuring this relationship out; however, the commanded speed will increase even if 
he was early and the time error was increasing. Overall, most of the confusion appears to be 
centered on the relationship between the FIM speed and the time error. Future indicators of the 
time error between the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft should concentrate on providing clear 
indication of the relationship between the time error and commanded speed changes. 
5.3.5.5 FIM Conformance Box 
Flight crews in this experiment were presented with a “conformance box” during the 
experiment’s final, exploratory run. This display was a green box that appeared around the 
depiction of the ownship aircraft on the ND, indicating how much control authority ASTAR10 
has. If the ownship moved outside the conformance box, the algorithm is predicting that it is no 
longer possible for the aircraft to meet the spacing goal by a given “achieve by point.” The goal 
of the conformance box was to provide flight crew with better predictability regarding the 
spacing operation. Using a scale of 1 (Completely Disagree) to 7 (Completely Agree), pilots 
slightly to moderately agreed that the conformance box helped them monitor the FIM operation 
(M=5.29, SD=1.78, N=24) and that the conformance box should be part of any display designed 
to support FIM operations (M=5.36, SD=1.62, N=24). However, the flight crews were only 
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neutral to slightly in agreement with the statements that the conformance box helped them 
predict speed changes (M=4.75, SD=1.80, N=24), that it increased the level of safety of FIM 
(M=4.75, SD=1.78, N=24), or that it increased their comfort with FIM (M=4.88, SD=1.98,
N=24). Additionally, one pilot misinterpreted the conformance box as a separation box, and one 
pilot would have disobeyed the commanded speed to center his aircraft in the box if his 
crewmember had not intervened. 
In the end, the conformance box provided pilots a snapshot of their time error relative to the 
“excessive error” bounds. However, it did not help pilots understand why they were receiving 
particular speed commands, or help the pilots obtain an accurate mental model of ASTAR10. An 
example is demonstrated by the following quote: 
 “The conformance box was the easiest method to predict performance and trends. 
Without it I had to refer to the IM page in the CDU. Even then it was difficult to predict 
the next commanded speed. On several occasions when I checked the IM page it showed 
me as much as 23 sec ahead of schedule and yet it subsequently commanded a speed 
increase.” 
The comment suggests that while the conformance box provided pilots with an easy way to 
determine how well the spacing operation was proceeding, it did not help them understand the 
rationale behind the commanded speeds or provide them with a more accurate mental model of 
IM. The pilot made the same mistake that was present in previous comments; that a negative 
(early) time error meant that the commanded speeds would always decrease. Pilot comments 
demonstrate that they are attempting to connect the time error shown on their displays to the 
speed commands they are receiving. Future trend indicators should concentrate on making this 
relationship more apparent. 
5.4 Off-Nominal Scenario 
Each flight crew experienced one exploratory off-nominal scenario, and only questionnaire 
data were collected and analyzed. This off-nominal scenario occurred after all the other scenarios 
were complete, and examined: 
 Issuing a FIM clearance at low altitude; 
 Terminating the FIM operation and issuing a new FIM clearance; 
 Inserting an aircraft into the arrival stream; 
 Spacing behind an aircraft to a converging runway; and 
 Spacing behind an aircraft on the same arrival but landing on a parallel runway. 
Traffic arrived from all directions; however, normal KDFW operations (independent parallel 
runways) were used and the spacing behind aircraft reduced to simulate a typical arrival rate 
during visual weather conditions (approximately 70 to 100 seconds between aircraft). A cloud 
deck between 2000 ft and 6000 ft MSL was added to invoke instrument flight rule scan patterns 
and tasks for the flight crew (in particular, to allow for head-down time below 10,000 ft). 
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To explore issuing a FIM clearance at low altitude, the final controller instructed one of the 
aircraft conducting a FIM operation to “go-around for insufficient spacing” when approximately 
two miles from the runway threshold. To create realistic closure behind the Target aircraft on 
controller scopes and cockpit displays, the appropriate Target aircraft (an ASTOR station) was 
intentionally slowed to 150 knots well prior to when it should have slowed. The three crews that 
experienced this event were aware of the closure to Target through voice communication and 
cockpit displays, and commented that the closure allowed by the FIM Commanded Speed 
appeared to be too great (range, speed, and closure information was intentionally not displayed 
on the ND). After the go-around, the IFD crews were also issued a new FIM clearance while 
climbing to 5000 ft MSL. Even though the aircraft was in the weather and ATC responsible for 
aircraft separation, crews reported head down time and workload as too great for CPDLC 
messages containing FIM clearances in that environment (below 10,000 ft, proximity to other 
aircraft, etc.). 
To create a gap in the arrival stream, a different crew had their FIM clearance amended to 
increase their spacing interval from 100 to 145 seconds. This was timed to occur just after the 
aircraft in the paragraph above initiated the go-around procedure, which the research team felt 
would be representative of a robust FIM operation. Three minutes later, the original FIM 
clearance was terminated, and the crew was issued a new FIM clearance with a different Target 
aircraft and spacing interval. The flight crew were generally passing through 12,000 ft MSL and 
changing frequencies to the TRACON controller when the second FIM clearance was issued. All 
three crews commented the workload was manageable but a significant challenge, and were 
somewhat aware that the change and new clearance had been issued to accommodate the 
insertion of an aircraft into the arrival stream. 
Both crews (the one being inserted into the arrival stream, and the one creating a gap and 
changing to a new Target) were asked to comment about the feasibility and acceptability of 
inserting an aircraft into the arrival stream. All the crews involved felt comfortable with the 
physical location of the aircraft (range and closure to other traffic); however, the response to 
whether the FIM operation was acceptable was driven by the altitude the crew was at when the 
event occurred. The crew of the go-around aircraft stated conducting any operation that required 
significant head-down time was not acceptable at low altitude, and the crew of the aircraft 
creating the gap in the arrival stream reported that the FIM operation was acceptable. 
The crews spacing behind a Target aircraft proceeding to a converging runway, and those 
spacing behind a Target aircraft on the same arrival but landing on a parallel runway, reported no 
additional workload to conduct that operation, and that the procedure was operationally 
acceptable. 
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6 Conclusions 
This section provides a high-level general summary conclusion of the IMSPiDR experiment, 
then more detail for each of the four experiment objectives. The final sub-section addresses 
issues that require further research. 
6.1 General Summary Conclusion 
Pilot participants flew arrivals into KDFW using one of three different simulators located at 
NASA LaRC to explore a range of aircraft equipage levels and the resulting crew procedures for 
FIM operations. Scenarios were flown using either RTA or RTA+FIM control methods during 
various types of error. Results indicate that pilots delivered their aircraft to the runway threshold 
within 3.5 seconds (SD=4 seconds) of the RTA, and within 2.2 seconds (SD=3.9 seconds) of the 
spacing interval for the respective control methods. Analysis of the time error and number of IM 
speed changes as a function of position in the arrival stream suggest the spacing algorithm 
generates stable behavior in the stream while in the presence of continuous (wind) or impulse 
(offset) error. The mean time for the flight crew to load the FIM clearance into the spacing tool, 
review the calculated speed, and respond to ATC was under 43 seconds. 
An overall mean rating of Moderately Agree was given when the crews were asked if the use 
of CPDLC was operationally acceptable as simulated in this experiment. Flight crews reported 
the FIM concept, procedures, and interfaces acceptable, and associated workload levels to be 
low. Concerns cited included the occurrence of multiple speed changes within a short time 
period, speed changes required within twenty miles of the runway, and an increase in airspeed 
followed shortly by a decrease in airspeed. 
6.2 Performance and Behavior of the FIM Software 
Experiment results indicate that aircraft, with the flight crew using FIM procedures to fly a 
speed generated by the ASTAR10 spacing algorithm, were able to arrive at the runway threshold 
within a 2.2 second mean (SD=0.9 seconds) from the assigned spacing interval. The type of error 
(wind or offset) did cause different algorithm behavior to resolve the spacing time error; 
however, the difference of the final error at the runway threshold was within 1.3 seconds, which 
is considered operationally insignificant. 
To achieve this precision at the runway, the number of additional speed changes over that 
required for the published approach, ranged from “5” (No Error scenarios) to “11” (wind shear 
plus forecast wind error scenarios). In general, these speed changes happened predictably and 
used smaller magnitude speed changes than currently used by controllers. The number of speed 
changes was also dependent on, and compensated for, the variance in pilot performance. 
One of the major differences between aircraft controlled to an absolute time (RTA scenarios) 
and those controlled to an interval behind a lead aircraft (RTA+IM scenarios) occurred during 
the Wind Error scenarios. Plots of the time error throughout the arrival demonstrated that the 
aircraft in the RTA scenarios had a large increase in time error when flying through the wind 
shear, whereas the aircraft in the RTA+IM scenarios were less affected by the wind shear when 
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on the same trajectory as the controlling Target aircraft. The difference is most likely due to the 
fact that the wind shear occurs during a segment of flight where the spacing aircraft and lead 
aircraft were on the same path, thus they flew through the same wind shear and were able to 
maintain the spacing between themselves and their lead aircraft. The analysis of the difference 
between an aircraft’s nominal profile speed and the FIM commanded speeds did not reveal large 
differences between the RTA control method and the RTA+IM control method for No Error and 
Offset Error scenarios. 
Analysis of time error by runway showed no statistically significant difference. Analysis of 
the time error and number of FIM speed changes as a function of position in the arrival stream 
suggest the spacing algorithm generates predictable and desirable behavior in the stream while in 
the presence of continuous (wind) or impulse (offset) error. 
6.3 Performance and Behavior of Flight Crew During FIM Operations 
Pilot reaction time to changes in the FIM speed varied by error condition, and it is 
hypothesized that No Error scenarios had a longer reaction time because the flight crew were less 
vigilant in monitoring the FIM speed than during the Wind Error scenarios. However, the 1.6 
second difference in mean reaction time is considered operationally insignificant. The pilots’ 
ability to remain within 5 knots of the FIM speed varied by error condition, with the Wind Error 
again being the most challenging. In-depth analysis indicates the majority of the deviation (in all 
scenarios) occurred during the initial deceleration to the next FIM speed. 
In general, it took approximately 6 seconds for the flight crew to read the CPDLC message 
containing the FIM clearance, and this did not vary by simulator type or run order. In 87% of the 
runs, the flight crew were able to respond via CPDLC within 60 seconds (send an accept 
message). Review of all 23 of 177 data points where a CPDLC response was not sent within 60 
seconds indicates the flight crew had sufficient time to respond; however, they either forgot or 
thought they had sent the FIM clearance accept message via CPDLC. The mean response time 
for the two-crew simulators was approximately 12 seconds more than the single-pilot simulator, 
reflecting the time required for the crew to coordinate with each other about the message.  
6.4 Flight Crew Assessment of the FIM Concept, Procedures, and Displays 
Flight crews generally found the airborne spacing concept and procedures acceptable, and 
reported the speeds commanded by ASTAR10 as correct, safe, and comfortable. However, the 
large wind and offset errors injected into the system resulted in specific algorithm behaviors that 
flight crews found undesirable. These behaviors included too many speed changes within a short 
period of time, too many speed changes while on final approach, speed reversals, and speed 
increases that required the flaps to be raised. 
Flight crews rated the workload of FIM operations as 1.97 (1 very easy, 10 impossible), and 
the pilot interface used in support of the spacing operation was found to be useful and utilized in 
the way anticipated. The subject pilots reported that the alert designed to notify them of speed 
command changes was not sufficiently salient, causing them to spend excessive time monitoring 
the speed command symbology on the PFD. 
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Flight crews provided post-run and post-experiment ratings regarding the use of CPDLC as 
the means of communication for FIM operations. On a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree), they moderately agreed that the use of CPDLC did not detract from other 
tasks, and moderately agreed that the amount of head down time required for CPDLC was 
acceptable. However, they also reported that the particular procedure used for the FIM operation 
required too many button pushes, and the procedure should be simplified. 
Although the flight crews were able to remain within approximately 6 knots of the FIM 
speed, the need for more salient notification of changes to the FIM speed was reported. On the 
same scale of 1 to 7, flight crews moderately agreed that it was important to be able to predict the 
next FIM speed change, and moderately agreed that the spacing software itself was predictable. 
In addition to that result, a few pilots misinterpreted the relationship between the time error value 
on the MCDU and the speed commands that the spacing algorithm provided. Future displays 
depicting the time error should concentrate on making this relationship more apparent to the 
flight crew. 
The desire most often expressed by the flight crews was to have a selectable (not always 
visible) representation of the current status and trend of the FIM operation (similar to the 
conformance box used during the off-nominal scenario). The crews also expressed a desire for 
more predictable FIM speed changes, and fewer of them (primarily during Wind Error 
scenarios). Finally, crews expressed a desire for more salient alerting for FIM speed changes. 
6.5 Potential Operational Issues of the FIM Concept 
This section discusses issues that were outside the scope of the experiment or beyond the 
capability of the simulation platforms at the time of the IMSPiDR experiment. 
6.5.1 Aircraft Avionics 
An accurate understanding is needed of the likelihood of various aircraft equipment failures, 
and future FIM experiments should explore the procedures to be used when those events occur. 
Examples include failure of the Target aircraft’s ADS-B, failure of the FIM aircraft’s ADS-B, 
and failure of the FIM aircraft’s CPDLC. 
FIM arrival operations that begin when within the jet stream may exhibit behavior not yet 
simulated. A real-world operational example is en route controllers must begin the descent of 
east-bound aircraft into KDFW early to compensate for the jet stream from the west. 
The behavior of an aircraft conducting FIM and a second aircraft not conducting FIM as they 
approach a common merge point from different directions must be thoroughly studied and 
understood.
The FIM procedures and controller-pilot phraseology would be considerably simplified, 
resulting in lower workload and less error, if the FIM software was able to determine the FIM 
and Target aircraft’s route without requiring the flight crew to enter that information. 
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6.5.2 Flight Crew Procedures 
A study should be conducted to determine if flight crews can be more precise if the 
ASTAR10 spacing software uses a static location for when the FIM mode changes to the FAS 
(currently it varies based on the time error left to be corrected). 
The FIM procedures should be retested using CPDLC with the acknowledgement timers 
turned on. These were intentionally turned off at the request of the FAA (to measure all crew 
response times); however, this twice created a situation where the crew thought they had sent an 
ACCEPT message to ATC and were conducting the FIM operation, but ATC had in fact not 
been notified. 
6.5.3 Air Traffic Control Software 
The current version of software available to en route and terminal airspace controllers does 
not have a mechanism to indicate which aircraft are FIM capable, which aircraft are conducting 
FIM operations, which aircraft are being used as a Target, nor is there method to display the FIM 
clearance. Furthermore, there are no controller decision support tools or displays to indicate the 
position and trend of the FIM aircraft to the desired location. 
The current flight plan format does not enable the flight crew or the airline to specify which 
aircraft or what flight is FIM capable. 
6.5.4 Air Traffic Control Procedures 
To enable arrival operations that rely on speed control alone, the published arrival procedures 
(for example, a STAR) should be designed with slightly shallower descent angles and slower 
speeds to enable the use of speed control only during arrival operations. 
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Appendix A: Glossary 
This Appendix is the Glossary of terms and their definitions frequently used and important to 
this experiment. Well known acronyms (e.g., FAA, NASA) are not included. 
Table 17.  Acronyms and Definitions 
Acronym Term Definition 
4D 
trajectory 
Four-dimensional trajectory The centerline of a path formed by segments that link consecutive 
trajectory change points; each point defined by a longitude, 
latitude, altitude. NOTE: some waypoints may have time, altitude, 
and/or speed constraints. These restrictions can be equality (e.g., 
specific altitutude) or inequality (e.g., at or above) constraints. 
-- Achieve-By Point Waypoint on the FIM aircraft’s route where the Assigned Spacing 
Goal behind the Target aircraft is expected to be achieved. 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast 
ADS-B is a technology where aircraft avionics (or ground 
equipment) autonomously broadcasts the aircraft’s (or ground 
vehicle’s) position, altitude, velocity, and other parameters. “ADS-
B Out” refers to the broadcast of ADS-B transmissions from an 
aircraft or vehicle, and “ADS-B In” refers to reception of the ADS-
B transmissions from other aircraft or vehicles. 
ASTAR Airborne Spacing for Terminal 
Arrival Routes 
Advanced flight deck-based automation that constantly calculates 
the airspeed required to position an aircraft at the Achieve By 
Point at the Assigned Spacing Goal behind the Target aircraft. 
ASTAR10 Airborne Spacing for Terminal 
Arrival Routes 
Version of ASTAR specifically designed for dependent parallel 
runway operations (two Target aircraft). 
ETA Estimated Time-of-Arrival The current estimate of the aircraft’s time-of-arrival at a point 
along its flight path based on forecast winds, aircraft performance 
and defined arrival procedures, but not adjusted to compensate for 
traffic separation or metering delays. The ETA is re-calculated 
whenever an event occurs, such as route-of-flight change, etc. 
FAS Final Approach Speed The airspeed flown from the FAF to the runway. There are flight 
crew and airline variances for when this speed is achieved. 
FIM Flight deck Interval 
Management 
Flight crew makes use of specialized avionics that provides speed 
commands for interval management. Exclusively the airborne 
component of entire IM system. 
-- FIM aircraft The aircraft receiving speed commands from the onboard FIM 
equipment to achieve the assigned spacing behind the Target 
aircraft. This aircraft must have ADS-B transmit and receive 
equipment, and be equipped for FIM operations. 
-- FIM clearance The FIM clearance contains the Target aircraft’s identification 
(callsign) and the Assigned Spacing Goal (ASG), the RTA to the 
Achieve By Point (the runway threshold in IMSPiDR), and the 
Target’s route of flight. 
-- FIM Commanded End Speed The speed calculated and provided by the aircraft FIM equipment 
during a FIM operation to achieve the Assigned Spacing Goal 
behind the Target by the Achieve-By Point. Airspeed at the end of 
the change; occurs as a discrete jump; shown in digits on displays. 
-- FIM Commanded Speed The FIM Commanded End Speed adjusted for aircraft’s 
deceleration, estimated for that moment, shown by the speed bug. 
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Table 17.  Acronyms and Definitions (concluded) 
Acronym Term Definition 
-- FIM operations Refers to one or more FIM aircraft actively spacing to achieve the 
ASG behind their Target aircraft. Responsibility for spacing 
(accomplished by flying the FIM speed) resides with the flight 
crew, aircraft separation responsibility remains with ATC. 
-- FIM speed mode: 
- RTA
- FIM 
- FNL 
Various ASTAR10 modes once FIM clearance has been entered. 
- Airpeed to meet time at runway (no Tartget ADS-B data) 
- Airpseed to achieve Spacing Interval behind Target 
- FMS calculated final approach speed; after FAF 
FMS Flight Management System Computerized avionics component found on most commercial and 
business aircraft for navigation, flight planning, and aircraft 
control functions. It is composed of: Flight Management 
Computer, Auto Flight System, Navigation System (including 
Inertial Reference System and Global Positioning System), and an 
Electronic Flight Instrument System. 
GIM-S Ground-based Interval 
Management - Spacing 
Ground-based functions to support aircraft crossing the TRACON 
boundary along the route of flight at specific times or STAs.
IM Interval Management Systems to achieve and maintain spacing between aircraft. 
Includes flight deck (FIM) and ground-based (GIM-S) elements. 
OPD Optimized Profile Descent Designed to reduce fuel consumption, emissions, and noise during 
descent by allowing aircraft to fly an optimized descent during 
arrival with engines near idle from en route altitude to the runway 
threshold (however, it may not include the instrument approach 
portion). OPD procedures specify the lateral path, vertical 
boundaries, and a speed for every segment of the procedure. The 
vertical boundaries of the OPD are established to accommodate a 
wide range of descent profiles. 
-- Ownship Refers to the FIM aircraft. 
RTA Required Time of Arrival Entered by the flight crew into the ASTAR10 software; is the 
same as the Scheduled Time of Arrival. 
SI Spacing Interval The true horizontal along-path spacing (expressed in time) 
between the FIM and Target Aircraft. The SI should equal the 
ASG by the Achieve-By Point (final approach fix). 
STA Scheduled Time of Arrival Calculated by the ground scheduling software to meet all of the 
scheduling and sequence constraints; set at “Freeze Horizon” and 
normally not changed thereafter. 
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route A pre-planned instrument arrival procedure published for pilot use 
in graphic and/or textual form. Provides transition from the en 
route structure to an instrument approach fix in the terminal area. 
TGT or 
TTF 
Target aircraft, or 
Traffic To Follow 
The aircraft lead specified by ATC for the FIM aircraft. Must be 
equipped with ADS-B Out (transmit), but is not required to be 
ADS-B In (receive) equipped or capable of FIM operations. TGT 
used in CPDLC messages, TTF used by ASTAR10. 
TOD Top-Of-Descent The computed transition from the cruise phase of flight to the 
descent phase, the point at which the descent to final approach 
altitude is initiated. 
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Appendix B: Dependent Runways and KDFW Operations 
B.1 Dependent Parallel Runway Criteria 
Below are excerpts from the FAA guidance for when dependent parallel runway operations 
must occur [7].  The ground equipment installed at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport (KDFW) 
allows normal operations to occur as independent parallel runway operations despite the runway 
centerlines being less than 9000 ft apart [7]. This experiment assumed that ground equipment 
was not available to explore Flight deck Interval Management (FIM) during dependent parallel 
runway operations. 
 1000 feet (ft) vertical and 3 nautical miles (nmi) radar separation between aircraft 
during turn on. 
 At least 1.5 nmi radar separation diagonally between aircraft when runway centerlines 
are at least 2500 ft but no more than 4300 ft. 
 At least 2.0 nmi radar separation diagonally between aircraft when runway centerlines 
are more than 4300 ft but no more than 9000 ft apart. 
 Provide minimum applicable radar separation between aircraft on the same final. 
B.2 KDFW Operations 
A site visit and briefing was held at KDFW Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) 
on 9/13/2010 to discuss the Interval Management with Spacing to Parallel Dependent Runways 
(IMSPiDR) experiment. Present were Bruce Thorson (TRACON Training Manager), Greg Juro 
(Air Traffic Manager and acting Procedures Manager), James Karanian (FAA Air Traffic 
Operations Office and retired KDFW Center Line Supervisor), and Brian Baxley. Mr. Thorson 
provided to NASA the following documents to describe KDFW TRACON operations: 
 D10 TRACON Air Traffic Control, D10 7110.65 (June 8, 2010) 
 D10 TRACON Arrival / Final Monitor Study Guide 
 D10 TRACON Departure Control Study Guide 
From these documents and briefing, the following is a description of operations that typically 
occur at KDFW, and were used to the maximum extent possible in the IMSPiDR experiment: 
 Maximum arrival rate is approximately 30 aircraft per hour per arrival runway. 
 Arrival runways are typically (east to west) runways 17L, 17C, and 18R. 
 Most of the traffic arrives from the northeast (~65%), followed by southeast (~35%). 
 If traffic is too light to require three runways, runway 17L is not used. 
 If runway 17C is too busy, aircraft will be crossed from the east to the west, and landed 
on runway 18R, or from west to east and landed on runway 17C (~5%). 
 Traffic landing at Dallas Love airfield and arriving from the northwest will be vectored 
north of the field at low altitude (not desired), or brought in over DFW and then rapid 
descent while in a left turn for approach to runway 13L or 13R at Love Field. 
 Turbo-prop aircraft generally arrive from the south and land on runway 13R. 
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 For south flow, the NE and NW corner posts are “low-side”, SE and SW “high-side”. 
 Parallel flows from the “low-side” corner posts (northern points during south flow) will 
offset towards the center line of the airfield (e.g., MASTY Arrival). These flows are used 
to for aircraft flying a different speed, to a different runway, or to a different airfield. 
 Converging ILS approaches are only used when Tower cannot provide visual separation, 
usually when weather is worse than 1000 ft ceiling or 3 nmi visibility. 
 Altitude to intercept runway centerline (Figure 46 for a two runway example is from 
KDFW TRACON training material that is referenced above):  
o Aircraft arriving to runway 17C will always be the highest 
o 2 runway:  runway 17C 5000 ft, runway 18R 4000 ft 
o 3 runway:  runway 17C 6000 ft, runway 18R 5000 ft, runway 17L 4000 
Figure 46.  Separation Requirement for Parallel Approaches 
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Table 18 lists those callsigns and associated airlines that were observed to operate to and 
from KDFW during the site visit hosted by the TRACON in 2010. These callsigns were used in 
the IMSPiDR experiment, and in questions asked after the experiment about using data tags that 
did not align with voice callsign. 
Table 18.  Aircraft Callsigns and Associated Airline 
Display  Spoken Airline 
UPS UPS UPS 
FDX FedEx FedEx 
AAL American American Airlines 
DAL Delta Delta Airlines 
COA Continental Continental Airlines 
BTA JetBlue JetBlue Airlines 
EGF Eagle Flight American Eagle 
RPA Brickyard Republic Airlines 
SWA Southwest Southwest Airlines 
AWE America West America West 
DLH Lufthansa Lufthansa Airlines 
TRS Citrus Airtran Airways 
USA US Air US Airways 
FFT Frontier Frontier Airlines 
GA/Business aviation   
N305LM N305LM n/a 
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Appendix C: Differences of FIM Displays by Simulator 
Features and differences in the Primary Flight Displays (PFD) of the Aircraft Simulation for 
Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) stations, Development and Test Simulator (DTS), and 
Integration Flight Deck (IFD) are shown in Figure 47), and described below. 
 Flight Mode Annunciator bar (upper middle of PFD): 
- ASTOR and DTS:  SPD (Speed), LNAV (Lateral Navigation), VNAV PTH (Path) 
- IFD:  SPD, VNAV PTH, LNAV 
 Auto-pilot (A/P or AP) engaged: 
- ASTOR:  A/P in upper center 
- DTS:  AP ON in upper right 
- IFD:  CMD at top right 
 Aircraft’s FMS commanded speed: 
- ASTOR, DTS:  magenta number in upper left 
- IFD:  no number displayed 
 Aircraft’s FMS commanded speed on the vertical speed tape: 
- ASTOR:  triangle-rectangle (automatic and discrete jump to next value) 
- DTS:  butterfly (automatic and discrete jump to next value) 
- IFD:  single line in the IFD and moved in conjunction with value in Mode Control 
Panel (MCP) window 
o NOTE:  In the ASTOR and DTS, as the aircraft intercepted the final approach 
course, the final approach mode of the Flight Management System (FMS) is 
triggered, which caused the MCP Speed Window to open, and the speed bug 
to behave as in the IFD. 
 FIM commanded end speed (speed to flown, discrete value): 
- ASTOR, DTS, IFD:  green number, above FMS speed (if shown) 
 FIM mode (immediate right of FIM speed): 
- Required Time of Arrival (RTA):  time at achieve-by point (runway threshold) 
- FIM:  paired with Target aircraft transmitting valid ADS-B data 
- Final (FNL):  speed shown is the FMS calculated final approach speed 
 Change to FIM commanded speed number or mode: 
- ASTOR, DTS, IFD:  green box around speed or mode for 10 seconds; removed after 
10 seconds regardless of crew action or inaction (see left plot of Figure 47) 
 FIM commanded speed (accounts for aircraft deceleration, continuous value): 
- ASTOR:  green butterfly to left of magenta FMS speed bug 
- DTS:  green triangle to left of magenta FMS speed bug 
- IFD:  green double line 
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 Aircraft magnetic heading (bottom middle of PFD): 
- ASTOR, DTS:  shown 
- IFD:  not shown 
Figure 47.  PFD for ASTOR (left), DTS (center), and IFD (right). 
Features and differences in the Navigation Displays (ND) of the three simulators is shown in 
Figure 48 and described below. 
 Magnetic heading: 
- ASTOR:  white triangle outside of the heading arc 
- DTS:  green triangle inside the heading arc 
- IFD:  white triangle inside the heading arc 
 Aircraft transmitting ADS-B data shown as: 
- ASTORL:  chevrons 
- DTS, IFD:  diamonds 
 FIM Target aircraft shown as: 
- ASTOR:  double chevron 
- DTS, IFD:  double diamond 
 Target aircraft that determined the FIM speed: 
- ASTOR:  second (outer) chevron green 
- DTS, IFD:  second (outer) diamond green 
 Target aircraft not visible on the ND: 
- ASTOR:  TRAFFIC OFF SCALE text 
- DTS, IFD:  half-symbol at the edge of the display 
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Figure 48.  ND for ASTOR (left), DTS (center), and IFD (right). 
Other simulator differences included: 
 Controller-Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC) interfaces to receive and respond to 
FIM clearance: 
- ASTOR:  used the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) 
- DTS, IFD:  used the Multi-function Control and Display Unit (MCDU) 
 MCDU: 
- ASTOR, DTS, IFD:  IM button in the top row, fourth from the left 
- IFD:  FMC COMM button on the second row, fourth from the left 
 Aircraft control interfaces (flight controls, throttle, speed brake, flaps, gear): 
- ASTOR:  computer mouse for all interactions 
- DTS:  side-stick controller and standard throttle/flap/speed brake quadrant 
- IFD:  yoke and standard throttle/flap/speed brake quadrant 
 Aircraft terminated when: 
- ASTOR: 35 ft above the runway threshold 
- DTS, IFD:  once below 5 knots during rollout 
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Appendix D: Post-Run Questionnaire 
You will be asked to complete a more extensive questionnaire at the end of the experiment, 
so please try and keep written comments as concise as possible. Some questions intended for 
pilots flying a specific simulator are labeled with DTS, IFD, and ATOL. Please only answer 
these questions if the label for the simulator you are flying is present. Questions without a label 
are intended for all participants. 
Administrative Questions 
1. Please circle the scenario you just completed from the list below: 
 Scenario 1 
 Scenario 2 
 Scenario 3 
 Scenario 4 
 Scenario 5 
 Scenario 6 
 Scenario 7 
 Scenario 8 
 Scenario 9 
 Scenario 10 
 Scenario 11 
 Scenario 12 (Extra Scenario, time permitting) 
 Scenario 13 (Extra Scenario, time permitting) 
2. Please circle the simulator you are flying from the list below: 
 ASTOR 4 
 ASTOR 5 
 ASTOR 9 
 ASTOR 10 
 DTS Right Seat 
 DTS Left Seat 
 IFD Right Seat 
 IFD Left Seat 
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Average and Peak Workload Ratings (Modified Cooper-Harper) 
3. Follow the flow chart above to select the average workload you experienced during the 
scenario you just completed. 
 Rating of your average workload level:  _________ 
4. (DTS, IFD only) Follow the flow chart above to select the average workload you believe 
your crew member experienced during the scenario you just completed. 
 Rating of your crew member’s average workload level:  _________ 
(Optional)  Use the space provided below to record any clarifying comments or 
interesting observations related to the workload level you experienced during the last run: 
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5. Follow the flow chart above to select the peak workload you experienced during the 
scenario you just completed. 
 Rating of your peak workload level:  _________ 
 Please select the segment of flight during which your peak workload level occurred: 
o >18,000ft (cruise, initial descent, CPDLC) 
o 18,000ft – 11,000ft (descent, approach check) 
o 11,000ft - 5,000ft (TRACON, low altitude merge) 
o <5,000ft (final approach, configure aircraft) 
6. (DTS, IFD only) Follow the flow chart above to select the peak workload you believe 
your crew member experienced during the scenario you just completed.
 Rating of your crew member’s peak workload level:  _________ 
 Please select the segment of flight during which you believe your crew member’s 
peak workload level occurred (same as above).
(Optional)  Use the space provided below to record any clarifying comments or 
interesting observations related to the workload level you experienced during the last run: 
Situation Awareness and Crew Coordination Ratings 
7. Respond to each of the statements shown below using a scale ranging from “1” (Low) to 
“7” (High). Circle one number in conjunction with each statement. 
Demand on Attentional Resources: 
Rate your overall impression of the scenario in terms of how much 
attention and effort was required to successfully perform the tasks. Items 
to consider include: the likelihood of the situation changing suddenly, the 
degree of complexity associated with the scenario, and the number of 
variables changing in the scenario. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Supply of Attentional Resources: 
Rate the degree of spare attention that you had available to perform tasks 
other than your primary task of flying the aircraft. Items to consider 
include: the amount of focus and concentration needed to complete the 
tasks and how divided you attention was between flying the aircraft and 
other tasks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Understanding:
Rate your overall understanding of the events in the previous scenario. 
Items to consider include: the quantity and quality of information, and the 
familiarity you had with events in the scenario. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8. Respond to each of the statements shown below using a scale ranging from “1” 
(Completely Disagree) to “7” (Completely Agree). Circle one number in conjunction 
with each statement. 
Relevant information, including operational plans, decisions, and 
changes in aircraft state were effectively communicated between yourself 
and your crewmember. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Task priorities were clearly communicated between yourself and your 
crewmember. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The time available for tasks was well managed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Potential distractions caused by automated systems were anticipated, and 
either appropriate action was taken or appropriate plans were made to 
decrease the impact of the distraction. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Awareness and Acceptability Ratings 
9. Respond to each of the statements shown below using a scale ranging from “1” 
(Completely Disagree) to “7” (Completely Agree). Circle one number in conjunction 
with each statement. 
I was aware of commanded speed changes within an appropriate 
timeframe. (You will be asked to define “timely awareness” in the post 
experiment questionnaire) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I was able to implement the speed changes within an appropriate 
timeframe when the speed window was open. (You will be asked to 
define “timely implementation” in the post experiment-questionnaire) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The commanded speed was operationally acceptable and appropriate. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The frequency of IM speed commands was acceptable at all times 
throughout the scenario. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I was able to predict when IM speed changes would occur before they 
were given. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I maintained adequate awareness of my lead aircraft throughout the 
scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The events I experienced in this scenario are operationally realistic. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The flight crew procedures for the events in this scenario are 
operationally feasible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The amount of head down time required to respond to CPDLC messages 
was acceptable. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The time take to review and respond to CPDLC clearances did not
detract from your ability to complete other critical tasks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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10. Answer the following questions based on your experience with the IM spacing tool and 
procedure during the previous run. 
There was a time in the scenario where you thought it was unsafe to fly 
the commanded speed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
There was a time in the scenario where you thought the commanded 
speed would not get you to the runway threshold at the correct time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The IM commanded speed interrupted you while you were in the process 
of completing other critical tasks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
There was a time in the scenario where the spacing tool behaved in an 
unexpected manner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
There was a time in the scenario where you felt that the commanded 
speed or other information available from the spacing tool conflicted 
with other information available through ATC, your CDTI display, voice 
comm., etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
There was a time in the scenario where you felt uncomfortable flying the 
commanded speed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
There was a time in the scenario where you felt frustrated by the spacing 
tool (The spacing tool refers to CPDLC messages, displays, and 
automation that has been added to the aircraft to aid in spacing). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. If desired, please explain any undesirable ratings from the statements above. 
12. Did you receive an EICAS message other than “IM DRAG REQD”, “IM SPD 
LIMITED”, or “IM AC 1/AC 2 SPACING” during the arrival or approach?  Yes/No 
If “yes,” please describe the message(s) that appeared (exact text not needed).  
13. If you received an EICAS Caution message during the arrival or approach, please 
respond to each of the following statements using a scale from “Completely Disagree” 
to “Completely Agree”, or N/A if appropriate.
It was clear why the EICAS Caution message was given. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
As the arrival progressed, I expected this EICAS Caution to occur. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The EICAS Caution message was warranted for this event. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The flight crew procedures for this EICAS caution message were 
clear. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Describe any unusual or unexpected event(s) and your reaction(s), if applicable. 
15. (Optional) This space is reserved for any additional comments related to awareness and 
acceptability issues. If you have any clarifying comments or interesting observations 
related to awareness and acceptability issues, please provide them below. 
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Appendix E: Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
Administrative Questions 
1. Please circle the simulator you flew from the list below: 
 ASTOR 4 
 ASTOR 5 
 ASTOR 9 
 ASTOR 10 
 DTS Captain 
 DTS First Officer 
 IFD Captain 
 IFD First Officer 
Simulator and Flight Scenarios 
2. Were there any anomalies or inconsistencies in the simulator that affected your ability to 
perform the requested tasks?  Yes/No 
If “yes,” describe the anomalies and/or inconsistencies in the simulator that you encountered and 
how they affected your ability to perform the requested tasks: 
3. Was the workload required to operate the simulator much less than, the same as, or greater 
than the workload required to fly an actual aircraft? 
Much More 
Moderately
More
Slightly
More The Same 
Slightly
Less
Moderately
Less Much Less 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please provide any additional comments regarding the simulator: 
4. Please share your impressions of the flight scenarios (e.g., comment on their level of realism, 
appropriateness, and/or diversity) and comment on how the design of the scenarios impacted 
your ability to perform the spacing task. 
Training
5. Did you receive adequate training with respect to flying the simulator?  Yes/No 
If not, briefly describe how simulator training can be improved. 
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6. Did you receive adequate training with respect to the IM spacing procedure and the spacing 
tool?  Yes/No 
If not, briefly describe how IM procedure or spacing tool training can be improved: 
Interval Management Procedures 
7. In a real world environment, how much additional workload do you think would be required 
to carry out the spacing procedures while flying the Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) 
compared to current step-down procedures? 
Much More 
Moderately
More
Slightly
More The Same 
Slightly
Less
Moderately
Less Much Less 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Did you find the responsibility and workload associated with complying with speeds generated 
by onboard automation to be acceptable?
YES   ___ 
NO     ___ 
If not, why not, and what could be done to make the responsibility or workload acceptable? 
9. How difficult do you think it would be for a typical flight crew to learn and integrate the IM 
spacing procedures into their current daily operational flight procedures?  Consider how 
similar the procedure is to current practices, the information and tasks required to conduct 
the procedure, etc. 
Very 
Difficult 
Moderately
Difficult 
Slightly
Difficult Neutral 
Slightly
Easy
Moderately
Easy
Very  
Easy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Briefly describe any challenges to integrate the IM procedures with existing procedures: 
10. Given the experience with IM that you gained during this simulation, what is your overall 
assessment of the safety of the spacing procedure compared with current day operations?  
(“Safety” in this question refers to your holistic opinion to include workload, awareness, 
position relative to other aircraft, etc.) 
Not Safe At 
All 
Moderately
Less Safe 
Slightly
Less Safe As Safe 
Slightly
More Safe 
Moderately
More Safe 
Much More 
Safe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Briefly describe any characteristic or event that determined your rating (if appropriate): 
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11. Were the IM procedures used during this experiment complete, accurate, and logical?  Yes/No 
Please provide any suggestions regarding the way(s) in which the procedures may be improved. 
12. ATC controllers are accustomed to aircraft callsign data tags on their radar scope not 
matching the respective voice callsign or airline name (examples: Airtran Airways is “TRS” 
but pronounced “Citrus,” and Express Jet Airlinesis “BTA” but pronounced “JetLink”). Was 
it an issue to correlate verbal ATC instructions with the CPDLC instructions? 
Insurmountable 
Issue
Significant
Issue
Somewhat of 
an Issue 
Insignificant
Issue
Not an Issue 
 at All 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please identify any method(s) that might make this a less challenging issue: 
13. In this experiment the FMS automatically managed the commanded speed in the ASTOR and 
DTS aircraft, while the IFD pilots were required to manually input the IM commanded speed 
into the MCP. Are there specific times during an approach into a terminal area when one of 
these methods would be preferable over the other?  Yes/No 
If “yes,” please describe when a particular method of speed control would be preferable and why 
it would be preferable, or conversely why a particular method would not be acceptable. 
CPDLC, MCDU, and Spacing Tool 
14. How long should a pilot have in a busy terminal (as simulated by this experiment) to respond 
to a CPDLC uplink message?  Consider other cockpit tasks, environmental conditions, 
complexity of flight operation, importance of the message, crew coordination and briefing, etc. 
Flight crews should typically respond to a CPDLC message within _________ seconds. 
15. During the Post Run Questionnaire, you were asked whether you noticed the speed changes 
within an appropriate timeframe. What did you consider to be “timely awareness” of a change 
in the commanded speed in a busy terminal area? 
Timely awareness = noticing speed changes within _________ seconds of the change being 
displayed on the PFD. 
16. In each Post Run Questionnaire, you ware asked whether you were able to implement the 
speed changes within an appropriate timeframe when the speed window was open. What did 
you consider to be “timely implementation” of the commanded speed? 
Timely implementation = Dialing the new commanded speed into the MCP within _________ 
seconds of noticing that a speed change was required. 
17. Did following the IM commanded speed and procedure ever cause unexpected or undesirable 
behavior?  Yes/No 
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If “yes,” please explain what the unexpected or undesirable behavior was: 
18. What steps did you take to determine if the RTA or IM clearance was or was not acceptable? 
Describe information you accessed and considered during your decision making process, and 
any coordination that occurred with your crewmember (if applicable).  
19. Describe any displays or trends that helped you predict changes to the commanded speed 
before they occurred. Please include any specific displays that helped you with the prediction.
20. Describe in general terms the desirable behavior the spacing tool should use to determine 
speed commands. Examples include: frequency of speed changes, magnitude of speed change, 
when the change occurs, the rate at which the aircraft achieves the assigned spacing interval, 
etc. 
21. Does the automated spacing tool support pilot performance without introducing unnecessary 
or undesirable features? In this case pilot performance refers maintaining acceptable levels of 
workload and awareness: 
Please circle the most accurate statement below: 
o The automated spacing tool supports pilot performance without introducing unnecessary 
and/or undesirable features. 
o The automated spacing tool supports pilot performance, but the tool has unnecessary and/or 
undesirable features that need to be changed. 
o The automated spacing tool does not support pilot performance, either as a result of 
unnecessary/undesirable features, or for some other reason described below. 
If applicable, briefly outline any unnecessary or undesirable features of the spacing tool as well 
as any other undesirable aspects of the tool: 
22. Do interruptions caused by the spacing tool or distracting features of the spacing tool 
undermine a pilot’s ability to engage in high-level planning, problem solving, and/or other time 
critical tasks? 
YES   ___ 
NO     ___ 
If “yes,” describe which aspect(s) of the automated spacing tool distracted and/or interrupted 
you, the task(s) and/or planning you were completing at the time of the interruption, and how the use 
of the automated spacing tool negatively affected high-level planning, problem solving, and/or time 
critical tasks: 
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23. Does use of the spacing tool require the extraneous expenditure of mental resources that 
should instead be devoted to the main task of flying the aircraft and activities associated with 
preparing to land? 
Please circle the most accurate statement below: 
o Yes
o No, use of the spacing tool requires an acceptable expenditure of mental resources. 
o No, use of the spacing tool “frees up” mental resources that may be devoted to the main task 
of flying the aircraft and activities associated with preparing to land. 
If “yes,” briefly describe how use of the spacing tool consumes an excessive amount of mental 
resources:
24. Within the context of an approach into a busy terminal area, are there times when it is not 
acceptable to receive a CPDLC message?  Yes/No
If “yes,” briefly when it is not be acceptable to receive a CPDLC clearance: 
25. Please rate each of the following statements using a scale ranging from “Completely Disagree” 
to “Completely Agree:” 
a) Based on my experience during this simulation, the spacing tool behaves in a predictable 
manner. 
Completely 
Disagree
Moderately
Disagree
Slightly
Disagree Neutral 
Slightly
Agree
Moderately
Agree
Completely 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b) It is important to be able to predict changes to the commanded speed before they occur.
Completely 
Disagree
Moderately
Disagree
Slightly
Disagree Neutral 
Slightly
Agree
Moderately
Agree
Completely 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c) The use of CPDLC messages were operationally acceptable as simulated in this experiment. 
Completely 
Disagree
Moderately
Disagree
Slightly
Disagree Neutral 
Slightly
Agree
Moderately
Agree
Completely 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Display Elements 
26. Using a scale ranging from “Detrimental (Hurts Performance)” to “Could Not Do IM 
Without”, rate how useful you think each display element would be in order to gather 
information regarding how the IM process was proceeding (after all clearances and 
information had been entered). 
 Detrimental 
(Hurts 
Performance) 
Not
Useful 
At All 
Slightly 
Useful 
Moderately 
Useful 
Very 
Useful 
Required 
for IM 
PFD: IM Commanded End 
Speed (text) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PFD: IM speed bug  1 2 3 4 5 6 
PFD: Speed change indicator 
(green box around speed) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PFD: IMmodesdisplayednext
toIMspeed(RTA,IM,RVT,FNL) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ND: Visual representation of the 
target (lead)  aircraft 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ND: Off Scale depiction of target 
(lead) aircraft 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ND: Visual representation of 
other traffic 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ND:  Callsign of target (lead) 
aircraft 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ND:  Altitude of target aircraft 1 2 3 4 5 6 
MCDU: Spacing error (for 
aircraft 1 and aircraft 2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
MCDU: Lead aircraft final 
approach speed 1 2 3 4 5 6 
MCDU: Lead aircraft assigned 
runway 1 2 3 4 5 6 
EICAS message: IM DRAG 
REQD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
EICAS message: IM SPD 
LIMITED 1 2 3 4 5 6 
EICAS message: IM AC 1/AC 2 
SPACING 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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27. Is there any information not listed above that you believe would be needed (or desirable) 
during IM operations into a busy terminal area, or was there any information that seemed to 
conflict with other displays or ATC instructions? If so, please explain: 
28. Did the displays associated with the spacing tool provide you with adequate feedback about its 
operation (please consider awareness of the IM speed, the IM mode indicator, and whether you 
were able to crosscheck that the spacing tool was operating correctly). Was the feedback 
presented in an easy to understand manner and in a logical location? 
Please circle the best answer: 
o The spacing tool presented too much feedback 
o The spacing tool presented adequate feedback in an easy to understand manner and in a logical 
location 
o The spacing tool provided adequate feedback, but either the location and/or the manner in which 
the feedback was presented, was  undesirable 
o The spacing tool did not provide adequate feedback 
If there are any display elements that are not in a desirable location or do not have a desirable 
format, please explain. Additionally, please include any suggestions you have for improving the IM 
displays.
29. Please select all of the following display elements that you desire to help direct your attention 
to the commanded speed when it changes. For example, if you want a flashing box and a 
chime, select both flashing box and chime; if you do not want any awareness displays that are 
listed, select none of the above: 
Please check all that apply: 
 A green box that appears around the commanded speed for 10 seconds after a speed 
change (like you had in the experiment you just completed) 
 A flashing green box that appears around the commanded speed for 10 seconds after a 
speed change 
 A chime that sounds when a new commanded speed is displayed to the crew 
 Speed command on PFD without box or aural chime 
 Other (please explain below) 
Please use the space below to provide any alternative display elements you desire to assist you in 
detecting IM speed changes. 
30. The conformance box is the green box that should have appeared on the ND during the last 
scenario. Respond to each of the statements shown below using a scale ranging from “1” 
(Completely Disagree) to “7” (Completely Agree). Circle one number in conjunction with each 
statement.
100
Completely 
Disagree 
Neutr
al
Completely 
Disagree 
The conformance box helped me monitor the 
interval management operation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The conformance box helped me predict speed 
changes before they were given. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My level of comfort with the IM operation was 
increased as a result of the conformance box 
being present. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The level of safety associated with the IM 
operation is increased as a result of the 
conformance box being present. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I disobeyed the posted commanded speed on the 
PFD to try and center my aircraft in the 
conformance box.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The conformance box should be a part of a 
display for any aircraft conducting interval 
management operations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. Please describe in detail how you used the information provided by the conformance box and 
any decisions the conformance box helped you make.
Crew Coordination and Awareness 
32. (DTS, IFD only)   Do you think the division of tasks between the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot 
Monitoring (PM) was both desirable and fits within the current distribution of tasks between 
PF and PM?  
YES   ___ 
NO     ___ 
If “no,” what was wrong with the division, and how would you reallocate the tasks? 
33. (DTS, IFD only)   Did the use of CPDLC or the IM spacing tool change the way you and your 
crewmember communicated or coordinated activities? 
YES   ___ 
NO     ___ 
 If “yes,” please elaborate: 
34. The goal of this question is to better understand how you monitor the IM process. Please rate 
the frequency at which you observed the following areas in order to gather information 
regarding how the IM process was proceeding (after all clearances and information had been 
entered). Please rate the following areas using a scale from “Never” to “All The Time.” 
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Never Slightly Often 
Moderately 
Often 
Very 
Often 
All The 
Time 
IM Information on the PFD 1 2 3 4 5 
IM Information on the ND 1 2 3 4 5 
IM Information on the MCDU 1 2 3 4 5 
Information from ATC  1 2 3 4 5 
Visual information available out the 
window (DTS, IFD only) 1 2 3 4 5 
Verbal communication from your crew 
member (DTS, IFD only) 1 2 3 4 5 
Functional Allocation 
35. Please indicate where you believe a particular function is best performed, assuming the 
collaborative NextGen air traffic management system, aircraft equipage used in this 
experiment, and the Interval Management with Spacing (IM-S) procedure. 
a) Optimization of aircraft route and altitude AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
b) Establishing arrival sequence of aircraft AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
c) Setting the spacing interval between aircraft AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
d) Determining the speed to fly during an 
arrival to meet the sequence and spacing 
AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
e) Setting the airspeed to fly during the arrival AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
f) Responsibility for achieving spacing interval AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
g) Responsibility for separation from the lead 
aircraft 
AOC ATC Pilot Aircraft 
automation 
If desired, describe the reasoning behind your answers. 
Additional Comments 
36. Do you have any additional comments about the experiment? 
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Appendix F: Airspace, Arrivals, and Airport Charts 
This Appendix contains the Dallas-Fort Worth (KDFW) airport diagram, Standard Terminal 
Arrival Procedures (STARs), and Standard Instrument Approach Procedures (SIAPs) used by the 
subject pilots during the Interval Management with Spacing to Parallel Dependent Runways 
(IMSPiDR) experiment. Not shown in this Appendix are the departures from KDFW and the 
STAR into the Dallas Love (KDAL) airport. 
Figure 49 provides a general overview of all the arrival routes into the KDFW airport used 
during the IMSPiDR experiment. Every scenario had 41 arriving aircraft (33 to KDFW, 8 to 
KDAL), and of those, the 6 aircraft flown by subject pilots were always on the MASTY THREE, 
BONHAM FIVE, or CEDAR CREEK SIX Arrival. All aircraft on those three arrivals 
intercepted the ILS Runway 17C, and landed on runway 17 Center. The aircraft flown as Aircraft 
Simulation for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) stations used a software Pilot Model, and 
flew the BOWIE ONE Arrival and GLEN ROSE NINE Arrival to intercept the ILS to runway 
18R and land on runway 18R. 
Figure 49.  Arrival Routes into KDFW Airport 
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The next three figures show in clockwise sequence from the north the three Arrival 
procedures to runway 17C. 
The MASTY THREE Arrival (Figure 50) is based on the current MASTY TWO Arrival to 
KDFW, which is normally only assigned by ATC when aircraft arriving from the northwest will 
land on the eastern runway (based on conversations with DFW TRACON controllers during the 
site visit). Modifications made for the IMSPiDR experiment include changing the crossing 
altitude and speed restriction at GREGS, removing waypoint GIBBI, adding waypoint BOSSL, 
and including waypoint BOSSI (an IF for the ILS 17C). Altitude and speed restrictions were also 
added for BOSSI, and BOSSL. 
Figure 50.  MASTY THREE Arrival (North) 
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The BONHAM FIVE Arrival (Figure 51) is based on the current arrival of the same name 
into KDFW. Modifications for the IMSPiDR experiment include changes to altitude and speed 
restrictions at COVIE and LEMYN, the removal of waypoints STONZ and DIRKK, the addition 
of waypoint CARBN (with altitude and speed constraints), and the inclusion of PENNY, an IF 
for the ILS 17C. Text was also added for aircraft landing south to “Expect ILS Runway 17C”. 
Figure 51.  BONHAM FIVE Arrival (Northeast) 
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The CEDAR CREEK SIX Arrival (Figure 52) is based on the current arrival of the same 
name into KDFW. Modifications for the IMSPiDR experiment include moving the 11,000 ft 
altitude restriction from HOWDY to DIETZ, a 240 knot speed restriction at DIETZ, adding 
waypoint CARBN (and an altitude and speed constraint), and including PENNY (an IF for ILS 
17C). Text was also added for aircraft landing south to “Expect ILS Runway 17C.” 
Figure 52.  CEDAR CREEK Arrival (Southeast) 
A version of the ILS Runway 17C from early 2011 was used during the IMSPiDR 
experiment (Figure 53). Just prior to the experiment, the final approach course and missed 
approach course were updated to 1760, however there was not sufficient time to update all the 
simulator databases, therefore the previous early 2011 version was used (final heading of 1740).
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Figure 53.  ILS Runway 17C 
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Figure 54.  KDFW Airport Diagram  
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Appendix G: Pilot IM User Guide 
This Pilot’s IM User Guide is tailored for the IFD, with similar guides for the DTS and 
ASTOR (not included in this Appendix). Each subject pilot received the appropriate User Guide 
prior to arriving at LaRC based on their assigned simulator. 
Revision 004, May 9, 2011 
INTERVAL MANAGEMENT (IM) 
BACKGROUND
Merging aircraft into a manageable sequence and controlling their spacing on final approach are essential 
to improving the productivity of the National Airspace System (NAS). Airport arrival capacities are 
governed by runway configurations, runway occupancy times, and wake turbulence separation 
requirements. ATC often adds buffers to in-trail arrival spacing due to the limitations of ground-based 
surveillance, the procedures used to communicate and confirm speed commands, as well as 
uncertainties about how instructions will be followed,. This leads to large variances in the actual arrival 
separation values. By increasing aircraft separation accuracy and precisely spacing aircraft over the 
runway threshold, the need for such buffers may be reduced. In turn, this would reduce the spacing 
variance, effectively increasing airport arrival capacity without lowering separation minima. 
The arrival sequence into an airport can be set by the Airline Operations Center (AOC) and/or Air Traffic 
Control (ATC). Once the arrival sequence is determined, the time interval between landing aircraft can be 
adjusted to meet operational needs. 
Interval management (IM) concepts were derived from development activities occurring within the FAA 
and the global aviation community. IM is designed to facilitate the needs of aircraft operators while at the 
same time provide Air Traffic Controllers with an easier way to manage the sequence and spacing of 
aircraft into any airport. This is done by providing the flight crew with automated speed guidance for their 
“Ownship” during IM operations. By following IM speed guidance, precise time intervals can be achieved 
between successive aircraft on approach.  
IM employs a new onboard avionics system that provides speed guidance to the flight crew. This speed 
guidance is generated by the NASA LaRC Airborne Spacing for Terminal Arrival Routes (ASTAR) 
algorithm.  
ASTAR uses relatively small speed changes to achieve the desired spacing interval by the runway 
threshold. This is done in a predictable and safe operation that allows the merging of multiple arrival 
streams and the delivery of aircraft to the runways within a 5 second window. For situations where 
multiple arrival routes are being flown to common or parallel runways, the IM speed guidance also 
ensures safe and accurate merging at the points where arrival routes converge. 
Interval management operations and Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) are part of the FAA’s Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Many of the NextGen applications will rely on the 
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predictability of the aircraft’s speed and vertical path for separation assurance. To ensure the 
predictability of vertical paths during IM operations, flight crews will be required to modulate thrust and 
drag to stay on both the IM speed profile and the OPD vertical path. 
In this experiment, flight crews will fly a charted Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) to an ILS approach into 
Dallas Fort Worth (KDFW) airport while following IM speed guidance. In addition, IM avionics and the 
ASTAR algorithm will be accessed through the Multi-function Control Display Unit (MCDU). 
Prior to performing the OPD and ILS approach flight crews will be assigned either one or two target 
aircraft to perform interval management with to include the required spacing in either time or distance. An 
optional RTA to the runway threshold may also be assigned. The IM system will command speed to meet 
the RTA at the runway until there is valid data on the target aircraft. At this time the IM commanded speed 
will achieve the required spacing from that aircraft at the runway threshold. The assigned spacing interval 
will meet wake vortex and instrument flight rules separation criteria. Information about the target aircraft 
and the precise time (or distance) interval to be achieved at the runway threshold are used by the ASTAR 
algorithm to generate IM speed guidance and is entered into the IM avionics via the MCDU either by 
loading from CPDLC or manual entry. 
The merge to the same lateral path behind the target aircraft landing on the same runway may occur at 
altitude, during descent, or in the terminal area. The other target aircraft would be landing on a parallel 
runway. IM speed guidance is only given until Ownship reaches the Final Approach Fix (FAF). At this 
point the system will provide commanded speeds so that the aircraft is stabilized at final flap setting and 
approach speed at 1000 feet AGL. During IM operations, the separation between aircraft should never be 
less than the standard separation criteria used today.  Air Traffic Control (ATC) is responsible for 
separation assurance. 
UNDER LAYING TECHNOLOGIES 
 Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 
In commercial aviation the basic ADS-B signal is sent out from the aircraft using the same 1090MHZ 
frequency as the transponder. When a commercial aircraft is equipped with ADS-B the transponder is 
expected to send, among other things, the aircraft’s registration number, altitude, squawk code and the 
aircraft’s position. In most cases the aircraft’s position data is likely to be based on the Global Positioning 
System (GPS). This basic data is referred to as the aircraft’s “State Data”. It is possible for the 
transponder to send more data and other ADS-B concepts are being developed to take advantage of an 
expanded ADS-B data set. 
 Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R) 
Non-commercial aircraft are expected to use a Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) data link to transmit 
their state data and ground stations will be used to receive data over the UAT data link and rebroadcast 
that information over the over 1090MHz data link used by commercial aircraft. This will enable aircraft 
equipped with a 1090MHz ADS-B receiver to receive data from aircraft transmitting using the UAT data 
link. 
 Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B) 
Data concerning aircraft that are not equipped with either the UAT or 1090MHz transponder will be 
obtained using conventional radar. This radar data will be converted into ADS-B message sets and then 
transmitted from ground stations. Transmission of radar data over the ADS-B data link is known as Traffic 
Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B). TIS-B will enable aircraft equipped with a 1090MHz ADS-B 
receiver to receive data concerning aircraft that are not equipped with an operable ADS-B or UAT. 
 Flight Information Services – Broadcast (FIS-B) 
Flight Information Services-Broadcast (FIS-B) is an automated, digital data link system. The system 
provides non-control, advisory information needed by pilots to operate more safely and efficiently in the 
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National Airspace System and in international airspace. FIS provides to pilots the necessary weather 
graphics and text, Special Use Airspace (SUA) information, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), and other 
information.
 Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) 
Regardless of its source, when data concerning the surrounding aircraft is displayed for pilots to use it is 
known as the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information or CDTI. CDTI can include the traffic’s altitude, speed, 
direction of flight, and call sign. 
 ASTAR and IM Technologies 
IM uses ADS-B, CDTI and a unique algorithm developed at NASA’s Langley Research Center known as 
Airborne Spacing for Terminal Arrival Routes (ASTAR).  ASTAR uses 4-D trajectory modeling to compute 
speed guidance for the IM avionics that are used to achieve a precise time interval behind the more 
limiting of up to two target aircraft measured from when the aircraft cross the runway threshold. This 
speed guidance is based on data from the target aircraft which includes its current state (position, altitude 
and velocity) and its planned final approach speed. The ASTAR algorithm also considers “Ownship” (the 
subject-pilot-controlled simulated aircraft) configuration, stabilized approach criteria, wind profile, the 
planned arrival route, and planned final approach speed. 
 Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) 
This portion of the experiment will be conducted in the Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) at 
NASA’s Langley Research Center. The ATOL is home to the Airspace and Traffic Operation Simulation 
(ATOS), a medium-fidelity, distributed simulation capability designed to explore future concepts in a rapid-
prototyping environment. The ATOS system hosts twelve “Aircraft Simulation for Traffic Operations 
Research” (ASTOR) pilot workstations. Connected to the network are also the Integration Flight Deck 
(IFD) simulator and Development and Test Simulator (DTS). These fixed based cabs allow for the normal 
interaction of two pilots. The network also includes a simulation manager that controls time, events and 
simulation system modes.  
 Integration Flight Deck (IFD) 
The Integration Flight Deck (IFD) is 757-200 flight deck cab that can either be mounted on a 6 degree of 
freedom motion platform or used as a fixed based simulator.  The IFD was the original simulator cab for 
NASA’s 757 which was powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 engines. It was the place where NASA 
researchers could integrate their research project into a 757 flight deck. As a result the IFD has seen 
many modifications. It has a Panoramic 200°horizontal and 40° field-of-view and Heads Up Display on the 
Captain’s side. The IFD 757 aircraft hardware is supplemented with a number of devices and displays 
and controls used to conduct NASA research. 
 Sequence of events 
The basic sequences of events are as follows: 
1. The scenario begins at cruise altitude or on descent with autopilot and autothrottles engaged  
2. The route, arrival and ILS are programmed into Route 1 of the FMC 
3. The descent profile speeds of CRZ MACH/300 are programmed into the FMC descent page 
4. Forecast Descent winds are programmed into the FMC for FL400, 10,000, 5,000 and 600 feet  
5. The MCP altitude window is set to 2300 ft (You have already been cleared for the OPD arrival) 
6. Both LNAV and VNAV PATH are active. 
7. Crew will receive, load, verify, accept, and activate IM message for spacing. 
8. Crew manually sets IM commanded speed in the MCP speed window 
9. Crew maintains speed and ± 200 ft of VNAV profile altitude. 
10. Arm approach mode between 6-2 miles of Final Approach Fix. 
11. The aircraft must be fully configured and stabilized prior to 1,000 ft AGL 
Note: This is a high energy approach and configuring the aircraft in a timely fashion is essential. 
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IFD DISPLAYS 
The Interval Management experiment will be conducted using the NASA LaRC Integrated Fixed Device 
(IFD) simulator. The IFD displays are shown here for content continuity purposes. See the Flight Manual 
Bulletin for instructions on how to operate the IFD. 
IFD components include: aircraft and engine models; autopilot and autothrottle systems; Flight 
Management Computer (FMC) and Multi-function Control Display Unit (MCDU); Mode Control Panel 
(MCP); displays such as the Primary Flight Display (PFD), Navigation Display (ND), and Engine Indication 
and Crew Alerting System display (EICAS); and a sophisticated simulation model of ADS-B. 
The key components for IM operations are the MCP, ND, PFD and the MCDU. As with many transport 
category aircraft in use today MCDU can be used to control many things such as the Flight Management 
Computer (FMC), the communications system or surrogate inputs from the Electronic Flight 
Instrumentation System, and Mode Control Panel. In addition to controlling the FMC, the ASTOR 
workstation also uses the MCDU to control the inputs for IM operations and initialize the ASTAR 
algorithm. The PFD is monitored for speed and configuration changes and the MCP is used to maneuver 
the aircraft. 
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 Mode Control Panel (MCP) 
IM operation uses the Mode Control Panel to control the aircraft’s vertical and lateral path. The IFD is 
operated in both LNAV and VNAV with the speed window open and the pilot manually setting the IM 
commanded speed. 
 Primary Flight Display (PFD) 
IM commanded speed indications are displayed on the IFD Primary Flight Display (PFD). When the MCP 
speed window is open with vnav engaged the mode will be VNAV SPD and the FMC will manage the 
aircraft speed to what is set in the MCP speed window. The crew will use speed brake and throttles as 
necessary to remain within ± 200 feet of the commanded vnav vertical path. The vnav mode will change 
to VNAV PATH with first flap extension. At this point the crew must control thrust and drag to manage the 
speed. 
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 Navigation Display (ND) 
The Navigation Display of the IFD enables flight crews to monitor the relative position of proximate traffic, 
identify the target aircraft, and see how the aircraft is conforming to the IM clearance spacing. The VNAV 
indicator also provides the crew with feedback on how the aircraft is conforming to the optimized vertical 
profile. 
With IM in the RTA Mode 
The conformance box may be shown on the ND while in RTA mode. The VNAV indicator will be present 
to advise the crew how the aircraft is performing with regards to the optimized vertical profile. Proximate 
traffic is shown for advisory purposes only. 
With IM in the Paired Mode 
Target Aircraft will have an outer white diamond and an inner white diamond  
Target Aircraft responsible for command IM speed will an outer green diamond and inner white 
diamond 
Conformance box may be present to show conformance of IM spacing 
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ND Indications 
and Symbols Meaning Example 
Ownship The subject-pilot-controlled simulated aircraft 
IM Target Aircraft When an aircraft is selected as a target aircraft, its icon on the Navigational Display is two white diamonds and its Call sign is displayed. 
IM Controlling 
Target Aircraft  
A target aircraft that is responsible for the commanded IM speed. Its icon on 
the Navigation Display an outer green diamond and an inner white diamond. 
ADS-B
Equipped Traffic 
The altitude associated with traffic displayed on the ND can be displayed 
relative to own ship altitude or as the target’s absolute altitude. The depicted 
traffic is shown as 1,300 feet above Ownship with a callsign of NAS328 
VNAV Indicator Indicates how aircraft is conforming to vertical profile. Range is ±400 feet 
Conformance Box Indicates how the aircraft is conforming to final interval position 
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 Engine Indication and 
Crew Alerting System display 
(EICAS) 
The Engine Indication and Crew 
Alerting System Display (EICAS) of 
the “Integrated Fixed Base (IFD) 
simulator enables flight crews to 
monitor for IM Caution, Advisory and 
Memo messages. 
When multiple messages occur at the 
same time the messages are 
displayed in priority order of Caution, 
Advisory and Memo. 
A table of EICAS messages and pilot 
actions are provided at the end of this 
guide. 
 Multi-function Control Display Unit (MCDU) 
The Multi-function Control Display Unit (MCDU) of the 
IFD enables flight crews to interact with the Flight 
Management Computer (FMC) and the IM avionics. IM 
functions are accessed through the IM button. 
The FMC and IM avionics are separate pieces of 
equipment and as a result they have separate and 
distinct indications.  
CAUTION:
The FMC controls the indications for LNAV and VNAV 
PATH for the Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) and the 
ASTAR Algorithm controls the indications for the Interval 
Management (IM) speed guidance. As a result, it is 
possible to be on the LNAV and VNAV PATH and off of 
the IM Profile. 
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SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
IM spacing will commence when you receive a CPDLC IM clearance from ATC. This clearance will 
contain the target aircraft call sign and interval value ATC desires you to achieve. This clearance may 
assign you one or two aircraft for spacing. The clearance may also contain an RTA to the runway 
threshold. You are to fly commanded speeds to meet this RTA until you are paired with at least one of 
your assigned target aircraft. At this time, the IM system will command a speed to meet the target aircraft 
interval. If there are two target aircraft, the IM system will command the speed to meet the most restrictive 
interval. If there is no RTA assigned in your clearance, ATC assumes that your distance to the target 
aircraft is within range to be paired immediately with that aircraft. Once paired to a target aircraft, the 
ownship speed is compared to the information known about the target aircraft and IM speed guidance is 
generated that will achieve the assigned spacing interval when the aircraft cross the runway threshold. At 
airports saturated with arrival aircraft, the greatest capacity benefits may be realized by having sequences 
of aircraft operating in Paired mode, with each aircraft actively spacing off the aircraft sequenced ahead 
of it. 
Speed guidance is controlled through the MCDU and presented to the flight crew on the PFD. The IM 
commanded speed on the PFD will have RTA, IM, FNL, or RVT beside it to identify what is actually 
controlling the speed. Although IM speed guidance can be followed using manual throttle input, this 
experiment requires the use of the auto throttle system. The use of the auto throttle system reduces pilot 
workload and allows precise spacing intervals to be established. The commanded IM speed will be set 
manually in the MCP speed window by the pilot. 
After crossing the FAF, IM Speed guidance will automatically transition to a final mode and will display a 
final speed which is equal to the target speed entered into the MCDU. Final mode is not pilot-selectable. 
 Mode Changes 
Consistent with standard flight guidance mode symbology, all Interval Management speed changes are 
annunciated with a green box around the commanded IM speed. The green box is displayed for 10 
seconds after the mode change. 
 Speed Constraints 
The ASTAR Spacing guidance logic contains several safeguards to ensure that appropriate speed 
guidance is being generated. First, all Paired mode IM guidance is limited to ±10% of the Profile mode 
speeds. Second, all speed guidance is bounded by the aircraft flight envelope. 
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DETAILED PROCEDURES 
This IM experiment begins at or near the Terminal area of Dallas Fort Worth Airport (KDFW). Your 
Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) arrival clearance will have been dynamically sent via CPDLC to your 
aircraft prior to Top of Descent Point. It contains required waypoints and restrictions as well as the 
approach you will fly. This information will already be loaded into your FMC. You have already been 
cleared for the OPD arrival so 2300 feet is set in your MCP altitude window. 
1. The scenario begins at cruise altitude with autopilot and autothrottles engaged. LNAV and VNAV 
PATH will be active.  
2. The route, arrival and ILS are programmed into Route 1 of the FMC 
 NOTE:  ASTAR speed guidance accounts for the charted speeds on the STAR. When IM is 
active fly the IM guidance speeds. 
3. The descent profile speeds of CRZ MACH/300 are programmed into the FMC descent page. 
4. Forecast Descent winds have been programmed into the FMC for FL4000, 10,000, 5,000 and 
600 feet.
5. Crew will receive a message from ATC for IM operations. (notified by ATC prompt on EICAS) 
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6. Crew loads IM Pages from CPDLC  
o (PF) Press IM key on MCDU  
o (PM) Press FMC/COMM key on MCDU 
o (PM) Press LOAD [6L] button on MCDU 
119
7. Verify Interval Management Clearance 
         
 Compare IM Pages (PF) to CPDLC clearance (PM) 
o IM-S Page 
 [1L] RTA Waypoint is correct (if applicable) 
 [1R] RTA time value is correct (if applicable) 
 [2L] IM-S speed is acceptable to pilot 
o ACFT1 Page (select by pressing [4L] or NEXT PAGE button) 
 [1L] Aircraft1 Call sign is correct 
 [1R] Achieve By waypoint is correct 
 [2L] The type of spacing (Precision or NCT) is correct 
 [2R] Terminate AT waypoint is correct 
 [3L] IM-S Goal is correct 
 [3R] Aircraft1 Approach Speed is correct 
 [4L,5L] Aircraft1 routing is correct 
o ACFT2 Page (select by pressing [6L][4R] or NEXT PAGE button) 
 Verify information same procedure as ACFT1 
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8. Accept or Reject Interval Management Clearance 
 Check acceptability of clearance 
o (PF) Press ACTIVATE [6R]  
o Check that there is no UNABLE IM message [3L] 
o Is the commanded speed acceptable [2L] 
 If Clearance is acceptable 
o (PM) Click ACCEPT on CPDLC  ATC UPLINK page [5R] (last page) 
o (PF) Activate IM Guidance 
 Press EXEC Key 
 Observe appearance of FIM Speed cue above speed tape on PFD 
 Open speed window on MCP and set FIM commanded speed 
o (PM) Inform ATC when paired with each aircraft  
 If Clearance is not Acceptable 
o (PM) Press REJECT  button on MCDU [5L] 
o  (PF) Erase IM Guidance 
 Press ERASE [6L] 
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9. Amendment to IM Clearance Procedures 
 CPDLC Clearance 
 CPDLC Clearance with a second aircraft or change in spacing requirements 
o Press IM Key 
o On IM-S Page press TERMINATE [6R] button then EXEC key 
o Follow Procedures for original clearance to load, verify, and accept 
 VOICE Clearance 
 Voice Clearance for change in spacing requirements 
o Press IM button on MCDU 
o Press aircraft call sign [4L][4R] of affected aircraft 
o Enter new spacing information (“s” for seconds, “m” or “nm” for miles) [3L] 
o Accept clearance by voice with ATC 
o Press EXEC Key 
o Confirm Airspeed is acceptable (if not notify ATC) 
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10. Arrival Interval Management Procedures 
 (PF, PM) Airspeed Requirements 
o Observe and announce IM Speed changes on PFD 
o Set IM commanded speed in speed window on MCP 
o Configure aircraft as necessary to maintain IM commanded speed 
o Airspeed is safe and acceptable to the pilot for current conditions (See non normal below 
for action) 
 (PF, PM) Vertical Path Requirements 
o Verify VNAV SPD is active mode 
o Ensure aircraft starts a descent at Top of Descent (TOD) Point 
o Use drag devices and thrust as necessary to maintain VNAV path within ±200 feet 
o Monitor that aircraft stays on path and all restrictions will be met 
 (PF, PM) Spacing Requirements 
o Aircraft stays in conformance box (if present) 
o No EICAS or status messages (See non normal below for action) 
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11. Final Segment Interval Management Procedures 
 (PF, PM) Configuration and Energy Management 
o Extend Flaps prior to Min Flap maneuvering airspeed but no earlier than placard-5 knots 
o Maintain least amount of flaps required to maintain IM speed 
o When IM Commanded speed transitions to FNL mode 
 Gear down 
 Flaps 20 
 Target Speed set in MCP Window 
 Configure as necessary to be stable by 1000 feet AGL 
 Automation Procedures 
o Aircraft will transition to VNAV PATH when flaps are extended 
o Arm approach mode between 6-2 miles prior to FAF 
o Ensure aircraft will capture both the localizer and glideslope 
o Set Target Speed in MCP speed window when IM commanded speed transitions to FNL 
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ALERTS: CAUTIONS, ADVISORY AND MEMOS 
The IM system and its associated ASTAR algorithm have the following alerts: 
Alert
Level EICAS Message Meaning Pilot Action 
Caution IM DISENGAGED 
Loss of ownship flight path data, 
failure of the interface between 
the spacing algorithm and the 
aircraft avionics, ADS-B receiver 
failure, or other aircraft avionic 
failures
 Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
Caution IM AC 1 OFF PATH IM AC 2 OFF PATH
Target aircraft is not on the flight 
path given by the ATC IM 
clearance
 Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
 ATC may issue new 
clearance
Caution IM AC 1 ADSB LOST IM AC 2 ADSB LOST 
Target aircraft ADS-B 
information is lost
 Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
Caution IM ERROR EXCESS 
IM spacing software determines 
it is not possible to meet the 
assigned RTA or spacing 
interval
 Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
 ATC may issue new 
clearance
Advisory IM OWN BAD PATH 
Flight path provided by aircraft 
avionics to the spacing algorithm 
is invalid or not available prior to 
beginning IM operations
 Flight crew verifies correct 
IM information
Advisory IM OWN OFF PATH 
Aircraft is greater than 2.5 nmi 
laterally, 6000 ft vertically, or 90 
degrees of heading from the 
planned flight path
 Flight crew corrects to path, 
or updates FMS to reflect 
current flight path 
Advisory IM AC 1 BAD PATH IM AC 2 BAD PATH 
IM spacing software has no path 
or an invalid flight path for that 
particular reference aircraft
 Flight crew verifies correct 
IM information
Memo IM DRAG REQUIRED IM spacing software determines drag is required
 Ensure thrust levers at IDLE 
 Deploy spoilers to return to 
flight path and commanded 
speed
Memo IM SPEED LIMITED Speed is constrained by profile, Mmo, Vmo 
 Advisory only, no action 
required 
Memo IM AC 1 SPACING IM AC 2 SPACING 
IM has valid data to calculate 
spacing  Flight crew notifies ATC
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TERMINATE SPACING PROCEDURE 
Terminate due to crew preference, ATC instruction, or EICAS message. ATC issues an entire IM 
clearance; therefore the flight crew terminates the entire IM clearance. That is, neither ATC nor the crew 
can selectively cancel one of the two aircraft in a two reference aircraft IM clearance. 
1) Flight crew notifies ATC they are terminating the IM clearance (time permitting, respond in 
same mode) 
2) Flight crew flies the last IM speed (shown on the PFD with RVT) until receiving further 
instructions from ATC 
3) (PM) Once new clearance is received from ATC pilots will terminate current IM Operation 
a. Press IM Key on MCDU 
b. ON IM-S Page press TERMINATE [6R] 
c. Press EXEC button on MCDU 
4) Reload new IM clearance if available 
126
Appendix H: Training Profiles 
H.1 Basic Simulator Familiarization Training Profile 
Basic Simulator and Aircraft Operations 
 Engage LNAV & VNAV 
 Change ND range scale 
 MCP Speed Window: 
o VNAV PTH to VNAV SPD: open window, change speed in speed window 
o Re-engage VNAV PTH, window closes (NOTE:  resolves software defect if 
needed)
 MCP Heading Window:  
o change setting, then SEL 
o change back to course, then LNAV PTH 
 MCP Altitude Window:  set to 5000 ft, then 2300 ft, then 5000 ft 
o When 5000 ft set (after sim in OPERATE), impact of not setting (aircraft flies 
past T/D) 
 LOC and APP to be discussed during arrival phase 
 PFD and ND displays (speed tape on IFD is not standard for B-757) 
 MDCU: 
o Normally set by researcher between runs, however crew to check route, 
constraints, etc 
o LEGS, NEXT PAGE 
o PROG page 
o IM, NEXT PAGE 
o Scratch page, enter “90” into time interval 
o DESCEND NOW (IFD only) 
 Radio control panel: 
o  VHF L for ATC, VHF R for ATIS 
 must transmit on VHF L in IFD and DTS 
o Change frequencies (STNDBY to ACTIVE) 
o Set new frequency (load new STNDBY, then change to ACTIVE) 
o Listen to single or multiple radios 
o Microphone switch: 
 click on MIC, watch for stuck mic (ATOL) 
 two locations (IFD, DTS) 
 ND control panel:  ADS-B setting (Normal, Above, Below, All) 
 EICAS page: 
o ENG is normal setting 
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o COMM for CPDLC messages (ATOL only) 
o CNCL/RECALL buttons 
 Throttle, speed brake, flaps, gear: 
o Fly IM speed (within 5 knots), or data link clearance speed if no IM 
o ATOL, DTS:  use of throttle and speed brake while in VNAV PTH 
o IFD:  use of throttle and speed brake while in VNAV SPD 
o Flap and gear deployment to be discussed during arrival phase 
 Display control panel / Simulation status panel 
o Do not change simulator until in OPERATE or directed by researcher 
 Event button:  location, when to use 
 Review: 
o STAR (frequencies, altitude and speed constraints) 
o ILS17C(frequencies, altitude and speed constraints) 
o Aircraft Checklist (IFD and DTS only) 
 Scenario admin: 
o Scenario card provides callsign, location, route 
o “Going to operate” 
o Scenario terminates:  at 35 ft AGL (ATOL) or < 5 knots GS (IFD, DTS) 
o Decisions/pacing as if in operational environment
CPDLC message receive and respond 
 Press COM button on the Display Select Panel 
 Click LOAD IM-S icon on ATC UPLINK Page to load clearance into IM pages 
 Press IM button on MCDU 
 Verify correct data load on IM pages  (refer to Pilot Procedures – ATC IM Clearance) 
 ON IM-S Page press Activate [6R] 
 Check that there is no EICAS cautions and speed [2L] is acceptable 
 EXIT INFO on EICAS page 
 Click ACCEPT on CPDLC ATC UPLINK page 
o Click CANCEL icon on ATC UPLINK Page (if applicable to clear bottom 
banner)
o Click ACCEPT icon on ATC UPLINK PAGE 
 Press EXEC Key (activates IM Guidance) 
 Observe appearance of IM speed cue on PFD 
o Box around speed for first 10 seconds of new speed 
o Box around type of spacing for first 10 seconds, such as RTA, IM (will see in T2) 
 Observe FMS Speed matches IM commanded speed on PFD 
 Observe IM speed changes on PFD  
 Use Thrust and Drag devices to maintain ±5 knots of IM commanded speed bug 
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 IM Contingency:  Contact ATC 
o If RVT on PFD (triggered by EICAS message of:  BAD PATH, OFF PATH) 
Arrival and Approach Procedures 
 Configure aircraft as necessary to maintain IM speed 
 Configuration and Energy Management 
o Extend Flaps prior to Min Flap maneuvering airspeed but no earlier than placard-
5 knots 
o Maintain least amount of flaps required to maintain IM speed 
o When IM Commanded speed transitions to FNL mode 
 Gear down 
 Flaps 20 
 Target Speed set in MCP Window  
 Configure as necessary to be stable by 1000 feet AGL 
 Automation Procedures 
o Arm approach mode between 6-2 miles prior to FAF 
o Ensure aircraft will capture both the localizer and glideslope 
o Speed Window opens at glideslope capture 
 Manually set IM speed in MCP speed window 
o Set Target Speed in MCP speed window when IM commanded speed transitions 
to FNL 
H.2 Interval Management Training Profile 
Start of flight 
 LNAV and VNAV PTH engaged 
 MCP Altitude Window set to 5000 feet 
First IM Message (single Target aircraft) 
  (PM) Press ATC button on MCDU 
  (PM) Press LOAD  [6L] on MCDU to load clearance into IM pages 
 (PF) Press IM button on MCDU 
 (PF,PM) Verify correct data load on IM pages  (refer to Pilot Procedures – ATC IM 
Clearance)
 (PF) ON IM-S Page press Activate [6R] 
 (PF, PM) Check that there is no EICAS cautions and speed [2L] is acceptable 
 (PM) Click ACCEPT [5R] on CPDLC ATC UPLINK Page (last page) 
 (PF) Press EXEC Key (activates IM Guidance) 
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 (PF, PM) Observe appearance of IM speed cue on PFD 
 Open MCP Speed Window and set IM commanded speed 
 (PM) Observe EICAS Advisory of Spacing with AC 1 
 (PM) Press IM button on MCDU 
 (PM) On IM-S Page observe callsign of AC 1 
 (PM) Inform ATC by voice that you are spacing off of {state callsign} 
 (PF,PM) Observe and announce IM speed changes on PFD   
 (PF,PM) Set IM Commanded speed in speed window on MCP 
 (PF) Use Thrust and Drag devices to maintain ±200 feet of vertical profile 
Second IM Message (two Target aircraft) 
 (PM) Press IM key on MCDU (refer to Pilot Procedures – Amendment to IM Clearance) 
 (PM) On IM-S Page press TERMINATE button[6R] 
 (PM) Press EXEC key on MCDU (this will terminate ongoing IM operations) 
 (PF, PM) Load, verify, accept, and execute new clearance as stated above 
 (PM) Observe EICAS Advisory of Spacing with AC 1 and AC 2 
 (PM) Press IM button on MCDU 
 (PM) On IM-S Page observe callsigns of AC 1 and AC 2 
 (PM) Inform ATC by voice that you are spacing off of {state callsigns} 
 Follow speed guidance as stated above 
Arrival and Approach Procedures 
 Configure aircraft as necessary to maintain IM speed 
 (PF, PM) Configuration and Energy Management 
o Extend Flaps prior to Min Flap maneuvering airspeed but no earlier than placard-
5 knots 
o Maintain least amount of flaps required to maintain IM speed 
o When IM Commanded speed transitions to FNL mode 
 Gear down 
 Flaps 20 
 Target Speed set in MCP Window 
 Configure as necessary to be stable by 1000 feet AGL 
 Automation Procedures 
o Aircraft will transition to VNAV PATH when flaps are extended 
o Arm approach mode between 6-2 miles prior to FAF 
o Ensure aircraft will capture both the localizer and glideslope 
o Set Target Speed in MCP speed window when IM commanded speed transitions 
to FNL 
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H.3 Interval Management Pilot Procedures (specific to IFD) 
En route 
 Fly published procedure and Econ airspeed 
 Ensure LNAV and VNAV PATH are engaged 
 Ensure airspeed window on MCP is closed 
 Ensure 5000 ft set in MCP altitude window for OPD arrival 
Receive ATC Spacing Clearance 
 (PF, PM) Observe ATC prompt on EICAS 
 (PM) Press FMC COMM button on MCDU 
 (PM) Press LOAD  [6L] on MCDU to load clearance into IM pages 
 (PF) Press IM button on MCDU 
Verify accuracy and acceptability of ATC Spacing Clearance 
 (PF,PM) Verify correct data load on IM pages  (compare IM Pages on PF MCDU to 
CPDLC message on PM MCDU) 
o IM-S Page  
 [1L] RTA Waypoint is correct (if applicable) 
 [1R] RTA time value is correct (if applicable) 
 [2L] IM-S speed is acceptable to pilot 
o ACFT1 Page (select by pressing [4L] or NEXT PAGE button) 
 [1L] Aircraft1 Call sign is correct 
 [1R] Achieve By waypoint is correct 
 [2L] The type of spacing (Precision or NCT) is correct 
 [2R] Terminate AT waypoint is correct 
 [3L] IM Goal is correct 
 [3R] Aircraft1 Approach Speed is correct 
 [4L,5L] Aircraft1 routing is correct 
o ACFT2 Page (select by pressing [6L][4R] or NEXT PAGE button) 
 Verify same as ACFT1 
Acceptance or Rejection of Clearance 
 Check acceptability of clearance 
o (PF) Press ACTIVATE [6R]  
o Check that there is no UNABLE IM message [3L] 
o Is the commanded speed acceptable [2L] 
 If Clearance is acceptable 
o (PM) Click ACCEPT [5R] on CPDLC  ATC UPLINK page (last page) 
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o (PF) Activate IM Guidance 
 Press EXEC Key 
 Observe appearance of IM Speed cue above speed tape on PFD 
 Open speed window on MCP and set IM commanded speed 
o (PM) Inform ATC when paired with each aircraft  
 If Clearance is not Acceptable 
o (PM) Click REJECT button on MCDU [5L] on CPDLC  ATC UPLINK page (last 
page)
o  (PF) Erase IM Guidance 
 Press ERASE ALL [6L] 
Amendment to IM Clearance Procedures 
 (PM) CPDLC Clearance with a second aircraft or change in spacing requirements 
o Press IM key on MCDU page 
o Press TERMINATE [6R] on IM-S page 
o Press EXEC on MCDU 
o Follow Procedures for original clearance to load, verify, and accept 
 (PM) Voice Clearance for change in spacing requirements 
o Press IM button on MCDU 
o Press aircraft call sign [4L][4R] of affected aircraft 
o Enter new spacing information (time, distance, type) [2L][3L] 
o Press EXEC Key 
Arrival IM Procedures 
 (PF, PM) Airspeed Requirements 
o Observe and announce IM Speed changes on PFD 
o Set IM commanded speed in speed window on MCP 
o Configure aircraft as necessary to maintain IM commanded speed 
o Airspeed is safe and acceptable to the pilot for current conditions (See non normal 
below for action) 
 (PF, PM) Vertical Path Requirements 
o Verify VNAV SPD is active mode 
o Ensure aircraft starts a descent at Top of Descent (TOD) Point 
o Use drag and thrust as necessary to maintain VNAV path within ±200 feet 
o Monitor that aircraft stays on path and all restrictions will be met 
 (PF, PM) Spacing Requirements 
o Aircraft stays in conformance box  (if present) 
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o No EICAS or status messages (See non normal below for action) 
Final Segment IM Procedures 
  (PF, PM) Configuration and Energy Management 
o Extend Flaps prior to Min Flap maneuvering airspeed but no earlier than placard-
5 knots 
o Maintain least amount of flaps required to maintain IM speed 
o When IM Commanded speed transitions to FNL mode 
 Gear down 
 Flaps 20 
 Target Speed set in MCP Window 
 Configure as necessary to be stable by 1000 feet AGL 
 Automation Procedures 
o Aircraft will transition to VNAV PATH when flaps are extended 
o Arm approach mode between 6-2 miles prior to FAF 
o Ensure aircraft will capture both the localizer and glideslope 
o Set Target Speed in MCP speed window when IM commanded speed transitions 
to FNL 
Terminate IM Procedures 
Terminate due to crew preference, ATC instruction, or EICAS message. ATC issues an entire 
IM clearance; therefore, the flight crew terminates the entire IM clearance. That is, neither ATC 
nor the crew can selectively cancel one of the two aircraft in a two reference aircraft IM 
clearance. 
1) Flight crew notifies ATC they are terminating the IM clearance (time permitting, 
respond in same mode) 
2) Flight crew flies the last IM speed (shown on the PFD with RVT) until receiving 
further instructions from ATC 
3) (PM) Once new clearance is received from ATC pilots will terminate current IM 
Operation 
a. Press IM Key on MCDU 
b. ON IM-S Page press TERMINATE [6R] 
c. Press EXEC button on MCDU 
4) Reload new IM clearance if available 
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Table 19.  Non-Normal IM Procedures 
Alert
Level EICAS Message Meaning Pilot Action 
Caution IM DISENGAGED 
Loss of ownship flight path data, failure of 
the interface between the spacing algorithm 
and the aircraft avionics, ADS-B receiver 
failure, or other aircraft avionic failures 
Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
Caution IM AC 1 OFF PATH IM AC 2 OFF PATH 
Target aircraft is not on the flight path given 
by the ATC IM clearance 
Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
ATC may issue new 
clearance 
Caution IM AC 1 ADSB LOST IM AC 2 ADSB LOST Target aircraft ADS-B information is lost 
Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
Caution IM ERROR EXCESS 
IM spacing software determines it is not 
possible to meet the assigned RTA or 
spacing interval 
Execute Terminate Spacing 
Procedure 
ATC may issue new 
clearance 
Caution IM OWN BAD PATH 
Flight path provided by aircraft avionics to 
the spacing algorithm is invalid or not 
available prior to beginning IM operations 
Flight crew verifies correct 
IM information 
Caution IM OWN OFF PATH 
Aircraft is greater than 2.5 nmi laterally, 
6000 ft vertically, or 90 degrees of heading 
from the planned flight path 
Flight crew corrects to path, 
or updates FMS to reflect 
current flight path 
Caution IM AC 1 BAD PATH IM AC 2 BAD PATH 
IM spacing software has no path or an 
invalid flight path for that particular 
reference aircraft 
Flight crew verifies correct 
IM information 
Advisory IM DRAG REQD IM spacing software determines drag is required 
Ensure thrust levers at IDLE 
Deploy spoilers to return to 
flight path and commanded 
speed 
Advisory IM SPD LIMITED Speed is constrained by profile, Mmo, Vmo Advisory only, no action required 
Advisory IM AC 1 SPACING IM AC 2 SPACING IM has valid data to calculate spacing Flight crew notifies ATC 
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Appendix I: Spacing Interval Error Results 
Table 20 contains the average and route mean square (in seconds) for the spacing interval 
error for the piloted aircraft at the runway threshold (listed in arrival sequence for that scenario). 
Table 20.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square, all Platforms 
ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Sim Scenario Week1
Week
2
Week
3 Avg RMS Sim Scenario 
Week
1
Week
2
Week
3 Avg RMS 
None A10 A -4.5 -2.2 -4.4 -3.7 3.8 A04 B -4.2 1.0 -7.6 -3.6 5.0 
 IFD A (Cpt) 4.0 1.8 -2.8 1.0 3.0 A10 B -1.1 -1.5 4.5 0.6 2.8 
 A09 A -11.0 -2.8 -3.6 -5.8 6.9 DTS B (Cpt) 0.0 -4.1 2.4 -0.6 2.7 
 DTS A (Cpt) 3.0 -1.1 0.7 0.8 1.9 IFD B (Cpt) 0.1 6.8 -4.0 1.0 4.6 
 A05 A -1.8 -3.7 -4.4 -3.3 3.4 A09 B -5.6 -1.0 -4.9 -3.8 4.3 
 A04 A -16.3 -1.9 -8.6 -8.9 10.7 A05 B -1.5 -5.7 -6.2 -4.5 4.9 
Avg -4.4 -1.6 -3.8 -3.3  Avg -2.0 -0.8 -2.6 -1.8  
RMS 12.0 3.4 6.7  5.8 RMS 4.2 5.8 7.3  4.2 
Wind DTS C (Cpt) 5.0 3.6 6.8 5.1 5.3 A05 D 4.8 -9.2 0.6 -1.3 6.0 
 A09 C 7.6 5.2 -2.3 3.5 5.5 DTS D (Cpt) -0.6 3.9 6.1 3.1 4.2 
 A05 C 3.0 5.0 4.4 4.1 4.2 IFD D (Cpt) 4.4 -1.6 -0.7 0.7 2.7 
 A10 C 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 A04 D -4.1 2.8 2.3 0.3 3.2 
 A04 C -2.6 2.6 -0.2 -0.1 2.1 A10 D 2.0 0.4 1.6 1.3 1.5 
 IFD C (Cpt) 6.4 -8.7 5.0 0.9 6.9 A09 D NA 7.6 0.2 3.9 4.4 
Avg 4.1 2.1 3.1 3.1  Avg 1.3 0.7 1.7 1.2  
RMS 7.4 7.6 6.4  5.0 RMS 4.6 7.5 3.9  4.0 
Wind DTS G (FO) 6.8 4.9 3.2 4.9 5.2 A05 H 3.7 1.8 -0.6 1.6 2.4 
 A09 G 4.1 3.5 -1.8 2.0 3.3 DTS H (FO) 3.1 -1.7 3.8 1.7 3.0 
 A05 G 2.8 3.7 8.8 5.1 5.7 IFD H (FO) -0.2 4.3 -1.9 0.7 2.7 
 A10 G 5.0 5.6 3.0 4.5 4.6 A04 H -3.6 -4.4 -7.8 -5.2 5.5 
 A04 G 1.9 3.2 4.8 3.3 3.5 A10 H 1.6 -2.5 3.4 0.8 2.6 
 IFD G (FO) 6.6 2.5 2.8 3.9 4.4 A09 H -1.3 7.7 5.8 4.0 5.6 
Avg 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.9  Avg 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.6  
RMS 6.9 5.7 6.6  4.5 RMS 3.6 6.0 6.4  3.9 
Offset DTS J (Cpt) -5.1 2.9 3.1 0.3 3.8 A05 K 1.7 1.9 0.3 1.3 1.5 
 A09 J -4.4 -2.9 -8.3 -5.2 5.6 DTS K (Cpt) -6.5 -1.4 0.8 -2.4 3.9 
 A05 J -0.7 -2.6 -3.1 -2.1 2.3 IFD K (Cpt) 3.6 -7.8 -4.4 -2.9 5.6 
 A10 J -3.1 -2.7 -3.9 -3.2 3.2 A04 K -8.7 -2.4 -5.0 -5.4 6.0 
 A04 J -6.3 -3.0 -5.3 -4.8 5.0 A10 K -6.4 -2.3 -3.3 -4.0 4.3 
 IFD J (Cpt) 1.4 3.2 -1.1 1.1 2.1 A09 K -1.5 -3.2 -6.6 -3.7 4.3 
   -3.0 -0.8 -3.1 -2.3  -3.0 -2.5 -3.0 -2.8 2.8 
Avg 5.7 4.1 6.6  3.9 Avg 7.7 5.4 5.7  4.5 
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Table 20.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square (concluded) 
ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Sim Scenario Week1
Week
2
Week
3 Avg RMS Sim Scenario 
Week
1
Week
2
Week
3 Avg RMS 
Offset DTS L (FO) 0.0 -1.6 -1.6 -1.1 1.3 A05 M -2.4 1.9 2.3 0.6 2.2 
 A09 L -2.9 -4.0 -4.3 -3.7 3.7 DTS M (FO) 0.3 -4.4 0.1 -1.3 2.5 
 A05 L -7.2 -3.0 -2.0 -4.1 4.6 IFD M (FO) 5.0 -0.2 -4.3 0.2 3.8 
 A10 L -3.5 -3.4 -2.8 -3.2 3.2 A04 M -4.8 -6.3 -5.0 -5.3 5.4 
 A04 L -7.9 -3.5 -1.6 -4.3 5.0 A10 M -1.5 -0.9 -1.9 -1.4 1.5 
 IFD L (FO) 8.2 0.4 -0.3 2.7 4.7 A09 M -2.8 -2.2 0.4 -1.5 2.0 
Avg 2.2 2.5 2.1 -2.3  Avg -1.0 -2.0 -1.4 -1.5  
RMS 8.2 4.1 3.4  4.0 RMS 4.6 4.8 4.2  3.2 
Table 21 provides the subset of this data for the IFD only, Table 22 the data for the DTS 
only, and Table 23 combines the data from the IFD and DTS. Table 24 presents data by 
individual subject pilot or crew, and Table 25 provides a comparison of single versus two-crew 
simulators. All data is in seconds. 
Table 21.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square, IFD only 
ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Scenario Week 1
Week 
2
Week 
3 Avg RMS Scenario 
Week 
1
Week 
2
Week 
3 Avg RMS 
None A (Cpt) 4.0 1.8 -2.8 1.0 3.0 B (Cpt) 0.1 6.8 -4.0 1.0 4.6 
Wind C (Cpt) 6.4 -8.7 5.0 0.9 6.9 D (Cpt) 4.4 -1.6 -0.7 0.7 2.7 
 G (FO) 6.6 2.5 2.8 3.9 4.4 H (FO) -0.2 4.3 -1.9 0.7 2.7 
Offset J (Cpt) 1.4 3.2 -1.1 1.1 2.1 K (Cpt) 3.6 -7.8 -4.4 -2.9 5.6 
 L (FO) 8.2 0.4 -0.3 2.7 4.7 M (FO) 5.0 -0.2 -4.3 0.2 3.8 
Table 22.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square, DTS only 
ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Scenario Week 1
Week 
2
Week 
3 Avg RMS Scenario 
Week 
1
Week 
2
Week 
3 Avg RMS 
None A (Cpt) 3.0 -1.1 0.7 0.8 1.9 B (Cpt) 0.0 -4.1 2.4 -0.6 2.7 
Wind C (Cpt) 5.0 3.6 6.8 5.1 5.3 D (Cpt) -0.6 3.9 6.1 3.1 4.2 
 G (FO) 6.8 4.9 3.2 4.9 5.2 H (FO) 3.1 -1.7 3.8 1.7 3.0 
Offset J (Cpt) -5.1 2.9 3.1 0.3 3.8 K (Cpt) -6.5 -1.4 0.8 -2.4 3.9 
 L (FO) 0.0 -1.6 -1.6 -1.1 1.3 M (FO) 0.3 -4.4 0.1 -1.3 2.5 
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Table 23.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square, IFD and DTS 
ABSOLUTE (RTA)   RELATIVE (RTA+FIM)   
Error Scenario Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Avg RMS Scenario Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Avg RMS 
None A 3.5 0.3 -1.1 0.9 2.5 B 0.1 1.4 -0.8 0.2 3.8 
Wind C 5.7 -2.6 5.9 3.0 6.1 D 1.9 1.2 2.7 1.9 3.5 
 G 6.7 3.7 3.0 4.4 4.8 H 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.2 2.9 
Offset J -1.9 3.0 1.0 0.7 3.1 K -1.5 -4.6 -1.8 -2.6 4.8 
 L 4.1 -0.6 -1.0 0.8 3.5 M 2.7 -2.3 -2.1 -0.6 3.2 
Table 24.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square, by Flight Crew 
 ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Platform Scen. Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Scen. Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
None A04 A -16.3 -1.9 -8.6 B -4.2 1.0 -7.6 
Wind A04 C -2.6 2.6 -0.2 D -4.1 2.8 2.3 
Wind A04 G 1.9 3.2 4.8 H -3.6 -4.4 -7.8 
Offset A04 J -6.3 -3.0 -5.3 K -8.7 -2.4 -5.0 
Offset A04 L -7.9 -3.5 -1.6 M -4.8 -6.3 -5.0 
Avg -7.8 -0.7 -2.7 Avg -6.3 -2.3 -5.8 
RMS 8.7 2.9 5.0 RMS 5.4 3.8 5.9 
None A05 A -1.8 -3.7 -4.4 B -1.5 -5.7 -6.2 
Wind A05 C 3.0 5.0 4.4 D 4.8 -9.2 0.6 
Wind A05 G 2.8 3.7 8.8 H 3.7 1.8 -0.6 
Offset A05 J -0.7 -2.6 -3.1 K 1.7 1.9 0.3 
Offset A05 L -7.2 -3.0 -2.0 M -2.4 1.9 2.3 
Avg -1.0 -0.1 0.9 Avg 1.6 -2.3 -0.9 
RMS 3.8 3.7 5.1 RMS 3.1 5.0 3.0 
None A09 A -11.0 -2.8 -3.6 B -5.6 -1.0 -4.9 
Wind A09 C 7.6 5.2 -2.3 D NA 7.6 0.2 
Wind A09 G 4.1 3.5 -1.8 H -1.3 7.7 5.8 
Offset A09 J -4.4 -2.9 -8.3 K -1.5 -3.2 -6.6 
Offset A09 L -2.9 -4.0 -4.3 M -2.8 -2.2 0.4 
Avg -1.6 -0.2 -5.0 Avg -2.8 2.2 -1.3 
RMS 6.7 3.8 4.6 RMS 3.3 5.1 4.5 
None A10 A -4.5 -2.2 -4.4 B -1.1 -1.5 4.5 
Wind A10 C 4.9 5.1 5.1 D 2.0 0.4 1.6 
Wind A10 G 5.0 5.6 3.0 H 1.6 -2.5 3.4 
Offset A10 J -3.1 -2.7 -3.9 K -6.4 -2.3 -3.3 
Offset A10 L -3.5 -3.4 -2.8 M -1.5 -0.9 -1.9 
Avg -0.3 0.6 -0.7 Avg -1.3 -1.7 1.1 
RMS 4.2 4.0 3.9 RMS 3.2 1.7 3.1 
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Table 24.  Spacing Error Average and Route Mean Square (concluded) 
 ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Platform Scen. Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Scen. Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
None IFD A (Cpt) 4.0 1.8 -2.8 B (Cpt) 0.1 6.8 -4.0 
Wind IFD C (Cpt) 6.4 -8.7 5.0 D (Cpt) 4.4 -1.6 -0.7 
Wind IFD G (FO) 6.6 2.5 2.8 H (FO) -0.2 4.3 -1.9 
Offset IFD J (Cpt) 1.4 3.2 -1.1 K (Cpt) 3.6 -7.8 -4.4 
Offset IFD L (FO) 8.2 0.4 -0.3 M (FO) 5.0 -0.2 -4.3 
Avg 6.6 -0.2 0.9 Avg 3.2 0.4 -3.8 
RMS 5.8 4.4 2.9 RMS 3.4 5.1 3.4 
None DTS A (Cpt) 3.0 -1.1 0.7 B (Cpt) 0.0 -4.1 2.4 
Wind DTS C (Cpt) 5.0 3.6 6.8 D (Cpt) -0.6 3.9 6.1 
Wind DTS G (FO) 6.8 4.9 3.2 H (FO) 3.1 -1.7 3.8 
Offset DTS J (Cpt) -5.1 2.9 3.1 K (Cpt) -6.5 -1.4 0.8 
Offset DTS L (FO) 0.0 -1.6 -1.6 M (FO) 0.3 -4.4 0.1 
Avg 2.4 2.2 3.0 Avg -0.9 -1.9 3.3 
RMS 4.6 3.1 3.7 RMS 3.2 3.4 3.4 
Table 25.  Spacing Interval Error, by Single and Two-Crew Simulators 
ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Scenario Single-Crew Two-Crew Scenario Single-Crew Two-Crew 
None A -5.4 0.9 B -2.8 0.2 
Wind C 3.2 3.0 D 0.814 1.9 
 G 3.7 4.4 H 0.3 1.2 
Offset J -3.8 0.7 K -2.9 -2.6 
 L -3.8 0.8 M -1.9 -0.6 
Avg -1.2 2.0 Avg -1.3 0.0 
RMS 4.9 4.2 RMS 4.1 3.7 
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Appendix J: FIM Speed Change Results 
Table 26 tabulates the number of speed changes for each aircraft (listed in arrival sequence), 
for every scenario. 
Table 26.  FIM Speed Changes, by Simulator 
ABSOLUTE (RTA) RELATIVE (RTA+FIM) 
Error Scen Sim Callsign
Week
1
Week
2
Week
3 Avg Scen Sim 
Call
sign
Week
1
Week
2
Week
3 Avg 
None A A10 094 10 11 10 10.3 B A04 094 8 11 8 9.0 
 A IFD 163 9 7 7 7.7 B A10 163 14 10 9 11.0 
 A A09 557 8 8 8 8.0 B DTS 557 8 7 11 8.7 
 A DTS 328 14 9 9 10.7 B IFD 328 10 9 9 9.3 
 A A05 472 9 8 14 10.3 B A09 472 10 12 12 11.3 
 A A04 701 9 8 9 8.7 B A05 701 7 9 11 9.0 
Wind C DTS 094 12 9 12 11.0 D A05 094 21 19 14 18.0 
 C A09 163 17 18 18 17.7 D DTS 163 18 13 16 15.7 
 C A05 557 23 23 25 23.7 D IFD 557 17 15 19 17.0 
 C A10 328 15 15 15 15.0 D A04 328 14 10 13 12.3 
 C A04 472 15 14 17 15.3 D A10 472 12 12 14 12.7 
 C IFD 701 21 18 21 20.0 D A09 701 20 19 22 20.3 
Wind G DTS 094 13 12 11 12.0 H A05 094 19 20 17 18.7 
 G A09 163 18 18 15 17.0 H DTS 163 14 14 17 15.0 
 G A05 557 22 24 23 23.0 H IFD 557 18 14 21 17.7 
 G A10 328 16 15 15 15.3 H A04 328 13 14 15 14.0 
 G A04 472 17 15 16 16.0 H A10 472 12 14 12 12.7 
 G IFD 701 21 21 20 20.7 H A09 701 21 20 21 20.7 
Offset J DTS 094 10 9 9 9.3 K A05 094 15 12 14 13.7 
 J A09 163 11 9 10 10.0 K DTS 163 13 12 15 13.3 
 J A05 557 10 11 11 10.7 K IFD 557 16 14 15 15.0 
 J A10 328 9 9 7 8.3 K A04 328 12 13 15 13.3 
 J A04 472 12 11 12 11.7 K A10 472 12 11 15 12.7 
 J IFD 701 10 13 15 12.7 K A09 701 12 11 14 12.3 
Offset L DTS 094 7 9 9 8.3 M A05 094 15 13 13 13.7 
 L A09 163 10 11 11 10.7 M DTS 163 12 12 10 11.3 
 L A05 557 11 11 10 10.7 M IFD 557 16 15 14 15.0 
 L A10 328 8 9 11 9.3 M A04 328 11 16 12 13.0 
 L A04 472 12 9 12 11.0 M A10 472 16 11 11 12.7 
 L IFD 701 20 12 9 13.7 M A09 701 10 12 13 11.7 
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Table 27 and Figure 22 contain statistical analysis of the number of speed changes by 
scenario condition (control method and error type). 
Table 27.  Analysis of Speed Changes, by Condition 
Error Control Error  Control 
p < 0.0005 p = 0.032 p < 0.0005 
 No Error condition had the lowest 
number of changes, and the wind 
condition had the highest. 
More speed changes occurred when 
the "IM-S" Control Method was 
experienced. 
The effect of Error Type on the total 
number of speed changes was 
dependent upon Control Method used. 
None (Error #1):   
M = 9.500, SD = 1.920, N = 36 [C] 
RTA (Control #1): 
M = 12.922, SD = 4.662, N = 90 
[A] 
None / RTA: 
M = 9.278, SD = 1.994, N = 18 [C] 
Wind (Error #2): 
M = 16.676, SD = 3.691, N = 71 [A] 
RTA+FIM (Control #2): 
M = 13.618, SD = 3.453, N = 89 
[B] 
None / RTA+FIM: 
M = 9.722, SD = 1.873, N = 18 [C] 
Offset (Error #3): 
M = 11.792, SD = 2.461, N = 72 [B] 
  Wind / RTA: 
M = 17.222, SD = 3.986, N = 36 [A] 
    Wind / RTA+FIM: 
M = 16.114, SD = 3.323, N = 35 [A] 
None < Offset < Wind RTA < RTA+FIM Offset / RTA: 
M = 10.444, SD = 2.298, N = 36 [C] 
 Offset / RTA+FIM: 
M = 13.139, SD = 1.807, N = 36 [B] 
Figure 55.  Plot of Speed Changes, by Condition 
Error
Control
321
212121
20.0
17.5
15.0
12.5
10.0
Sp
dC
ha
ng
es
Interval Plot of SpdChanges
95% CI for the Mean
140
Appendix K: CPDLC Message Results 
Table 28 shows the flight crew Read (outlined in blue) and Respond (outlined in red) time in 
seconds to the Controller-Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC) message clearance, sorted 
from longest to shortest Respond time. The Message Received column is the time from scenario 
start until the CPDLC chime and EICAS message were presented to the crew. All times are 
based from when the CPDLC chime occurred until that a button was pushed by the flight crew. 
For example, the first row indicates it took the flight crew 22.0 seconds to read the CPDLC 
button to read the message, and 99.2 seconds to respond to it. See Table 2 for the description of 
Scenario (error source, control method, and replicate number), Figure 4 for a review of crew 
CPDLC procedures, and Figure 34 for required communication performance.  
The legend for the Note column is after the table. Three runs were dropped from this analysis 
(not included in table). They were due to:  (1) pilot manually load FIM clearance into the spacing 
software, (2) pilot flew the FIM speeds but could not find the ACCEPT button to respond to 
ATC, and (3) equipment failure in the Development and Test Simulator (DTS). 
Table 28.  CPDLC Message Respond Time, from Slowest to Fastest 
G
ro
up
Sc
en
ar
io
 
C
al
lsi
gn
Si
m
ul
at
or Message
received 
(chime,
light)
READ
(push 
button) 
LOAD
(enter 
clnc) 
ACTIVATE
(start
algorithm) 
RESPOND
(accept to 
ATC) 
EXEC 
(display 
speeds) 
Note
3 J NAS094 DTS 14.6 22.0 48.6 58.4 99.2 82.0 1
2 B NAS328 IFD 14.2 6.2 18.6 44.8 83.8 70.8 
3 B NAS557 DTS 99.0 7.4 41.0 59.6 82.0 84.6 
2 A NAS163 IFD 88.8 16.6 29.0 34.0 79.6 70.2 1
2 M NAS163 DTS 129.6 14.2 45.0 51.2 78.2 80.2 
2 B NAS701 A05 130.0 8.8 19.8 54.4 76.0 85.2 
2 M NAS557 IFD 139.6 2.6 14.4 36.4 74.6 55.0 1
3 L NAS701 IFD 169.2 6.6 13.8 20.2 73.4 53.8 1
2 K NAS094 A05 15.0 4.2 19.0 47.0 73.4 84.2 
2 M NAS094 A05 15.2 12.0 24.4 46.0 73.4 80.0 
3 A NAS328 DTS 14.4 7.2 21.4 32.0 72.0 60.6 1
3 M NAS163 DTS 129.6 6.6 41.6 45.2 70.0 72.0 
2 H NAS163 DTS 89.8 3.4 32.2 37.2 68.2 69.2 
2 C NAS701 IFD 129.8 9.6 25.6 34.6 66.4 57.4 1
3 J NAS557 A05 140.0 18.8 24.2 27.8 66.4 69.0 
2 K NAS557 IFD 139.6 3.2 23.0 29.2 66.4 55.6 1
3 C NAS094 DTS 9.8 13.2 23.2 30.6 64.8 71.6 
1 A NAS163 IFD 89.6 5.0 26.2 39.8 64.4 65.8 
2 J NAS701 IFD 169.6 4.8 25.6 40.6 63.4 54.0 1
1 H NAS163 DTS 89.4 9.6 13.2 41.6 63.2 63.0 2
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Table 28.  CPDLC Message Respond Time (continued) 
G
ro
up
Sc
en
ar
io
 
C
al
lsi
gn
Si
m
ul
at
or Message
received 
(chime,
light)
READ
(push 
button) 
LOAD
(enter 
clnc) 
ACTIVATE
(start
algorithm) 
RESPOND
(accept to 
ATC) 
EXEC 
(display 
speeds) 
Note
3 J NAS472 A04 160.0 6.4 18.8 40.8 62.2 76.4 
2 H NAS557 IFD 99.8 4.0 20.2 27.6 61.0 47.0 1
3 K NAS163 DTS 129.6 7.0 33.8 39.0 60.8 67.0 
2 H NAS094 A05 10.0 9.6 24.8 35.6 59.6 72.4 
1 K NAS328 A04 20.2 5.8 30.6 37.0 59.4 57.4 2
3 A NAS163 IFD 89.4 2.4 6.4 10.8 58.4 12.6 1
1 J NAS472 A04 160.0 23.0 30.6 15.8 57.4 58.6 
1 A NAS701 A04 130.0 21.2 24.6 14.0 56.8 61.2 
3 L NAS472 A04 160.0 4.0 11.6 13.4 56.8 35.6 1
3 D NAS163 DTS 89.6 4.8 18.0 32.4 56.4 62.4 
2 J NAS557 A05 140.0 7.8 17.2 30.2 54.6 64.8 
1 M NAS328 A04 20.0 9.6 23.4 18.4 53.8 47.4 2
2 C NAS094 DTS 9.8 10.2 22.2 33.4 52.2 53.8 
3 H NAS163 DTS 89.2 3.8 22.6 26.0 52.0 54.4 
3 L NAS094 DTS 14.2 12.4 22.0 27.4 51.8 56.4 
2 D NAS328 A04 15.0 5.8 9.0 21.4 51.6 46.0 2
3 D NAS328 A04 15.0 3.2 8.8 29.8 51.4 74.4 4
1 H NAS557 IFD 99.2 21.0 21.0 29.0 51.2 52.8 
3 B NAS094 A04 10.0 6.0 30.0 46.4 50.6 54.8 
2 D NAS701 A09 130.0 4.8 20.8 26.2 50.6 59.6 
2 D NAS557 IFD 99.4 3.0 21.2 25.8 50.0 33.6 1
2 J NAS094 DTS 14.6 4.6 15.6 26.6 49.4 51.4 
1 D NAS557 IFD 98.8 5.2 14.4 17.6 49.2 51.0 
1 D NAS328 A04 15.0 5.4 19.6 13.0 49.0 51.8 
2 D NAS094 A05 10.0 5.0 13.4 27.2 49.0 59.0 
1 K NAS557 IFD 139.0 9.4 29.0 32.2 49.0 52.6 
2 B NAS557 DTS 99.4 4.2 12.6 28.8 48.6 50.0 
1 J NAS557 A05 140.0 8.0 17.0 24.2 48.2 52.0 
1 M NAS557 IFD 139.6 2.8 21.4 24.4 48.2 49.2 
3 A NAS094 A10 10.2 8.2 15.6 27.2 48.0 49.0 
1 C NAS472 A04 120.2 17.0 25.4 11.8 48.0 49.8 
3 B NAS472 A09 120.0 3.4 17.8 24.6 47.6 48.8 
1 B NAS328 IFD 14.6 5.4 21.4 23.0 47.6 48.8 
3 A NAS701 A04 130.2 3.4 13.6 37.8 47.4 65.8 
2 H NAS472 A10 120.0 16.4 18.2 24.8 47.4 48.6 
3 K NAS557 IFD 139.6 2.2 15.8 21.2 47.4 41.4 
2 H NAS328 A04 15.0 7.8 11.6 35.6 46.6 50.0 
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Table 28.  CPDLC Message Respond Time (continued) 
G
ro
up
Sc
en
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io
 
C
al
lsi
gn
Si
m
ul
at
or Message
received 
(chime,
light)
READ
(push 
button) 
LOAD
(enter 
clnc) 
ACTIVATE
(start
algorithm) 
RESPOND
(accept to 
ATC) 
EXEC 
(display 
speeds) 
Note
1 G NAS094 DTS 8.8 3.0 6.2 22.2 46.2 43.6 2
1 B NAS094 A04 10.0 5.0 15.2 9.0 46.0 47.4 
2 B NAS163 A10 90.0 4.0 11.2 18.6 46.0 47.6 
3 M NAS557 IFD 139.6 2.0 11.4 17.8 45.8 40.2 2
3 J NAS163 A09 130.0 4.4 14.4 24.4 45.6 47.4 
1 H NAS328 A04 15.0 13.0 21.8 25.6 44.8 481.6 4, 5 
2 B NAS472 A09 120.0 7.8 18.8 23.4 44.2 49.0 
2 K NAS163 DTS 129.6 3.2 15.2 18.4 44.0 46.0 
2 J NAS163 A09 130.0 6.2 13.0 18.0 43.8 48.2 
2 K NAS701 A09 170.2 2.8 17.8 22.6 43.8 52.6 
2 G NAS557 A05 100.2 6.2 13.2 18.8 43.0 50.6 
2 L NAS094 DTS 14.2 6.4 14.0 17.4 42.8 43.6 
2 A NAS094 A10 10.0 14.6 17.6 22.8 42.6 44.0 
3 G NAS094 DTS 9.0 7.6 17.2 20.4 42.4 43.4 
3 G NAS701 IFD 129.0 3.4 9.4 14.8 42.4 36.8 2
2 A NAS472 A05 120.0 3.2 10.2 22.6 42.0 47.2 
1 G NAS701 IFD 128.8 3.0 15.2 18.0 41.6 42.8 
3 H NAS094 A05 10.0 6.2 15.0 22.2 41.6 45.8 
1 J NAS701 IFD 168.8 5.6 12.2 19.4 41.6 42.6 
3 K NAS328 A04 20.2 3.6 9.4 16.0 41.6 55.0 
1 K NAS163 DTS 129.0 8.2 12.0 17.2 41.6 43.2 
3 D NAS701 A09 130.0 7.2 12.8 20.2 41.4 42.4 
2 D NAS472 A10 120.0 4.4 11.6 20.2 41.4 43.2 
2 M NAS701 A09 170.2 5.2 14.6 18.6 41.4 47.4 
3 B NAS701 A05 130.0 4.6 15.0 21.6 41.2 50.2 
3 C NAS472 A04 120.0 4.2 18.0 19.6 41.2 43.2 
3 G NAS472 A04 119.8 3.2 16.0 18.6 41.0 59.6 4
3 D NAS557 IFD 99.6 2.0 14.0 18.2 41.0 38.8 2
3 C NAS701 IFD 129.8 3.0 12.6 17.6 40.4 38.4 2
3 J NAS701 IFD 169.6 2.6 11.2 17.2 40.4 39.4 2
1 G NAS472 A04 120.0 6.6 14.0 18.0 40.2 36.8 2
1 B NAS701 A05 130.0 3.6 6.8 16.2 40.0 41.2 
1 D NAS094 A05 10.0 4.6 10.2 14.6 40.0 40.8 
2 D NAS163 DTS 89.2 3.6 16.4 19.6 40.0 41.2 
2 A NAS328 DTS 14.0 5.0 16.8 19.8 39.8 41.4 
2 J NAS328 A10 20.0 6.4 12.2 18.0 39.8 43.0 
2 G NAS094 DTS 9.6 4.2 12.8 16.2 39.6 40.0 
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Table 28.  CPDLC Message Respond Time (continued) 
G
ro
up
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gn
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or Message
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(chime,
light)
READ
(push 
button) 
LOAD
(enter 
clnc) 
ACTIVATE
(start
algorithm) 
RESPOND
(accept to 
ATC) 
EXEC 
(display 
speeds) 
Note
1 L NAS328 A10 20.0 5.8 7.2 11.4 39.6 41.6 
2 C NAS328 A10 15.0 5.6 12.2 19.0 39.4 41.2 
2 C NAS163 A09 90.0 3.6 8.6 12.4 39.2 43.2 
1 L NAS557 A05 140.0 6.6 9.4 17.2 39.2 40.2 
1 L NAS701 IFD 168.8 2.6 8.4 14.0 39.2 41.6 
3 A NAS557 A09 100.2 8.6 14.6 18.6 38.8 41.8 
3 H NAS557 IFD 99.2 2.6 9.8 14.2 38.8 35.2 2
2 B NAS094 A04 10.0 2.4 8.6 15.4 38.6 36.0 2
1 G NAS557 A05 100.0 11.6 13.6 16.0 38.2 39.8 
2 J NAS472 A04 160.0 3.4 10.6 13.8 38.2 44.0 
2 L NAS557 A05 139.8 5.0 9.6 17.0 38.2 43.8 
1 M NAS163 DTS 129.6 2.8 10.0 12.6 38.2 33.0 2
3 B NAS328 IFD 14.2 5.8 10.8 16.6 38.0 19.0 1
1 A NAS557 A09 100.0 6.6 13.6 18.8 37.8 39.4 
1 L NAS094 DTS 13.8 5.2 8.0 16.0 37.8 38.0 
3 B NAS163 A10 90.0 4.2 14.4 16.6 37.4 41.8 
1 C NAS701 IFD 129.8 6.6 12.8 15.8 37.4 38.4 
2 C NAS557 A05 100.0 7.0 10.0 17.6 37.2 43.4 
3 C NAS557 A05 100.2 3.8 12.4 16.6 37.2 39.2 
3 C NAS163 A09 90.0 7.2 13.2 15.6 37.2 39.0 
3 H NAS472 A10 120.0 3.2 9.4 14.4 37.2 35.0 2
1 C NAS557 A05 100.0 7.0 9.2 14.2 37.0 38.2 
3 D NAS472 A10 120.0 4.2 7.6 15.4 37.0 38.4 
3 L NAS328 A10 20.0 9.0 11.8 19.4 37.0 38.0 
3 D NAS094 A05 10.0 3.4 10.6 15.2 36.8 42.4 
3 K NAS094 A05 15.2 2.6 12.6 16.6 36.8 46.0 
2 M NAS328 A04 20.2 6.0 8.4 13.6 36.6 35.2 2
3 G NAS557 A05 99.8 4.2 12.0 17.4 36.4 37.6 
3 H NAS701 A09 130.0 8.0 12.4 17.0 36.4 44.4 
3 L NAS163 A09 130.0 7.6 13.2 16.6 36.4 37.4 
1 M NAS094 A05 15.0 4.8 13.4 14.8 36.2 37.2 
3 A NAS472 A05 120.0 4.6 10.8 16.0 35.8 63.2 4
1 D NAS163 DTS 89.0 2.6 8.2 11.4 35.8 36.4 
1 J NAS094 DTS 13.8 3.8 10.8 13.6 35.6 37.2 
1 L NAS472 A04 160.0 4.8 12.8 15.2 35.4 36.4 
3 M NAS701 A09 170.0 8.0 12.6 16.2 35.2 36.2 
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Table 28.  CPDLC Message Respond Time (continued) 
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(chime,
light)
READ
(push 
button) 
LOAD
(enter 
clnc) 
ACTIVATE
(start
algorithm) 
RESPOND
(accept to 
ATC) 
EXEC 
(display 
speeds) 
Note
1 C NAS328 A10 15.2 4.6 10.4 15.2 35.0 36.0 
3 G NAS163 A09 89.8 6.0 12.6 15.6 34.8 36.2 
3 C NAS328 A10 15.0 6.4 13.2 16.2 34.8 36.2 
3 M NAS328 A04 20.0 3.2 9.4 11.6 34.8 55.0 4
3 M NAS472 A10 160.0 3.6 8.6 13.0 34.8 36.0 
2 K NAS472 A10 160.0 6.4 11.6 14.4 34.6 35.6 
3 G NAS328 A10 15.0 7.0 9.8 14.6 34.2 35.6 
2 A NAS701 A04 130.0 3.4 6.0 12.0 34.0 31.8 2
1 A NAS094 A10 10.0 5.4 7.8 12.4 34.0 36.6 
2 G NAS472 A04 120.0 5.4 8.0 12.0 34.0 32.0 2
3 L NAS557 A05 140.0 3.8 11.2 15.2 34.0 38.6 
2 C NAS472 A04 119.8 3.6 8.0 12.0 33.8 38.4 
2 G NAS328 A10 15.2 5.2 10.0 13.4 33.6 35.2 
2 H NAS701 A09 130.0 7.8 14.6 36.6 33.6 62.0 4
3 K NAS472 A10 160.2 3.4 9.0 13.2 33.2 34.0 
2 L NAS163 A09 129.8 3.0 7.0 10.8 33.0 37.2 
1 A NAS472 A05 120.0 12.6 15.6 28.4 32.8 39.4 
2 M NAS472 A10 160.2 5.8 9.4 12.8 32.6 33.2 
1 M NAS701 A09 170.0 4.0 8.0 9.4 32.4 28.0 2
1 G NAS163 A09 90.0 4.8 8.2 9.8 32.2 34.0 
1 D NAS472 A10 120.0 4.0 6.0 11.0 31.6 34.0 
3 K NAS701 A09 170.2 3.6 7.6 10.6 31.6 29.6 2
1 K NAS701 A09 170.2 1.8 8.4 12.4 31.4 33.0 
3 M NAS094 A05 15.2 2.6 8.2 12.2 30.8 32.2 
1 K NAS472 A10 160.2 2.6 5.0 9.6 30.8 34.0 
2 A NAS557 A09 100.0 3.0 8.6 11.8 30.6 35.6 
1 G NAS328 A10 15.0 4.2 8.6 10.4 30.6 29.2 2
1 J NAS328 A10 20.0 4.4 7.0 10.6 30.6 31.8 
2 L NAS472 A04 160.0 3.4 6.4 9.8 30.4 28.8 2
1 B NAS557 DTS 99.8 3.0 5.8 8.8 30.2 31.4 
1 H NAS701 A09 130.0 2.6 8.6 10.8 29.8 31.2 
1 L NAS163 A09 130.0 3.0 7.2 8.6 29.8 30.8 
2 L NAS328 A10 20.0 4.4 7.0 11.0 29.8 31.0 
2 G NAS163 A09 90.2 2.6 6.4 10.0 29.6 33.4 
1 M NAS472 A10 160.0 3.4 6.8 9.6 29.4 32.8 
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Table 28.  CPDLC Message Respond Time (concluded) 
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READ
(push 
button) 
LOAD
(enter 
clnc) 
ACTIVATE
(start
algorithm) 
RESPOND
(accept to 
ATC) 
EXEC 
(display 
speeds) 
Note
1 J NAS163 A09 130.0 3.0 7.0 8.6 28.8 29.8 
2 K NAS328 A04 20.0 2.6 5.6 10.0 28.8 32.2 
1 C NAS163 A09 90.2 3.2 8.0 9.4 27.8 29.2 
1 B NAS163 A10 90.0 3.2 4.8 8.4 27.6 30.2 
1 H NAS472 A10 120.0 4.0 6.8 8.2 27.6 28.6 
1 D NAS701 A09 130.0 2.4 6.2 7.6 27.4 29.4 
1 B NAS472 A09 120.0 1.4 3.4 7.2 26.8 28.0 
1 H NAS094 A05 10.0 2.2 4.0 8.0 26.6 35.0 
1 K NAS094 A05 15.2 9.2 12.8 19.2 25.8 34.6 
1 C NAS094 DTS 9.8 5.2 5.2 11.8 19.0 33.8 4
2 L NAS701 IFD 169.4 3.2 34.0 40.6 16.0 61.0 4
2 G NAS701 IFD 129.8 2.6 45.8 56.2 11.6 76.2 4, 6 
NOTES: 
1) Flight crew completed steps out of sequence; FIM was executed (display FIM speed on 
PFD and ND) well prior to sending ACCEPT message to ATC. Appears to be a lack of 
understanding or training by the flight crew, but not considered an operational issue for 
controllers or pilots. 
2) Flight crew completed steps out of sequence; FIM was executed (display FIM speed on 
PFD and ND) just prior to sending ACCEPT message to ATC. Appears to have been an 
incorrect sequence of button pushes by the pilot, and is not an operational issue for 
controllers or pilots. 
3) Flight crew did not send an ACCEPT message to ATC in a timely fashion. Appears to 
have been either caused by the pilot believing a message response had been sent or forgot 
to send a message response (even though the EICAS message remained on). This could 
be an operational issue for controllers. 
4) Flight crew did not EXECUTE the FIM clearance in a timely manner, resulting in a FIM 
speed available on the MCDU, but not shown on the PFD or ND. This would only 
become an operational problem if the flight crew were expecting the FIM speed to be 
shown on the PFD or ND, and did flew the published speed instead. 
5) Video review of this run indicated the pilot was very proficient (the seventh of ten runs), 
and flew the correct FIM speed based on the MCDU display. 
6) Second run for this pilot; he accidentally accepted the FIM clearance prior to loading and 
activating the clearance into the spacing software. He immediately recognized the error, 
and went back to load and activate the FIM clearance. 
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Appendix L: Post-Run Questionnaire Results 
The first part of this Appendix contains data for post-run questions appropriate for data 
analysis. The second part contains a list of comments from various parts of the questionnaire. 
Light gray shading indicates data not relevant for that cell. 
 Question #3:  Select the average workload experienced during the scenario using the 
Modified Cooper-Harper scale of 1 (easily attainable) to 10 (cannot be accomplished). 
Table 29.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Average Workload 
By Condition       
 RTA, No 
Error 
RTA, Wind 
Error 
RTA, Offset 
Error 
RTA+FIM,
No Error 
RTA+FIM,
Wind Error 
RTA+FIM,
Offset Error 
Median 1.8958 1.8542  1.8958 1.8542 2.0625 1.8125 
Sum of Ranks 84.5 76.0 90.0 80.5 100.0 73.0 
By Control Method      
 RTA RTA+FIM 
Mean 1.95 1.98 
Stand Dev 0.87 0.86 
By Error Type      
 No Error Wind Error Offset Error 
Mean 1.88 2.02 1.96 
Stand Dev 0.84 0.85 0.89 
By Simulator       
 ATOL DTS IFD 
Mean 2.23 1.65 1.77 
Stand Dev 0.97 0.71 0.59 
By PF/PM       
 Pilot Flying Pilot Monitor 
Mean 1.85 1.57 
Stand Dev 0.63 0.65 
 Question #5:  Select the peak workload experienced during the scenario using the Modified 
Cooper-Harper scale of 1 (easily attainable) to 10 (cannot be accomplished). 
Table 30.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Peak Workload 
By Condition       
 RTA, No 
Error 
RTA, Wind 
Error 
RTA, Offset 
Error 
RTA+FIM,
No Error 
RTA+FIM,
Wind Error 
RTA+FIM,
Offset Error 
Median 2.3750 2.0000 2.2083 1.9583 2.4167 2.0417 
Sum of Ranks 91.0 68.5 93.0 73.0 105.0 73.5 
By Control Method      
 RTA RTA+FIM 
Mean 2.30 2.33 
Stand Dev 1.03 1.00 
By Error Type      
 No Error Wind Error Offset Error 
Mean 2.15 2.39 2.33 
Stand Dev 1.07 0.93 1.05 
147
Table 30.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Peak Workload (concluded) 
By Simulator       
 ATOL DTS IFD 
Mean 2.63 1.90 2.12 
Stand Dev 1.02 0.92 0.88 
By PF/PM       
 Pilot Flying Pilot Monitor 
Mean 2.18 1.83 
Stand Dev 0.87 0.91 
 Question #7a:  How much attention was required (demand) on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high). 
Table 31.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Attention Required 
By Control Method      
 RTA RTA+FIM 
Mean 2.64 2.79 
Stand Dev 1.47 1.47 
By Error Type      
 No Error Wind Error Offset Error 
Mean 2.31 2.85 2.78 
Stand Dev 1.29 1.42 1.57 
By Simulator       
 ATOL DTS IFD 
Mean 3.25 2.42 1.95 
Stand Dev 1.51 1.41 0.93 
By PF/PM       
 Pilot Flying Pilot Monitor 
Mean 2.43 1.93 
Stand Dev 1.28 1.09 
 Question #7b:  How much spare attention was available on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high). 
Table 32.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Supply of Attention 
By Control Method      
 RTA RTA+FIM 
Mean 5.22 5.11 
Stand Dev 1.52 1.52 
By Error Type      
 No Error Wind Error Offset Error 
Mean 5.25 5.00 5.28 
Stand Dev 1.59 1.54 1.46 
By Simulator       
 ATOL DTS IFD 
Mean 4.71 5.23 6.00 
Stand Dev 1.40 1.81 0.97 
By PF/PM       
 Pilot Flying Pilot Monitor 
Mean 5.57 5.67 
Stand Dev 1.32 1.66 
148
 Question #7c:  How much understanding of events on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high). 
Table 33.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Understanding of Events 
By Control Method      
 RTA RTA+FIM 
Mean 6.24 6.29 
Stand Dev 0.93 0.86 
By Error Type      
 No Error Wind Error Offset Error 
Mean 6.23 6.24 6.31 
Stand Dev 0.93 0.84 0.93 
By Simulator       
 ATOL DTS IFD 
Mean 6.13 6.45 6.35 
Stand Dev 1.00 0.57 0.92 
By PF/PM       
 Pilot Flying Pilot Monitor 
Mean 6.38 6.42 
Stand Dev 0.72 0.81 
The following scale was used for responses shown in Table 34 and Table 35. 
 1 to 2: completely disagree or moderately disagree 
 2 to 3: moderately disagree to slightly disagree 
 3 to 4: slightly disagree or neutral 
 4 to 5: neutral to slightly agree 
 5 to 6: slightly agree to moderately agree 
 6 to 7: moderately agree to completely agree 
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Questionnaire responses shown in Table 34 and Table 35 use the following scale: 
 1 to 2: completely disagree or moderately disagree 
 2 to 3: moderately disagree to slightly disagree 
 3 to 4: slightly disagree or neutral 
 4 to 5: neutral to slightly agree 
 5 to 6: slightly agree to moderately agree 
 6 to 7: moderately agree to completely agree 
 Question #9:  How acceptable were the FIM operations on a scale of 1 to 7. 
Table 34.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Acceptability of FIM Operation 
 IFD DTS ATOL 
RTA
+
FIM
RTA PF PM No Error 
Wind
Error 
Offset
Error 
I was aware of commanded speed 
changes within an appropriate 
timeframe. 
6.53 
0.70 
6.52 
0.62 
5.61 
1.44 
6.05 
1.21 
6.08 
1.21 
6.63 
0.55 
6.42 
0.74 
5.96 
1.15 
6.02 
1.26 
6.17 
1.19 
I was able to implement the speed 
changes within an appropriate 
timeframe when the speed 
window was open. 
6.60 
0.69 
6.38 
0.90 
5.63 
1.30 
6.08 
1.12 
6.04 
1.21 
6.58 
0.62 
6.40 
0.96 
6.10 
1.13 
5.93 
1.25 
6.17 
1.08 
The commanded speed was 
operationally acceptable and 
appropriate.
6.22 
1.11 
6.43 
1.06 
5.78 
1.43 
5.96 
1.22 
6.14 
1.37 
6.13 
1.20 
6.52 
0.93 
6.54 
0.62 
5.75 
1.53 
6.10 
1.22 
The frequency of speed 
commands was acceptable at all 
times throughout the scenario. 
5.68 
1.47 
6.15 
1.16 
5.50 
1.52 
5.63 
1.42 
5.78 
1.47 
5.70 
1.50 
6.13 
1.13 
6.35 
0.91 
5.23 
1.56 
5.86 
1.39 
I was able to predict when speed 
changes would occur, before they 
were given. 
5.15 
1.40 
5.87 
1.14 
5.22 
1.42 
5.40 
1.36 
5.33 
1.40 
5.47 
1.26 
5.55 
1.40 
5.46 
1.32 
5.13 
1.42 
5.55 
1.33 
I maintained adequate awareness 
of my lead aircraft throughout the 
scenario. 
6.38 
0.90 
6.20 
1.16 
5.52 
1.33 
6.28 
0.93 
5.53 
1.41 
6.28 
1.01 
6.30 
1.08 
5.90 
1.31 
5.88 
1.25 
5.94 
1.24 
The events I experienced in this 
scenario are operationally 
realistic.
6.48 
0.65 
6.68 
0.85 
6.07 
0.88 
6.42 
0.63 
6.23 
1.03 
6.58 
0.59 
6.58 
0.91 
6.33 
0.75 
6.26 
0.90 
6.39 
0.88 
The flight crew procedures for 
this event are operationally 
feasible. 
6.58 
0.70 
6.73 
0.45 
6.22 
0.71 
6.38 
0.72 
6.49 
0.65 
6.60 
0.69 
6.72 
0.45 
6.48 
0.65 
6.43 
0.64 
6.43 
0.75 
The amount of head down time 
required to respond to CPDLC 
messages was acceptable. 
6.52 
0.79 
6.63 
0.55 
5.80 
1.48 
6.22 
1.15 
6.16 
1.28 
6.60 
0.81 
6.55 
0.53 
6.10 
1.34 
6.32 
1.11 
6.09 
1.25 
The time take to review and 
respond to CPDLC clearances did 
not detract from your ability to 
complete other critical tasks. 
6.47 
0.81 
6.73 
0.66 
5.72 
1.50 
6.20 
1.19 
6.12 
1.34 
6.58 
0.89 
6.62 
0.58 
6.06 
1.39 
6.26 
1.15 
6.10 
1.30 
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 Question #10:  How acceptable was the FIM spacing tool on a scale of 1 to 7. 
Table 35.  Mean and Standard Deviation for Acceptability of FIM Spacing Tool 
 IFD DTS ATOL 
RTA
+
FIM
RTA PF PM No Error 
Wind
Error 
Offset
Error 
There was a time in the scenario 
where you thought it was unsafe 
to fly the commanded speed. 
1.45 
1.16 
1.01 
0.13 
1.41 
0.76 
1.35 
0.84 
1.29 
0.78 
1.22 
0.78 
1.25 
0.91 
1.23 
0.59 
1.48 
1.10 
1.21 
0.46 
There was a time in the scenario 
where you thought the 
commanded speed would not get 
you to the runway threshold at the 
correct time. 
1.55 
1.10 
1.17 
0.69 
1.56 
0.92 
1.47 
0.99 
1.45 
0.88 
1.40 
0.89 
1.32 
0.98 
1.50 
1.13 
1.52 
0.97 
1.38 
0.77 
The FIM commanded speed 
interrupted you while you were in 
the process of completing other 
critical tasks. 
2.20 
1.27 
1.65 
0.94 
3.18 
1.73 
2.48 
1.55 
2.63 
1.64 
2.00 
1.25 
1.85 
1.04 
2.42 
1.49 
2.63 
1.56 
2.55 
1.69 
There was a time in the scenario 
where the spacing tool behaved in 
an unexpected manner. 
2.15 
1.46 
1.67 
1.39 
2.23 
1.73 
2.12 
1.57 
2.02 
1.62 
2.15 
1.61 
1.67 
1.20 
1.60 
1.35 
2.48 
1.76 
1.89 
1.44 
There was a time in the scenario 
where you felt that the 
commanded speed or other 
information available from the 
spacing tool conflicted with other 
information available through 
ATC, CDTI, voice comm., etc. 
1.93 
1.27 
1.33 
0.91 
1.78 
1.26 
1.68 
1.18 
1.74 
1.23 
1.65 
1.20 
1.62 
1.09 
1.60 
1.23 
1.92 
1.39 
1.55 
0.95 
There was a time in the scenario 
where you felt uncomfortable 
with the commanded speed. 
1.67 
1.43 
1.10 
0.30 
1.71 
1.31 
1.56 
1.24 
1.53 
1.17 
1.40 
1.08 
1.37 
1.07 
1.40 
0.96 
1.74 
1.50 
1.43 
0.94 
There was a time in the scenario 
where you felt frustrated by the 
spacing tool. 
2.20 
1.52 
1.63 
1.29 
2.66 
1.75 
2.08 
1.49 
2.50 
1.75 
1.97 
1.41 
1.87 
1.40 
1.73 
1.16 
2.69 
1.80 
2.17 
1.58 
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This portion of the Appendix contains selected comments from various post-run questions. 
This format is used since the subject pilots tended to record their responses in several locations. 
 “Spent more head down time than was comfortable after FIM clearance was received 
but waiting for software to calculate a speed. No one was watching the aircraft.” 
 “Felt that an enormous amount of attention was required to stay on the vertical path 
while maintaining the required speed.” 
 “Drag Required message on EICAS triggered when aircraft already slowing. Other 
times the message seemed inappropriate, and the crew disregarded it.” 
 “Using both MCDUs at the same time to interact with CPDLC and FIM software was 
a bit confusing.” 
 “Not able to predict when the next FIM speed change would occur.” 
 “Workload for FIM operation seemed to peak as aircraft is intercepting the 
glideslope and the crew configuring the flaps.” 
 “RTA only scenario was easier than previous RTA+FIM scenario.” 
 “Changes to FIM speed were not always noticed, need more alerting. As a 
consequence, spent more time than normal monitoring airspeed and indications.” 
 “Too many FIM speed reversals (speed up followed by a slow down).” 
 “I am getting used to the FIM procedures and speed changes, and can more easily 
anticipate what it is doing and what it will do.” 
 “Frequency changes and traffic point outs were realistic, and caused some 
distraction.”
 “Need to smooth out number of FIM speed changes.” 
 “CPDLC procedures requires too many steps. Needs to be streamlined.” 
 “Not operationally realistic to command a speed up that also requires the flaps to be 
raised (very occasional okay, but not routinely).” 
 “Do not understand why speed were what they were, and why it changed so often.”  
[Note:  A review of these comments show almost all were written during Wind Error 
scenarios where a significant wind shear occurred on the turn to final.]
 “I think it would help scan/awareness if the FIM speed command box flashed as well 
as boxed during the ten second speed change command. This would aid in drawing 
attention to the box. It just doesn't stand-out enough for me from the other autoflight 
green command lights on the PFD.” 
 “We get better flying the FIM procedures the more we repeat them. I wonder how a 
line crew would do after training, and then not actually seeing a FIM approach for 
months, then being called on to do one.”
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Appendix M: Post-Experiment Questionnaire Results 
The first part of this Appendix contains data for post-experiment questions appropriate for 
data analysis. The second part contains excerpts of comments collected from the pilots. 
 Question #3:  Select the average workload experienced during the scenario using the 
Modified Cooper-Harper scale of 1 (easily attainable) to 10 (cannot be accomplished). 
Table 36.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Overall Workload 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
3. Was the workload required to operate the simulator 
much less than, the same as, or greater than the workload 
required to fly an actual aircraft? 
4.08 
1.68 
4.33 
1.03 
4.50 
0.84 
4.25 
1.33 
 Question #7:  How much additional workload do you think would be required to conduct 
FIM procedures while flying Optimized Profile Descents using a scale of 1 (much more) to 7 
(much less)? 
Table 37.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Additional Workload due to FIM Operations 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
7. In a real world environment, how much additional 
workload do you think would be required to carry out the 
spacing procedures while flying the Optimized Profile 
Descent (OPD) compared to current step-down 
procedures? 
3.67 
1.78 
4.33 
1.03 
3.83 
0.75 
3.88 
1.39 
 Question #9:  How difficult do you think it will be for a typical flight crew to learn and 
integrate FIM procedures into their current daily operations using a scale of 1 (very difficult) 
to 7 (very easy)? 
Table 38.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Learning FIM Operations 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
9. How difficult do you think it would be for a typical 
flight crew to learn and integrate the IM spacing 
procedures into their current daily operational flight 
procedures?  
4.83 
1.47 
4.00 
1.90 
4.67 
1.51 
4.58 
1.56 
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 Question #10:  What is your overall assessment of the safety of the FIM procedures 
compared to current day operations using a scale of 1 (not safe at all) to 7 (much more safe). 
Table 39. Mean and Standard Deviation of Safety of FIM Procedures 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
10. Given the experience with FIM that you gained during 
this simulation, what is your overall assessment of the 
safety of the spacing procedure compared with current day 
operations?  
4.92 
1.24 
5.17 
0.75 
4.50 
1.22 
4.88 
1.12 
 Question #12:  Impact to operations when electronic data tags do not match the voice callsign 
on a scale of 1 (insurmountable issue) to 5 (not an issue at all). 
Table 40.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Tag and Voice Callsign Confusion 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
12. ATC controllers are accustomed to aircraft callsign 
data tags they see on their radar scope not matching the 
respective voice callsign or airline name (examples include 
Airtran Airways has a “TRS” data tag but pronounced 
“Citrus”,ġ and Express Jet Airlines has a “BTA” data tag 
but pronounced “JetLink”). Was it an issue to correlate 
verbal ATC instructions with the CPDLC instructions? 
3.50 
1.09 
3.67 
1.03 
4.00 
0.89 
3.67 
1.01 
 Question #25a:  The FIM spacing tool behaves in a predictable manner using a scale of 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
Table 41.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Spacing Tool Predictability 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
25a. Based on my experience during this simulation, the 
spacing tool behaves in a predictable manner. 
6.08 
0.51 
6.00 
0.63 
6.00 
0.63 
6.04 
0.55 
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 Question #25b:  It is important to be able to predict changes to the FIM Commanded Speed 
using a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
Table 42.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Speed Change Predictability 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
25b. It is important to be able to predict changes to the 
commanded speed before they occur. 
5.58 
1.24 
5.83 
1.17 
4.83 
1.47 
6.04 
0.55 
 Question #25c:  The use of CPDLC messages was operationally acceptable as simulated in 
this experiment on a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
Table 43.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Use of CPDLC Acceptability 
 ATOL DTS IFD All 
25c. The use of CPDLC messages were operationally 
acceptable as simulated in this experiment. 
6.17 
1.03 
6.67 
0.52 
6.00 
1.55 
6.25 
1.07 
A list of the post-experiment comments are given below. 
 “I believe the scenarios to be very realistic. I did feel that the several speed changes 
during the final phase was annoying, however I also realized with the IM spacing, that 
this may be necessary to "keep the gap" correct. I can tell you that my task saturation 
was very high at the beginning of the training and very low at the end.” 
 “The scenarios were well thought out and reasonably realistic. Having this many pilots 
and controllers working together, improved the realism of the scenarios immensely.” 
 “The most confusing and distracting part of flight in the terminal area is the volume of 
radio traffic. There was very little traffic on the radio in these scenarios.” 
 “Having more information on the spacing tool would help me do my job better. I believe 
a little more time spent on briefing or teaching the pilots the why, what, were, when and 
how would be more beneficial.” 
 “No training should be required to perform the scenarios with level of experience we 
have.”
 “Do not believe that data tags (as seen on controller scopes and cockpit avionics) that 
are different than the voice callsigns is an issue.” 
 “Procedure of setting speed in Mode Control Panel (MCP) added to workload, 
especially in weather conditions.” 
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 “Need clearance to intercept the glideslope further out if the arrival connects to an 
approach. Should also try some scenarios using Area Navigation (RNAV) approaches.” 
 “Consider slower decel rates below 250 knots. Also need better speed alerting, especially 
when MCP speed window is open.” 
 “The Flight deck Interval Management (FIM) conformance box gave me a general idea 
where I was, but not enough to tell me exactly where I was. I found myself using the IM 
page on the Flight Management Computer (FMC) to determine the number of seconds I 
was ahead/behind.  Having that data alongside own aircraft on the Navigation Display 
(ND) might be more beneficial.” 
 “I couldn't make out the conformance box. It was difficult to see on my display and it was 
further hidden by mileage on the route or by airports (blue circles) that we flew over. I 
don't think it added anything to make the system better. In my opinion, it was a 
nuisance.” 
 “Once I'm below 10,000 ft MSL, I really don't want to be bothered by Controller-Pilot 
Datalink Communications (CPDLC) messages, especially if the weather is bad or there is 
high terrain in the area.” 
 “The deceleration commands should accommodate the flap extension schedule speeds of 
the aircraft. For example, the Boeing 747-400 aircraft takes a long time to get to flaps 5, 
but then quickly extends flaps after that. So, the large deceleration to final approach 
speed should commence with flaps 5 or more, not from a speed where flaps 1 would be 
appropriate. Ideally, once below 10,000 feet, I would like to see only 3 commands, one 
for roughly 240 knots, one for roughly 200 knots, and one for final approach speed.” 
 “I liked the target speed trend green "equals sign" on the speed tape. This helped me 
determine and adjust target deceleration/acceleration rates which allowed for smoother 
transitions and fewer self-inflicted FIM generated speed changes.” 
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